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CITIZEN EMPOWERMENT AND E-GOVERNMENT APPLICATION: DIFFERENCES IN 27 EU COUNTRIES

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Abstract

E-government has added to the transformation of the public sector worldwide. It has complemented the reforms in the public administration, as well as the necessity for public consultation in policy-making at the beginning of the 21st century. The present study offers both an analytical framework of and empirical evidence on the key aspects of online engagement initiatives in the countries of the European Union. It focuses on top-down opportunities of online civic participation through the ministerial websites of education in the EU27 by providing a classificatory typology meant to assess the development of e-government in connection with initiatives for public engagement, based on two dimensions: interactivity and public outreach. The findings of this research, conducted in May 2009, point towards a trend of increased access to information in education-related policy-making, with 93% of the cases scoring high on this aspect. However, only 32% of the websites analyzed proved successful on the public outreach dimension. A comparison between Western and Eastern Europe e-government web-based applications reveals slightly lower standards for the post-communist countries, with the potential of fast modernization.

1. Introduction

One decade and a half have passed since the birth of electronic government in US. E-government represents to the delivery of information and public services through internet technology twenty-four hours a day, seven days a week. In the last decade,
EU has made electronic government a priority, but discrepancies in online civic engagement at the level of national governments across member-states remain visible.

In recent times, e-government has been successfully applied in a wide range of activities conducted through the national public administration, from the payment of utility bills to passport application, while online platforms have facilitated the exchange of information between different departments dealing with public affairs. As different studies showed\(^3\), not only did e-government perfect the daily bureaucratic works, but also improved citizen interaction with government in general. Nevertheless, the degree to which the regular citizen is active in shaping policies that concern him directly through the means of information and communication technologies (hereafter ICT) is still limited. Concurrently, the supply side contributes extensively to creating the nowadays picture of the implementation of online government policies, as opportunities offered shape the demands raised and strengthen the support for increased participation.

While measures have been constantly taken in the European Union from 2001 onwards for the use of ICT in the public sector, much of what has been done already is restricted to providing information via web-based applications. The present study can be placed on the supply-side perspective, with its research question aiming to examine in which of the EU member states the governmental websites are offering extended opportunities for online civic participation. Whereas the specific ministries for the adoption and development of ICT are constantly monitored by different national and international-level organization, the study of other ministerial websites has remained relatively unexplored. Thus, the inquiry has concentrated around the national ministries of education, which are particularly attention-grabbing for two major reasons: the interest of the government in introducing ICT-related changes through the means of public education and the interest of the citizens in participating in educational policymaking which affects both themselves and future generations.

These websites have been analyzed in May 2009 based on two dimensions of online civic engagement – interactivity and public outreach. The results have been incorporated into a classificatory typology of civic engagement of e-citizens in the framework of electronic government evolution.

The practical relevance of this study consists in offering a clear picture of e-government implementation in EU member-states in 2009 for the ministerial websites of education, which could constitute the ground for increased cooperation and best practice exchange between national governments. Further implications concern the degree of indirect communication and the increased transparency of ministries that offer electronic access to different types of documents and provide for mechanisms of online participation in the decision-making process. Having informed citizens able to question different bureaucratic departments and participate in the public debates represents a step forward in eliminating corruption and strengthening the democratic accountability of officials. The document uniformity brought about by the introduction of e-government also raises the question of data standards and recommended actions. The present empirical research offers an overview of the extent to which these procedures have been realised and allow for extensive citizenry engagement.

The meaning of e-government and the literature on online citizen participation in policy-making is scrutinized throughout the first part. The following section puts into perspective and introduces the dimensions for creating a theoretical framework of analysis. The third part describes the research design and methodology and suggests the creation of a typology based the government-led online opportunities of national ministries of education in all EU countries. The findings are discussed extensively in the fourth section and a comparison between the situation in the older and newer member states is put forward. Finally, conclusions are drawn for future research directions.
2. From Access to Information to Civic Empowerment

A variety of definitions for e-government exist⁴. A comprehensive definition is the one provided by Koh and Prybutok⁵ as e-government being “the use of information and communication technology in all facets of the operation of a government organization”. Building on this, the manner in which the European Commission describes digital government includes the desirable effects as well. By “the use of information and communication technologies (ICT) in public administrations combined with organizational change and new skills in order to improve the public services and democratic processes and strengthen support to public policies”⁶, the EC adds the importance of the online public consultation as part of its description. While various international sources⁷ use their own designation in reference to e-government, what they have in common when defining electronic government is the use of information technology for the delivery of public services to citizens, businesses, and other government agencies, while enabling interaction beyond the traditional office time and space constraints. For the purpose of this article, e-government is understood particularly in connection with web-based applications for the use of citizens.

In spite of the fact that the purposes of developing e-government range from the accelerated modernization of the public administration communication services to the efficient management of the welfare state, Löfstedt⁸ argues that it is largely about “enhancing democratic processes and also about

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⁷ For example World Bank, UN or Global Business Dialogue on Electronic Commerce.
using new ideas to make lives easier for the citizen by, for example, transforming government processes, enabling economic development and renewing the role of government, itself, in society”.

In Europe, the main concern in the recent years has concentrated around the lack of consistency in the strategy defined for the genuine definition and real implementation of the electronic government policy. Alabau⁹ points to the fact that there are many opportunities to improve this field of action and their carrying out is urgent in the member states of the European Union. As mentioned in the 2000 Lisbon strategy, “the promotion of the Information Society appeared as one of the keys to achieving the economic development goals that were set there for the time horizon of 2010. To this, one should add the undeniable interest for promoting public procurement of ICT equipment and applications at a time when the sector is in difficulty”¹⁰. Notwithstanding these substantial implications, it has become necessary to establish a strategy for the implementation of ICT in public administration throughout Europe. Dating back to 2001, the White Paper on European Governance includes broad guidelines meant to help the member states to reach a “more open, inclusive and productive public sector, in line with good governance”¹¹. Eight years later, major discrepancies still exist, though, between different EU member-states in terms of web-based e-government implementation.

Concomitantly with the positive changes envisioned by the European Commission for the effective introduction of the ICT in the public sector, the ability of the government to control the activities in which the citizens engage is being reduced. In terms of public affairs, it prevails the need for citizens to become involved in a type of cooperation to secure that governmental decisions do not override the public interest. For this reason, access to information supports an increased citizen demand for a mode of consultation that is not mediated only by

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representatives, but rather by the people themselves. Throughout this process, groups rarely play a role, as the government-led opportunities of participation are mainly created for individual engagement. At the same time, every citizen is able to choose which source of authority to trust in and to what extent to become involved, whereas the governments adopting the electronic technologies as means of reaching out the citizenry are constantly challenged by the competitive exchange of information. In this environment, according to a definition of e-government by Chief Executives Group on Information Management and Technology\(^\text{12}\), a three-sided relationship emerges: civil society, business entities and government.

