Publications of Katalin Farkas

Belief may not be a necessary condition for knowledge

Most discussions in epistemology assume that believing that p is a necessary condition for knowing that p. In this paper, I will present some considerations that put this view into doubt. The candidate cases for knowledge without belief are the kind of cases that are usually used to argue for the so-called 'extended mind' thesis.

Budek T, Farkas K. Which Causes of an Experience are Also Objects of the Experience? In: Brogaard B, editor. Does Perception Have Content? Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press; 2014. p. 351-69.

Which Causes of an Experience are Also Objects of the Experience?

It is part of the phenomenology of perceptual experiences that objects seem to be presented to us. The first guide to objects is their perceptual presence. Further reflection shows that we take the objects of our perceptual experiences to be among the causes of our experiences. However, not all causes of the experience are also objects of the experience. This raises the question indicated in the title of this paper. We argue that taking phenomenal presence as the guide to the objects of perception, we can see that at least in two sensory modalities, smell and touch, there is no uniform answer to this question. The objects of olfactory and tactile experiences can move along the causal chain. Accordingly, the content of olfactory and tactile experience may vary.

Bodnár I. Szuperveniens dualizmus. In: Farkas K, Orthmayr I, editors. Bölcselet és analízis. Budapest: ELTE Eötvös Kiadó; 2003. p. 83-92.