Constructing a world for the senses

TitleConstructing a world for the senses
Publication TypeBook Chapter
AuthorsFarkas, K.
EditorsKriegel, Uriah
Book TitlePhenomenal Intentionality
PublisherOxford University Press
Place of PublicationNew York and Oxford
Publisher link

It is an integral part of the phenomenology of mature perceptual experience that it seems to present to us an experience-independent world. I shall call this feature 'perceptual intentionality'. In this paper, I argue that perceptual intentionality is constructed by the structure of more basic sensory features, features that are not intentional themselves. This theory can explain why the same sensory feature can figure both in presentational and non-presentational experiences. There is a fundamental difference between the intentionality of sensory experiences and the intentionality of thoughts: unlike the former, the latter is not constructed.

Department of Philosophy
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