**Figure 1. “The Knowledge Society” – a three-sided relationship**

\[\text{Source: Chief Executives Group on Information Management and Technology, 1999.}\]

Presenting from a broader perspective the intermingling of extensive processes with short, medium and long-term results on every stakeholder in the knowledge society development, this chart points to the importance of treating actors as communities continually interacting. E-citizens are defined as “citizens that access government websites”\textsuperscript{13}, but at the same time they are representatives of a type of societal interest aggregation working in the public benefit. As part of this study, the relationship between e-government and e-citizens becomes particularly interesting, given that the aim of reaching individuals in the virtual world presupposes major changes with physical consequences on both sides: on the one hand, the role of the bureaucracy changes in a wired world as compared to traditional workload and daily tasks; on the other hand, the individual impact of being e-government engaged goes beyond the wired environment and materialized in the day-to-day activities.

The possibility of creating an active citizenry depends on the provision of information in a top-down manner, as well as of the existence of a public channel of communication for citizens to reach the decision-makers with a real influence on policy – shaping. Standing out in the online interactions as two main attributes, access to information and civic consultation procedures have become the focus of citizen empowerment studies\textsuperscript{14}. In the “democracy of civic engagement” envisioned by James Fishkin\textsuperscript{15}, two more prerequisites for an extensive participation of the citizenry are added: political equality and non-tyranny, which comprises the tyranny of the majority as well.


Based on the degree of participation required from the citizens, West\textsuperscript{16} identified four stages in the development of e-government: (1) the billboard stage, in which governmental websites display information without requiring any type of interaction; (2) partial-service delivery stage, with limited services available online and more diverse mechanisms of retrieving information; (3) portal stage, in which fully executable online services and security protection are a must, but advancements are only efficiency-oriented and (4) interactive democracy, focused on public outreach and accountability via web personalization and automatic email updates customized to the needs and interests of different types of users.

The latter stage has been regarded as problematic in the framework of modern representative democracy, which is nowadays facing the voter apathy problem\textsuperscript{17} by falling short of enhancing political participation, with low turnout rates in countries where voting is not compulsory raising critical legitimacy questions. While different authors put forward different justifications for this phenomenon, they “share a general premise that existing social infrastructure for the support and encouragement of public debate and political action has been severely eroded and undermined”\textsuperscript{18}.

Held’s participatory model of democracy, while remaining an ideal type, provides the insight for the basic features that can enhance, but also undermine this political regime: “Democracy has been championed as a mechanism that bestows legitimacy on political decisions when they adhere to proper principles, rules and mechanisms of participation, representation and accountability”\textsuperscript{19}. Informed and active citizens are needed in order to avoid the


state of “pseudo-participation”\textsuperscript{20}, which is based not on creating the opportunity for participation, but rather on creating the feeling that participation is possible. This has long been deemed to undermine the e-government policy by the use of a controlled framework of action in which interest groups, rather than individual citizens, are more likely to make their opinion known.

Pateman\textsuperscript{21} distinguished between partial and full participation. While the latter represents “a process where each individual member of a decision-making body has equal power to determine the outcome of decisions”, the definition of partial participation applies accurately to the objective of online engagement as “a process in which two or more parties influence each other in the making of decisions, but the final power to decide rests with one party only”. Nonetheless, such an interaction represents a step forward in the mode of participation; an individual-based model of consultation, as opposed to the representative-based one, advances a different role of the government, that of remaining in permanent contact with the people. Further implications concern transparency and accountability, as the possibility of citizens’ control over governmental processes cannot be thoroughly restricted to a number of delegates.

By complementing traditional functions of government through online service delivery and by encouraging interactivity, e-government has the potential to reduce the gap between the representatives and their electorate in modern politics\textsuperscript{22}. Oppositely, Putman\textsuperscript{23} argued that only face-to-face communication and interaction could help citizens acquire the necessary skills for democratic participation and negotiation, by increasing the social capital. However, his study neglected any in-depth consideration of the power of information and communication technology to transform the public service delivery into a two-way interaction.

\textsuperscript{22} West, \textit{Digital Government}, 8.
In this sense, Macintosh et al.\textsuperscript{24} explored the emergence of citizens as producers, not just consumers of policies and information, with an important role in setting the agenda for policy formulation. Different case studies have described accurately the mechanisms for civic empowerment in small communities or in working with targeted groups\textsuperscript{25}. Nevertheless, large-scale studies evaluating e-government policies, such as UN 2008 E-government Report or EU User Satisfaction Report 2008 tend to focus more on technical issues and digital divide, rather than interactivity and transparency features. West\textsuperscript{26} also assessed that e-government research has mainly been bifurcated between in-depth case studies (mainly concentrated on specific local projects rather than focusing on national level) and highly theoretical conceptualisations, with little empirical relevance. This is consistent with what Norris and Lloyd\textsuperscript{27} concluded: e-government is a young and growing field to further develop in coming decades.

3. Creating a Typology for Government-led Initiatives of Online Engagement

The information technology supports three types of participation: information provision for passive users, consultation - a two-way relation between government and citizens and active participation, based on a civic partnership with the government\textsuperscript{28}. These types correspond to enabling, engaging and empowering citizens to get involved in policy formulation. Roza Tsagarousianou identified obtaining information, engaging in deliberation and participating in decision making as dimensions of

\begin{itemize}
  \item 26 West, \textit{Digital Government}, 2.
\end{itemize}
civic involvement. To her study, Jankowski and van Selm\textsuperscript{29} offer a critical perspective, consisting of the limitations imposed by the control and procedural mechanisms in place in the virtual space.

In what concerns the components of civil empowerment in online government, Wilhelm\textsuperscript{30} makes reference to four aspects: first, the importance of skills necessary for access, mainly consisting in computer literacy and broadband internet connection; second, inclusiveness, pointing to the need to ensure that those affected by certain policies can influence the outcome by expressing their preferences; third, deliberation, including extensive justification of the position adopted and the ability to act collectively and fourth, design, or the technological framework for interactivity being ensured in a secured, but at the same time uncensored space.

Different online platforms created for ground-up empowerment (such as webcasts, vlogs, blogs etc.), are however, hardly an integral part of e-government. Moreover, the political culture of the country is indicative of the type of engagement citizens are ready for and this may partially account for the discrepancies registered in making use of the opportunities provided through e-government. Top-down initiatives, on the other hand, are the necessary tools for assessing the extent to which opportunities for online engagement are present on specific websites of public interest with the decision-makers’ willingness to have them present there; thus, they appear more likely to integrate them in policy formulation.

Macintosh\textsuperscript{31} analyses ten key criteria for assessing the government-led initiatives for citizen participation: (1) level of participation; (2) stage in decision-making; (3) actors; (4) technologies used; (5) rules of engagement; (6) duration and


sustainability; (7) accessibility; (8) resources and promotion; (9) evaluation and outcomes and (10) critical factors for success. Apart from the framework and level of activity for the specific website, the main characteristics these dimensions revolve around pertain to accessibility and transparency, two of the features to be retained (under different labels) in the present analysis for the aim of creating a typology to explain the differences in the 27 EU member states.

