Katalin Farkas
Academic rank:
Professor
Department of Philosophy
Building:
Zrinyi u. 14
Phone number:
+36 1 327 3000 Qualifications:
MA in Mathematics and Philosophy, Eötvös Loránd University, Budapest
PhD in Philosophy, Hungarian Academy of Sciences
DSc in Philosophy, Hungarian Academy of Sciences
Academic/Professional Experience and Achievements:
My papers are available from my academia.edu page and on PhilPapers
Katalin Farkas's main area of research is the philosophy of mind. In her book, The Subject's Point of View (Oxford University Press, 2008) she defended an uncompromising internalism about the mental, and an equally uncompromising conception of the phenomenal availability of mental features. Perhaps unsurprisingly, she has great admiration for Descartes, and hopes to make a modest contribution to restoring his reputation after a century or so of bad press.
In recent years, Farkas has been working on the nature of perceptual experiences, where she hopes to combine a philosophical investigation about the phenomenal character of experiences with a study of empirical results from the psychology. Her current project is to create an empirically informed philosophical account of standing states, especially of beliefs.
Katalin Farkas was born and educated in Budapest, and after a few years of teaching at the Eotvos Lorand University, she joined CEU in the year 2000, when the Philosophy Department was founded. She was the head of the department between 2007 and 2010 and served as Provost and Academic Pro-Rector of CEU between 2010 and 2014. She had been a Junior Fellow at the Collegium Budapest, a visitor at the University of Sydney, The Center for Subjectivity Research in Copenhagen, the RSSS at the Australian National University in Canberra, and the holder of the Kerstin Hesselgren Visiting Chair at the University of Stockholm. In 2012, she was elected as a member of the Academia Europaea.
CV attachment:
Affiliations:
Department of Philosophy
Academic/research topics:
philosophy of mind
epistemology
Descartes
externalism/internalism debate
PERCEPTION (Philosophy)
Selected Publications:
The subject's point of view ; Oxford University Press, 2008
Metaphysics: a guide and anthology ; Oxford University Press, 2004
Constructing a world for the senses ; Oxford University Press, 2013
Courses taught by Katalin Farkas
| Epistemology | 2013/2014 |
| Varieties of Scepticism | 2012/2013 |
| Epistemology 2012/13 | 2012/2013 |
| Being | 2011/2012 |
| Epistemology 2011/12 | 2011/2012 |
| Knowledge and Scepticism | 2009/2010 |
| Epistemology 2009/10 | 2009/2010 |
Projects with involvement of Katalin Farkas
| Human Project |
Projects led by Katalin Farkas
Theses supervised by Katalin Farkas
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Sense of Self and Sense of Body: A study of experiential subjecthood and its theories Year of enrollment: 2008/2009 |
Publications
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The subject's point of view. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008.
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Metaphysics: a guide and anthology. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004.
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Modern metafizikai tanulmányok, Edited by F. Huoranszki and K. Farkas. Budapest: ELTE Eötvös Kiadó, 2004.
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Bölcselet és analízis, Edited by K. Farkas, Imre Orthmayr and János Kelemen. Budapest, Hungary: ELTE Eötvös Kiadó, 2003.
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Nyelvfilozófia. Áron Kiadó, 2002.
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"Constructing a world for the senses." In Phenomenal Intentionality, edited by Uriah Kriegel, 99-115. New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013.
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"A sense of reality." In Hallucination : philosophy and psychology, edited by Fiona MacPherson and D. Platchais, 399-417. Cambridge: MIT Press, 2013.
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"Independent intentional objects." In The Analytical Way: Proceedings of the 6th European Congress of Analytic Philosophy, 149-165. London: College Publications, 2010.
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"Nyelvfilozófia." In Filozófia, edited by G. Boros, 1273-1288. Budapest: Akadémiai Kiadó, 2007.
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"Semantic internalism and externalism." In The Oxford handbook of philosophy of language, edited by E. Lepore and B. C. Smith, 323-340. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006.
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"Is the whole world thinkable?" In Mind in world : essays on John McDowell's Mind and world, edited by J. Boros, 135-141. Pécs: Barmbauer, 2005.