By creating a typology of the degree of online engagement opportunities in EU countries according to their position on the scale of education-related advancements in what concerns e-government implementation, the existent differences will be pictured clearly and a trend in the development of e-government can be identified. In accordance with Elman, the function of the classificatory typology is to assign cases to specific categories with the purpose of mapping or comparing their attributes. The underlying dimensions that will constitute the foundations of the typology are interactivity and public outreach, in order to reach the outcome of placing national ministerial websites in categories following the score they obtain.

In operationalizing these measurements, I will rely on Demchak et al. criteria for interactivity – ownership, reachability and responses –, all of these testing for the means to have access to public officers and to information on internal organization and citizen consequences. Transparency features are included in the second and third criteria of interactivity, by allowing for identifying the attributes and the responsibilities of different persons inside the minister and providing for means of integrating the opinions of the citizens. West adds a series of website..

32 For the distinction between classification, typology and taxonomy, see Alberto Marradi, "Classification, Typology, Taxonomy", Quality and Quantity XXIV, 2 (1990): 129-157.
attributes connected to transaction services (services fully executable online), facilitated interaction (foreign language translation and specific programs for disabled citizens), public outreach (via search engines, automatic updates and customized services) and the existence of privacy and security policies, as a reassuring mechanism for unrestrained communication. The last three of these are considered useful for the purpose of this research (though operationalized differently) as they contribute to assessing the degree of civic empowerment for the domain of interest for this study: education.

The country typology to be created represents a unique attempt to compare national ministerial websites of education by the level of citizen interaction they enable. The analysis will include a total of 31 websites (25 national ministries plus 6 regional-level ones) and it is expected that the dimensions employed would be indicative of the extent to which interactivity is easier to achieve, as opposed to public outreach. It is not expected that the profile of users influences to a large extent the use of e-government services, therefore the unwillingness of internet users to engage in policy-making cannot be consistently accounted for by the characteristics of the communities they belong to.

4. Case Selection

The units of analysis for the present research are the 25 EU national governments (Austria, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Cyprus, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Spain, Sweden, Slovakia, Slovenia) and the two countries which provide regional-level ministerial websites based on language divisions: Belgium (French, Flemish and German-speaking communities) and United Kingdom (Northern Ireland, Scotland and England and Wales). According to the federal divisions existent in the two latter countries, there is no ministry of education at the national level. While choosing one specific regional ministry of education from these countries might
have introduced the risk of selection bias, by studying separately each regional-level ministerial website, clear conclusions regarding similarities or differences in the online civic participation opportunities can be drawn at the national level for the United Kingdom and Belgium, respectively.

All the 27 countries included in the study have been selected based on their membership to the European Union, which provides the framework for the development of the information and communication technology advancement through structural funds. Thus, the problems typically associated with e-government implementation and the levels of economic development, such as funding shortages or lack of expert staff, are avoided. The choice for websites of the ministries of education is motivated by a number of reasons: (a) the high interest on the part of government in having the newest technologies introduced to the largest public through the works of the ministry of education; (b) the substantial importance of public consultations on issues which concern the education of future generations; (c) the relevance of the will-driven engagement of the regular citizen for his personal benefit, as well as for the educational purposes of his community; (d) the need to get updated information on policies and regulations results into a frequent use of the webpages of the ministries of education, therefore encompassing an important part of the e-citizens.

However, for the present moment, there is no systematic account of the digital divide in the European Union. The available data on households connected to internet in 2008 show that over 30% of the population of EU 27 enjoys broadband access. In 2006, only 24% of the individuals aged 16-74 used the internet for interacting with public authorities. Due to the lack of data, the present research only concerns the users of internet and is not representative for the entire population living in a country.

37 Ibid, 490.
The unit of observation is the national ministerial website for educational policies. This specialized field is the one that affects directly the segment of the population that is more likely to become interested in participating in policy-making. Moreover, for a considerable part of the internet users, it produces visible effects in daily interactions. Starting from the premise that online government should not only provide for access to information, but also stimulate civic participation, the educational field of action selected represents the ground for comparing government – to - citizen interaction in a primarily will-driven instance (learning purposes). The claim of targeted niche among internet users for education sector will not be considered an important limitation for this study, as the general policies should address citizens regardless of their age or educational background.

The empirical research was conducted in May 2009, therefore the year of reference allows for the available data sources to be complemented with alternative information coming from 2008 case studies, with comparable indicators for newer member states. At the moment the study is realized, more than 12 years have passed since national ministries started to adopt e-government across Europe and 8 years since the issuing of the White Paper on Governance at the EU level.

5. Operationalization

For the present analysis of websites, I searched for material that would help an average citizen log onto a ministerial site dealing with national education programmes. This included: contact information for knowing exactly whom to address from a governmental agency in order to solve a problem, material on information, services, features that would facilitate e-government access by non-native language speakers and specifications about privacy and security over the Internet. The same type of criteria will be employed for every website for cross-country comparison purposes. The original language version of the website has been
the starting point of the research, complemented by the foreign translation.

Interactivity measurement is formed of the following variables: (1) ownership, which tests whether the agency has provided clickable email addresses; (2) reachability, an assessment of the extent to which the agency allows citizens to reach deeply inside the agency to different staff members – can citizens click on links to a number of different staff members, or participate in chat rooms, forums or discussion lists?; (3) responses, which tests for the interactive means to access information on citizen consequences, such as the possibility of clicking on a hot-linked organization chart, of downloading instructions on complying with the law, downloading forms, completing forms online or connecting to appeal processes.

Public outreach, on the other hand, is a newly created measure concentrating on the availability of information for different language groups and for diverse purposes. It comprises: (1) foreign language translation - whether the website is translated in at least one language; (2) the existence of search engines, focusing on whether citizens can search for the information of their interest or can only read what the officials want them to; (3) the existence of privacy and security policies, so that citizens are reassured their personal data is protected while using these services; and (4) availability of e-petitioning, consisting in being provided with the format for sending an official request to a higher authority on behalf of one or more citizens.

Each of these variables is assigned either to group “0” (absence of a certain feature) or “1” (presence of a specific feature). After checking the reliability and the validity of these measures, 4 categories have been created (see Table 1): (a) high interactivity- low public outreach, (b) high interactivity- extended public outreach; (c) low interactivity- low public outreach, (d) low interactivity- extended public outreach.

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38 For websites that did not provide English/ French/ Romanian/ Italian translation (for most of the sections) I made use of foreign language translation software available online through babelfish.altavista.com.


40 Combining different website features identified by West, Digital Government, 25.
The method of indexing is used for attributing cases to categories. The criterion for placement in a specific category is reached by adding up the score obtained for each of the above-mentioned feature for every dimension separately. Obtaining a score equal to or bigger than 2/3 of the highest possible score for each dimension places the specific website in the “high interactivity” or “extended public reach” category, respectively, while a score below 2/3 on each dimension is associated with “low interactivity” or “low public reach”.

**Table 1. Framework for the dimensions of online citizen participation**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dimension</th>
<th>INTERACTIVITY</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PUBLIC OUTREACH</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Level</td>
<td>Low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Low interactivity – Low public outreach</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Extended</td>
<td>Low interactivity – Extended public outreach</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**6. Findings**

After conducting the research, several general observations must be brought to the forefront. With the exception of Cyprus and Portugal, the remaining 29 cases included in the study clustered in the categories pertaining to high interactivity, as shown in Table 3. By and large, the expectations concerning the availability of transparency in ministerial websites were confirmed: 96% of the websites analyzed contained information about the ownership, whereas 93% provided detailed materials on citizen consequences by primarily offering forms for download or the possibility to fill in online documents. The average score registered for the dimension of interactivity when all cases were considered reached 2.32 on a 3-point scale, whereas the average for the dimension of public outreach was 2.29 on a 4-point scale.
In terms of features for direct contact and feedback, the percentages fall drastically: only 41% of the total number of websites displayed the characteristic of reachability, only 35% had a section dedicated to security and privacy policies and 38% offered a special format for e-petitioning. Progress has been registered especially in the e-government forerunning countries, such as Finland, Germany, United Kingdom, but the current typology places three of the newer EU member states - Malta, Poland and Romania - in the category with the most advanced opportunities for online civic engagement. The other eight post-communist countries that became member-states in 2004 or afterwards clustered in the “High Interactivity – Low Public Outreach” quadrant of the typology.

Yet, compared to previous studies stressing the accessibility problems\(^\text{41}\), more than 2/3 of all of the websites analyzed were translated in at least one foreign language\(^\text{42}\), which affected positively the score for public outreach. However, where a foreign language version of the website existed, no daily update of the content was provided. Most of the time, the last material translated dated back to as far as three months behind. On the other hand, it is worth mentioning that a high percentage of the ministerial websites included a search engine (90%), which points to understanding the need for providing access to information in a timely manner.

The placement of the countries in the mentioned categories illustrates the evolution of e-government implementation with less and less cases of low interactivity and increased concern for providing participation opportunities, which characterized 93% of the total cases analyzed. Thus, following the typology, most of the EU countries are still struggling to effectively engage more citizens through top-down initiatives 12 years after the introduction of e-government. This trend of providing for formal


\(^{42}\) This percentage excludes the 6 language-based regional ministries in Belgium and UK, out of which only 33% provided for a foreign language version of the website.
online consultation increased from the forerunning nine EU member states identified last year\textsuperscript{43} (Belgium, Denmark, Estonia, France, Lithuania, Malta, UK, Italy, Sweden) to 25 national ministerial websites for education policies in the present study.

**Table 2. A classificatory typology of the national educational ministries according to the opportunities for online civic engagement**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Public outreach</th>
<th>Interactivity</th>
<th>Interactivity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Cyprus</td>
<td>Austria, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, France, Greece, Hungary, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Italy, Latvia, Netherlands, Slovakia, Slovenia, Sweden, French Community (Belgium), Flemish Community (Belgium), German Community (Belgium)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Extended</td>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>Germany, Finland, Ireland, Malta, Poland, Romania, Spain, Scotland (UK), Wales (UK), Northern Ireland (UK)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

While the trend in the evolution of the two-way interactive government is confirmed by the clustering of countries in this typology, Cyprus and Portugal describe each an interesting case from the point of view of their placement in two different quadrants; by meeting the basic requirements of e-government, the website of the ministry of education from Cyprus lacks both interactivity and public outreach attributes. Although it shares the same characteristic of low interactivity, the ministerial website of education from Portugal provides for extended public outreach features, receiving the maximum score for the latter. Figure 4 illustrates the extreme distance recorded on the second dimension by comparing the average scores obtained for the

displayed features pertaining to interactivity and to public outreach in the case of Cyprus and Portugal.

The case of Cyprus is, however, challenging, given the rapid progress it has achieved in the last years. In 2007, it scored lower than the EU average on most of the relevant aspects to the implementation of e-government: the percentage of households connected to broadband internet reached only 20%, whereas out of those using the internet for interacting with public authorities, 18.4% did it for obtaining information, 13% for downloading forms and 9.6% for returning filled forms. As of 2009, several ongoing projects in different remote geographical areas provide technical assistance and support for internet accessibility. With most of the efforts concentrated on reducing the digital gap in schools, the Cypriot Ministry of Education and Culture developed a portal dealing with the specific needs of teachers, students and parents - the DIAS Project. Nevertheless, at the larger scale, most of the citizens are still unable to participate in public debates or obtain information in a different language at the present state of e-government initiatives.

In what concerns Portugal and its placement in the “Low Interactivity – Extended Public Reach” category, attention should be paid to the fast modernization and the burning of stages. The ministerial website of education scored highest on the second dimension analyzed, whereas the possibilities for interaction were quite reduced. The atypical situation of Portugal, compared to the other EU countries, illustrates the desire to communicate and receive feedback from those concerned by the decisions taken at the ministry level, with the caveat of less transparency and less accountability possibilities displayed. It is also indicative of the pressures governments face when attempting to perfect their work by allowing the input of e-citizens in policy-making and of the multiple interests affected by the e-government policies.

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Figure 2. Comparison of average scores for interactivity and public outreach features for the websites of national ministries of education in Cyprus and Portugal

High Interactivity – Low Public Outreach

This category concentrates the highest number of cases included in this study. It allows for features that further top-down communication rather than encouraging the bottom-up channels, all of the 19 cases displaying ownership information and 18 of them presenting interactive means to access information on citizen consequences, the exception being the French-speaking department for education in Belgium. Interestingly enough, the latter is one of the cases placed best in terms of reachability.

45 The category labeled “Low Interactivity – Low Public Reach” represents the basis for the evolution of the interactivity and public outreach features and has been the attribute of initial ministerial websites after the movement from the traditional government to the electronic government started. Its main characteristic is the extremely limited provision of public services through the means of ICT; in terms of citizenry participation in the online environment, it emphasizes the orientation towards improving access to information rather than interactive communication. While being a stage of development for the majority of public administration websites at the beginning of 2000s, it points to a laggard position in 2009.
together with the national ministerial websites for education in Denmark, France, Luxembourg and Lithuania.

**Figure 3. Percentages of average scores for interactivity and public outreach features in the “High interactivity – Low Public Outreach” category**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Feature</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ownership</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reachability</td>
<td>26%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Responses</td>
<td>95%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign Language</td>
<td>63%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Search Engines</td>
<td>89%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Privacy &amp; Security</td>
<td>11%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E-petitioning</td>
<td>11%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Allowing citizens to get in contact with different staff members with diverse functions inside the ministry by interactive means was uncommon for 74% of the cases in this category, whereas foreign language translation was not available for 37% of the websites, as shown in Figure 5. Although the percentages for the privacy and security policies displayed and the e-petitioning opportunities are equal in this category, the websites presenting these features were in each case different: on the one hand, France and the French Community (Belgium); on the other, Lithuania and Luxembourg. Search engines have been used in proportion of 89% in the creation of national ministerial websites for education.