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""Sajátos és eredeti módon" Frege az indexikus kifejezésekről." In Minden filozófia "nyelvkritika" II : . Analitikus filozófia és fenomenológia, edited by K. Neumer and J. Laki, 54-68. Budapest, Hungary: Gondolat, 2004.
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"Mitől tudatos egy cselekedet?" In Bölcselet és analízis, edited by K. Farkas and I. Orthmayr, 170-186. Budapest: ELTE, 2003.
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"Tartalom és jelölet." In Bölcselet és analízis, edited by K. Farkas and I. Orthmayr, 61-73. Budapest, Hungary: ELTE Eötvös Kiadó, 2003.
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"Externalizmus és önismeret." In Kitolási szakasz : fiatal filozófusok antológiája, edited by K. Kukla and T. Sutyák, 238-248. Budapest, Hungary: Balassi Kiadó, 1997.
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Laird Addis: Ontology and Explanation: Collected Papers In Addis, L. (2008). Mind: Ontology and explanation : collected papers 1981-2005. Frankfurt: Ontos. Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews , no. 2008.08.17., 2008.
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The Threefold Cord: Mind, Body and World In Putnam, H. (1999). The threefold cord: Mind, body, and world. New York: Columbia University Press. Vol. 112. Mind 112, no. 448., 2003.
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A szkepticizmus kihívása In Újvári Márta: A szkepticizmus kihívása Áron Kiadó, 1996. Vol. 10. Buksz 10, no. 4., 1998.
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"O Sentido Determina a Referência." In The Explanation of Human Interpretation. Proceedings of the conference Mind and Action III, 389-397. Lisboa: Ediçoes Colibri, 2005.
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"Practical know-wh." Noûs 51 (2017): 855-870.
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"Know-wh does not reduce to know-that." American Philosophical Quarterly 53, no. 2 (2016): 109-122.
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"Two versions of the extended mind thesis." Philosophia 40, no. 3 (2012): 435-447.
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"Not every feeling is intentional." European Journal of Analytic Philosophy 5, no. 2 (2009): 39-52.
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"Time, tense, truth." Synthese 160, no. 2 (2008): 269-284.
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"Phenomenal intentionality without compromise." Monist 91, no. 2 (2008): 273-293.
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"Emotions In The Natural World: Foreword." European Journal of Analytic Philosophy, no. 2 (2006): 5-6.
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"Indiscriminability and the Sameness of Appearance." Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 106, no. 2 (2006): 207-227.
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"The unity of Descartes's thought." History of Philosophy Quarterly 22, no. 1 (2005): 17-30.
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"Ismeretség és leírás." Világosság, no. 12 (2005): 53-60.
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"What is externalism?" Philosophical Studies 112, no. 3 (2003): 187-208.
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"Does Twin Earth Rest on a Mistake?" Croatian journal of philosophy 3, no. 8 (2003): 155-169.
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"A tárgyak megnevezése: az ágostoni nyelvkép kritikája a Vizsgálódásokban." Világosság 42, no. 2-3 (2001): 39-46.
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"Tőzsér János könyvérol." Magyar Filozofiai Szemle 45, no. 3 (2001): 431-438.
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"Néhány megjegyzés az externalista elméletek értelmezésérol." Magyar Filozofiai Szemle 45, no. 1-2 (2001): 35-43.
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"Szkepticizmus és filozófiai gondolkodás." Világosság 41, no. 4 (2000): 59-78.
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"Egy nagyon globális szkepticizmus." Magyar Filozofiai Szemle, no. 3-4 (1997): 618-622.
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"Lehetséges-e feminista ismeretelmélet?" Világosság, no. 1 (1997): 74-79.
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"A konceptuális sémák érdemeirõl és fogyatékosságairól." Világosság, no. 6 (1995): 21-26.
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"De wereld interpreteren." Krisis: Tijdschrift voor actuele filosofie (1995).
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"A név nem kötelez." Café Bábel 42, no. 4 (2001): 67-71.
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