Generally, the former communist countries obtained medium scores in this quadrant by offering web-based applications concerning educational issues that allowed for increased transparency and open access to information; among these, Lithuania obtained the maximum score on the interactivity dimension. These facts can be perceived as a blurring of the boundaries between Western and Eastern Europe in the implementation of ICT in public administration, which is supported not only by a major redirection of the funds for this sector towards newer member states to meet the EU accession and membership requirements, but also as a sign of increased
interest in the adoption of e-government in the national context, bearing the legacy of time-consuming bureaucratic procedures and corruption threats.

7. High Interactivity – Extended Public Outreach

The fourth category of the two-dimensional typology presented gives equal importance to voluntary exchanges of information between the main actors involved. Figure 6 offers a comprehensive picture of the move towards achieving the highest standards on each of the dimensions examined. Ten cases were included: Germany, Finland, Ireland, Malta, Poland, Romania, Spain, Scotland (UK), Wales (UK), and Northern Ireland (UK). Each of these websites made available information in terms of ownership and provided technical means for responses on citizen consequences and search engines. As the result of a gradual process of enhancing opportunities for online citizenry engagement in education-oriented policy-making, the average percentages for the features displayed did not fall below 80% (reachability) on the first dimension; on the second dimension, the lowest average score was obtained for foreign language translation (70%), mainly due to the presence of regional departments of education in the United Kingdom.

Figure 4. Percentages of average scores for interactivity and public outreach features in the “High interactivity – Extended Public Outreach” category
Despite the fact that it does not guarantee an equal participation in policy-making, the advanced opportunities for civic involvement in shaping education-related debates represent a sign of political awareness in directly engaging those concerned. By offering the possibility of e-petitioning, all national ministries in this category - with the exception of Ireland – acknowledge the importance of inputs and feedback for their decisions. Complemented by the display of privacy and security policies to a great extent, these opportunities act as a means of increasing trust not only in the use of new technology, but also in decision-makers themselves.

In this category, the ministerial websites of Germany, Malta, Spain and Wales obtained the maximum score. Considering the newer member states from Central and Eastern Europe, Romania and Poland moved towards extended public outreach after controversial educational packages have been heatedly debated during the transition and pre-accession periods. In the Romanian case, increased transparency has been demanded concerning the ministerial expenditures and the frequent changes in the educational system. Consequently, public consultation via online means has emerged rather as a solution to the pressures for constructive discussions in the benefit of those affected by the policies decided on.

8. Old EU, New EU

When comparing the national ministries of education as providers of digital content and opportunities for engagement according to the older-newer member states division, slight differences occur. The cases making up the EU-15 group score higher than the newer member states group, formed of the twelve cases corresponding to the national ministries of education belonging to the 2004 and 2007 EU accession (Czech Republic, Cyprus, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia plus Bulgaria and Romania). Measured on a 3-point scale, the average difference between the two groups on the interactivity dimension is of 0.26, indicating that the older member states provide for extended opportunities for access to information and transparency. Though scoring the same on both
dimensions, given that they were measured on different scales, the EU-15 group is placed lower on the public outreach dimension, with an average of 2,42 out of 4. The difference of 0.34 when compared to the newer member states average on this dimension can be explained by the clustering of the majority of cases in the “High Interactivity- Low Public Reach” quadrant, while the Cypriot ministerial website acted as an outlier.

**Figure 5. Comparison of average scores of interactivity and public outreach features for EU-15 and newer member states**

In spite of these slight differences, the larger picture does not indicate a tremendous gap between Western and Eastern Europe. West found a 37% difference between Eastern and Western Europe, when he included non-EU countries in his analysis of government websites offering online services (from online registration and booking services to library access and possibility of ordering publications). For the EU member states, such a division does not seem to reflect accurately the empirical situation, with most of the newer and older member states clustering in the same cell. Multiple reasons account for this situation, especially as governments started concentrating efforts towards issuing new legislation and strengthening “market liberalization, in order to catch-up with technology trends and provide up-to-date opportunities to their citizens and

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enterprises”47. Cumulated with the pre-accession and membership pressures for developing the sector of ICT, the drive towards moving online appeared as a necessity in newer member states at the time when older member states were just beginning to efficiently implement e-government themselves. In these conditions, it may have been a “fast catch-up” process for learning and exchanging of information, as well as good practices, mainly with the Central and Eastern European countries.

9. Conclusions

In meeting the participative demand of modern democracies, current governments transferred to the online environment a large part of the opportunities for civic engagement in policy-making. The implementation of e-government via web-based applications has therefore brought to the surface the need for substantial assessment of the top-down initiatives of citizen participation. The present study created an analytical framework based on two dimensions – interactivity and public outreach – on which to classify the government-led initiatives displayed on the websites of the national ministries of education across the 27 EU member states. The findings underlined a clustering of countries by the level of citizen participation they enable, pointing towards an evolution in the e-government implementation sensitive to public engagement from “Low Interactivity – Low Public Reach” towards “High Interactivity – Extended Public Reach”. Moreover, interactivity appears as the prevailing feature across national ministerial websites in the EU in the first half of 2009, whereas many of the websites examined are presenting at least one of the public outreach features.

By assigning cases to the categories of the typology, the differences between older and newer member states lessened as all countries from the latter group – with the exception of Cyprus – scored high on the interactivity dimension. The bulk of the cases analysed clustered in the “High Interactivity – Low Public Reach” quadrant and the Portuguese ministerial website provided

an example for the burning of stages, displaying reduced access to information and transparency features, but extended two-way interaction means. At another extreme, the Cypriot Ministry of Education illustrated one of the initial stages in the e-government implementation. The opposite conditions of development were found in Germany, Finland, Ireland, Malta, Poland, Romania, Spain and the United Kingdom, which approached the highest standards in available opportunities for civic consultation and participation within the EU.

In analysing the results, it is important to keep in mind the limitations of this research. Firstly, this initial effort to focus on ministerial websites dealing with educational issues offers some preliminary insights to the development of this sector. However, more research is needed for measuring the consistency of the finding in this sector with the rest of the e-government initiatives across Europe. Besides, it corresponds to a specific point in time and it is liable to undergo major changes in the years to come, therefore opportunities for comparative research both over time and cross regional are envisioned. Secondly, in assessing civic engagement in top-down online opportunities throughout the European Union, it is important not to disregard the shortcomings usually associated with the online environment: expert teams, security and privacy obstacles, real-time service delivery and lack of support from elected officials. Jan van Dijk\textsuperscript{48} adds to these four other important hurdles resulting in access inequalities: computer literacy, unequal access to computers and networks, insufficient user-friendliness and insufficient and unevenly distributed usage opportunities. These are all elements to be considered when any generalization from the expected findings is attempted, as this research only concerns the opportunities of civic empowerment by means of top-down e-government policies; it does not assess the impact of user experience and satisfaction with online services on the process of policy-making.

As a growing field, e-government literature can benefit more from studies that combine theoretical and empirical approaches. This

extended study contributes to understanding the implications of creating opportunities for participation by the use of ICT in the shift from traditional to electronic government. Based on the analytical framework developed above, monitoring outcomes and learning processes might represent a potentially fruitful avenue for further research. An assessment of the way in which the decision-making mechanism changes in the online environment would represent an interesting direction for study, as it would shed more light on the impact of e-government for the present society.

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EUROPEAN NEIGHBOURHOOD POLICY IN ARMENIA: ON THE ROAD TO FAILURE OR SUCCESS?

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Abstract

Encouraged by its success with the enlargements of 2004 and 2007, the EU has developed its European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP). This paper aims to analyze in the case of Armenia the potential effectiveness of the ENP in democracy promotion in post-communist states and to further test the applicability of the international socialization framework to democracy promotion studies. The paper classifies the strategies of the ENP by analysing ENP documentation. To identify and classify the domestic conditions, this paper traces the domestic political and economic situation at the time of ENP enforcement and examines international reports for balanced assessment of the country’s political situation. The findings indicate that the strategies of the ENP in Armenia do not correspond to the domestic conditions and are insufficient for successful democracy promotion. The paper shows that the theoretical framework can be applied to democracy promotion studies increasing their predictive value and opportunities for generalization.

1. Introduction

No matter how fuzzy and inconsistent the European Union’s (EU) foreign policy may be, it achieved considerable success with its enlargements of 2004 and 2007. The attractiveness of the EU’s

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incentives and the leverage of its political conditionality enabled the EU to promote democracy to the then candidate countries. Encouraged by this achievement, the EU developed a further norms promotion policy in the image of the enlargement one\(^2\); although it does not entail a membership incentive. The “newest democratization tool”\(^3\), the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), targets the EU’s near and not-so-near neighbourhood and aims to promote specific economic, political and security-related policies in partner countries. The partner countries vary widely in geographic location and degree of democratization, and include countries as diverse as Israel, Ukraine, and Morocco. Despite this variety, the EU is optimistic about the ENP’s impact on the target countries\(^4\). The empirical purpose of this paper is to analyze the potential effectiveness of the ENP in democracy promotion in post-communist countries by focusing on the case of Armenia.

This paper examines two specific aspects of ENP democracy promotion: what the strategies of the ENP democracy promotion are; and whether these strategies correspond to current analytical frameworks of effective democracy promotion. The paper applies an innovative theoretical framework of international socialization developed by Schimmelfennig et al\(^5\). International socialization is defined as “a process that is directed toward a state’s internalization of the constitutive beliefs and practices institutionalized in its international environment”\(^6\). Given this definition, international socialization can be viewed as an approach to study democracy promotion, thus addressing the atheoretical character of democracy promotion studies\(^7\).

\(^2\) Kelley, “International Actors on the Domestic Scene”.
\(^4\) Ibid.
Schimmelfennig and his collaborators have developed a theoretical framework that specifies potential outcomes of interaction of sets of international and domestic conditions. This paper analyzes the strategies of democracy promotion of the ENP—i.e., international conditions—and identifies domestic conditions to assess whether they are conducive to successful internalization of democratic norms. The theoretical purpose of this paper is to test the applicability of this framework to democracy promotion studies. While Schimmelfennig et al have conducted ex-post studies of democracy promotion, this paper examines an ex-ante case of democracy promotion case in order to assess the predictive power of the framework.

Armenia, which is a post-communist state, is going through a rapid economic development and provides control for the economic development variable, which is often missing from democracy promotion studies. It is a useful case because although it is a long-time target of extensive investment by democracy promoters, little research has been conducted on that matter. This paper adopts a qualitative research method and identifies the strategies of the ENP by analysing Strategy Papers, Country Reports, Commission Proposals, Action Plans, and Progress Reports and other documents of the EU. To identify the domestic conditions in Armenia and classify them according to the theoretical framework, the study traces the domestic political and economic situation at time of the ENP enforcement, analyzes statements by the state officials, and examines international reports for a balanced assessment of the country’s political situation.

The empirical result of the study shows that ENP is unlikely to be effective in promoting democracy because it does not employ necessary strategies of democracy promotion given current domestic conditions of Armenia. The study also shows that the framework developed by Schimmelfennig and collaborators can

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9 Schimmelfennig and Scholtz, “EU Democracy Promotion in the European Neighbourhood.”
be successfully applied to democracy promotion studies. The paper is organized as follows. The next section presents the international socialization as a useful theoretical framework for democracy promotion studies. The subsequent section analyzes the role of the EU as a democracy promoter and the ENP’s strategies. The final section examines Armenia’s domestic conditions as an aspirant democracy. The paper concludes considering the effectiveness of the ENP given research results and suggests possible policy implications and areas for future research.

2. Promoting Democracy

Until recently, scholars of comparative politics believed that international factors and processes are of marginal, if any, importance to democratization. Proponents of the internal dimension of democratization have claimed that the process of regime change is encouraged and initiated exclusively by domestic actors, where such endogenous factors as the strength of national economy, the institutional design, the openness of political culture, and the elite behaviour are the main catalysts of democratic change. These studies have either overlooked the significance of international factors or have simply denied any possibility of their influence on domestic change. This narrow and exclusive approach of comparative politics has resulted in a disagreement from various scholars who considered international factors to play a significant role in the process of regime change and subsequent democratization. In the beginning of the 1990s scholars of democratization supposed that external governments and institutions may have a determinative impact on

democratization of a given country. Others argue that in coming decades the significance of international institutions may prove pivotal for domestic political change. In a revisit of his well-known ‘requisites of democracy’ article, Lipset concludes that domestic conditions “do shape the probabilities for democracy, but they do not determine their outcomes.” Democracy is an “international cause”.

Scholars of democracy promotion have repeatedly expressed concerns over the lack of an adequate theoretical framework wielding predictive value for democracy promotion studies. The literature mainly relates to the practitioner and ex post view of democracy promotion, which is overwhelmingly a narrative of democracy promotion efforts of the USA and the EU, and the role of democracy promotion in their foreign policies. The lack of theoretical framework for studying democracy promotion ex ante as a process and indicating its potential effectiveness is obvious. So far, only some practitioner tools for ex post evaluation of democracy promotion are available. They have been developed by different foundations and development agencies: United States Agency for International Development (USAID), Swedish International Development Co-operation Agency, Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit etc.; and heavily criticised by the academics. Carothers even claims, “democracy

18 Burnell, “Does Democracy Promotion Work?”.
20 Peter Burnell, “Does Democracy Promotion Work?”.
21 Carothers, Aiding Democracy.
promoters treat political change in a pseudoscientific manner”\textsuperscript{24}, thus their democracy promotion does not have a theoretical background.

To study the phenomenon of democracy promotion it is important to derive from a set definition of democracy: Democracy is a meaningful and extensive competition among individuals and organized groups for all effective positions of government power; a highly inclusive level of political participation in selection of leaders and policies, at least through regular free and fair elections, and a level of civil and political liberties—freedom of expression, freedom of press, freedom to form and join organizations\textsuperscript{25}.

In their original piece Schmitter and Brouwer\textsuperscript{26} provide useful conceptualizations of the main terms in democracy promotion. Schmitter and Brouwer define democracy promotion as overt and voluntary activities adopted, supported, and (directly or indirectly) implemented by (public or private) foreign actors explicitly designed to contribute to the political liberalization of autocratic regimes and the subsequent democratization of autocratic regimes in specific recipient countries\textsuperscript{27}.

This definition does not include implicit actions of external actors, such as diplomatic and intelligence activities, health campaigns and alike, as well as it omits international factors, which do not require presence of a promoter. Besides, international actors do not always label some of their activities as democracy promotion regardless of the democratizing nature of those activities. However, this paper does not study the raison d’être of democracy promotion but rather aims to understand how the

\textsuperscript{24} Carroters, Critical Mission: Essays on Democracy Promotion, 102.
\textsuperscript{27} Ibid, 12.
process of democracy promotion should be studied so the framework is empirically applicable and generalizable.

3. International Socialization as the Analytical Framework

Schimmelfennig et al\textsuperscript{28} fill the theoretical lacuna by developing a robust and empirically testable theoretical framework based on the notion of international socialization. This paper adopts the framework developed by Schimmelfennig et al to examine the potential effectiveness of the ENP in Armenia. This section of the paper presents the framework in detail giving definitions of the important concepts, presenting the rationalist-constructivist debate, discussing the types of socialization and strategies, and identifying necessary international and domestic conditions of successful socialization.

International socialization is “a process in which states are induced to adopt the constitutive rules of an international community”\textsuperscript{29}. The state is considered successfully socialized when it adopts the rule creating domestic mechanisms and powerful institutional and political processes that guarantee compliance and discourage opposition to the rule. The theoretical framework is built on a synthetic approach of amalgamating current international relations approaches—rationalism and constructivism—and of analysing international socialization from a forward-looking perspective, “as a process directed at or potentially leading to rule adoption by the target states”\textsuperscript{30}. Another concern of scholars over democracy promotion studies has been insufficient focus on domestic political actors and processes\textsuperscript{31}. This theoretical framework not only examines the international conditions of international socialization, and thus democracy promotion, but also gives significant credit to the domestic conditions.

\textsuperscript{28} Schimmelfennig et al., \textit{International Socialization in Europe}.
\textsuperscript{29} Ibid., 2.
\textsuperscript{30} Ibid., 2

The literature on international socialization defines two general approaches through which international organizations promote their rules and norms. These methods are strategic actions of incentives and coercion, and appropriate actions of persuasion and example. The first one is the logic of appropriateness advocated by constructivists and the second one is the logic of consequentiality advocated by rationalists, and each represent “opposing ideal-types”\textsuperscript{32}. From the rationalist angle, states act in a technical environment of the international system, and international socialization is not a relevant concept per se. Socialization is only possible as a strategic action via incentives or coercion and is aimed at changing the behaviour of the target but not its identity or interest\textsuperscript{33}. On the other hand the constructivist angle on international socialization argues that states act in a social environment and international socialization is based on the concept of appropriate action. Thus, the agency socializes the target states by social persuasion and benign example acting as a role model and changing the identity and interests of the socialized\textsuperscript{34}.

However, none of the ideal-types alone can provide plausible and empirically grounded explanation for the success or failure of international socialization. Though the international socializers or democracy promoters publicize the image of a socially constructed role model pursuing benign purpose, it is unlikely that these purposes do not derive from their material interests. Likewise, the domestic actors, nurtured in their domestic, yet non-socialized, environments, are unlikely to regard foreign rules

\textsuperscript{32} Schimmelfennig et al., \textit{International Socialization in Europe}, 16.


and norms as appropriate because of their mere internationality. Schimmelfenning and collaborators design an analytical framework, which regards socialization as a strategic action in a community environment and views it as “a bargaining process with normative constraints.” Domestic actors are rational and risk-averse trying to maximize their utilities and the promoter is “a realist actor in normative clothes.” Thus, while they adopt the constructivist vision of cultural international environment and strong international organizations as socialization agents, they do not fully agree with the concept of the logic of appropriateness and turn to the assumptions of the rationalist logic of consequentiality. The rationalist argument is that domestic actor’s behaviour is shaped by self-interested preferences and it is unlikely to change and become appropriate as a consequence of interaction. Based on that, the main proposition of the framework states that successful socialization depends on the agency’s bargaining power, credible constraints and incentives, well-developed monitoring system, and the size of domestic adaptation costs.

The theoretical framework classifies socialization strategies as inclusive vs. exclusive and material reinforcement vs. social reinforcement or persuasion. In its turn the material reinforcement strategy is divided into reinforcement by reward, punishment and support. A socialization agency pursuing an inclusive strategy first grants states with membership then tries to socialize them from within, e.g. the Council of Europe, the OSCE, because the new members along with membership take on the obligation to adhere to the norms and principles of the socializer. A socialization agency pursuing an exclusive strategy socializes states before granting them membership, e.g. the EU and NATO, making the membership conditional on compliance with the promoted rules and norms. The socializing agency can

36 Schimmelfennig et al. 2006, 25.
38 Schimmelfennig, “Introduction: The Impact of International Organizations.”
also opt for different channels of socialization, i.e. intergovernmental, targeting the governments directly, and transnational, targeting non-governmental actors, e.g. social movements, interest groups or business actors\textsuperscript{39}.

Social reinforcement employs “socio-psychological”\textsuperscript{40} instruments of reward (international recognition and public praise), punishment (shaming, shunning), and support (additional meetings with the agency, arrival of expert groups). This strategy is generally used by the Council of Europe and the OSCE, which are socializing agencies without considerable economic or military leverage. The material reinforcement strategy is usually used by socializing agencies, which have the capability to enforce the promoted norm by means of their material leverage, e.g. NATO and the EU. The most widely used strategy of material reinforcement is the reinforcement by reward, more known as political conditionality\textsuperscript{41}. This strategy supposes tangible awards, in case the target state complies with the conditions set by the socialization agency. While the reinforcement by support supposes additional support in case of compliance, the reinforcement by punishment supposes not only withdrawal of current support but also introduction of specific sanctions. However, the last two strategies due to their costly nature are used only if the political conditionality fails and, due to high interdependence, the socialization of the target state is higher than the actual costs of support or punishment\textsuperscript{42}.

In choosing a socialization strategy, a rational socialization agency genuinely pursuing successful socialization should take into consideration not only its own preferences and capabilities but also the domestic conditions of the target state. As said above the usual strategy of socialization is the reinforcement by reward, which leaves the decision of compliance strictly to the target state. Assuming that domestic political actors are rational and try to maximize their utilities and taking into consideration

\textsuperscript{39} Schimmelfennig, "Introduction: The Impact of International Organizations."
\textsuperscript{40} Ibid., 33.
\textsuperscript{41} Frank Schimmelfennig and Ulrich Sedelmeier, \textit{The Europeanization of Central and Eastern Europe (Cornell Studies in Political Economy)} (Cornell University Press, 2005).
\textsuperscript{42} Ibid.
“state-centric domestic structure and the electoral volatility [of post-communist states]”, it would be unlikely for the target states to comply with liberal norms threatening their current state of affairs if the domestic costs of adaptation are higher than the tangible awards. Therefore, the potential success of social reinforcement acting on its own in a non-compliant state is highly doubtful.

The dependent variable of Schimmelfennig and his collaborators’ study is compliance, which supposes analysis of how the state reacted to international conditions and under which conditions it complied or did not comply with the promoted norms. To test their hypothesis they use a set of rationalist and constructivist variables which can also be distinguished on the basis of international-domestic divide and test them on nine European cases using the Qualitative Comparative Analysis. The rationalist independent variables are incentives (kind and size of tangible rewards), credibility (of promise to pay the reward), and costs (which are low in case rule conformity does not threaten current distribution of power). The constructivist independent variables are legitimacy (which measures whether the socializing agency itself complies with the promoted norm and promotes it on constant basis, identification (the extent to which the target state identifies itself with the international community and promoted norms), and resonance (the extent to which domestic institutional design matches with the promoted norms). The scholars argue: “credible membership perspective and low domestic political costs of rule adoption are both individually necessary and jointly sufficient conditions of successful socialization.”

This paper applies the described theoretical framework to the case of the ENP democracy promotion in Armenia and traces the evidence for the same independent variables in the ENP strategy and Armenia’s political situation to assess potential compliance.

43 Ibid., 53.
44 Ibid., 57-60.
46 See Table 1, source Schimmelfennig et. al. 2006, 61.
47 Schimmelfennig et al., “Costs, Commitment and Compliance”, 55.
The next section of the paper elaborates on the EU and ENP strategies of democracy promotion in correlation to the theoretical framework. Primarily, the priority areas of the ENP concerning the promotion of democracy and human rights and their implementation strategies are analyzed drawing comparison lines to the domestic conditions.

**Table 1. Variables of International Socialization**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Positive</th>
<th>Negative</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Incentives</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU and/or NATO membership</td>
<td>Smaller tangible and all social incentives</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Credibility</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Credible promise</td>
<td>Non-credible threats or promises</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Costs</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Power preservation</td>
<td>Collapse of government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Legitimacy</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democracy and human rights</td>
<td>Minority rights</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Identification</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>With Western or European community</td>
<td>With non-Western or non-European community</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Resonance</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corresponding beliefs</td>
<td>Contradictory beliefs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No opposing beliefs</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Compliance</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legal adoption of community rule</td>
<td>No legal adoption of community rule</td>
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4. **European Union as a Democracy Promoter and Its European Neighbourhood Policy**

The EU has the highest budget among Western community organizations\(^{48}\) and the highest membership criteria, which were set during the European Council meeting in Copenhagen in 1993. These criteria include requirements for candidate countries, or the countries ever willing to have closer cooperation with the EU, to embody institutions that guarantee democracy, rule of law, and respect and protection of minority rights. Many adhere to the idea that the most important function of the EU is to serve as a democratic model\(^{49}\). This can be also seen from the text of the

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\(^{48}\) Schimmelfennig, “Introduction: The Impact of International Organizations.”

Maastricht Treaty which states that “Community policy in this [development co-operation] area shall contribute to the general objective of developing and consolidating democracy and the rule of law and that of respecting human rights and fundamental freedoms” (Article 130 U, Section 2)\textsuperscript{50}. This commitment to democracy is reiterated in the Agenda 2000 of the European Commission (EC) which states that “the Union must...promote values such as peace and security, democracy and human rights”\textsuperscript{51}. The EU developed numerous policies and instruments for promotion of democracy and human rights, targeting countries in different regions of the world, PHARE, TACIS, MEDA, Barcelona process, EMP and others. Therefore, “democratization is by no means a new departure for the EU”\textsuperscript{52}. Nor is the ENP a new departure for the EU because it highly resembles the enlargement policy of the Commission, with the exception that it clearly does not offer membership to target countries. However, it introduces certain political conditionality in its relations with target countries and, in further development of Action Plans, follows its “meritocratic policy of socialization”\textsuperscript{53}.

The ENP, a response to enlargement\textsuperscript{54} and first outlined in the Commission Communication on Wider Europe, calls for bridging the dividing lines between the EU member states and their neighbours by promotion of democracy, stability, and security. In its Strategy Paper on the European Neighbourhood Policy published in May 2004, the EU outlines the strategies of cooperation with its target countries\textsuperscript{55}. Further in December 2006 and December 2007 the EU proposed strategies of strengthening the ENP\textsuperscript{56}. A policy without a “uniform acquis”\textsuperscript{57}, the ENP, offers

\textsuperscript{52} Ferrero-Waldner “Remarks on Democracy Promotion. Democracy Promotion”, 2.
\textsuperscript{53} Schimmelfennig et al. , “Costs, Commitment and Compliance”, 52.
\textsuperscript{55} Ibid.
its partners a “privileged partnership” and “sharing everything with the Union but institutions”\textsuperscript{58}, based on “mutual commitment to common values principally within the fields of the rule of law, good governance, the respect for human rights, including minority rights, the promotion of good neighbourly relations, and the principles of market economy and sustainable development”\textsuperscript{59}. The neighbouring countries can reach the “privileged partnership” depending on the “extent to which these values [respect for human dignity, liberty, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights] are effectively shared”\textsuperscript{60}. Taking into consideration the “joint ownership”\textsuperscript{61} of the action plans, it can be assumed that on the initial level the determination of the extent of adherence to shared values will be carried out based on the country’s declarations and country reports.

The EU strategies of democracy promotion usually follow the path of the reinforcement by reward with a positive political conditionality\textsuperscript{62}. The political conditionality is also present in the ENP on the stage of acceptance into the policy. In its ENP Strategy paper in regard to the countries, which are not yet worthy to be included, e.g. the South Caucasus countries, the Commission states “the EU should consider the possibility of developing Action Plans ... in the future on the basis of their individual merits. With this in view, the Commission will report to the Council on progress made by each country with respect to the strengthening of democracy, the rule of law and respect for

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\textsuperscript{57} Kelley, "International Actors on the Domestic Scene", 36.
\textsuperscript{59} Commission of the European Communities, “Communication from the Commission European Neighbourhood,” 3.
\textsuperscript{60} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{61} Commission of the European Communities, “Communication from the Commission European Neighbourhood,” 8.
\end{tiny}
human rights"\textsuperscript{63}. According to various studies and rankings\textsuperscript{64}, the state of democracy and respect of human rights is still highly doubtful in the South Caucasus countries, but they were included in the ENP in 2004 and the Action Plans were adopted in 2006. More detail on the content of the EU-Armenia Action Plan is provided in the next section of this paper.

On January 1, 2007, the EU reformed its external funding structure and replaced MEDA, TACIS, and other programs with the European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument, which will financially assist the implementation of the ENP in target countries. For the budgetary period of 2007-2013 EUR 12 billion is available to support the reforms in the countries according to the priorities mentioned in their Action Plans. For this assistance the EU introduces conditionality stating “where a partner country fails to observe the principles referred to in Article 1 [once again confirming the shared values principle], the Council, acting by a qualified majority on a proposal from the Commission, may take appropriate steps in respect of any Community assistance granted to the partner country under this Regulation” (European Parliament and the Council 2006: Article 28:1)\textsuperscript{65}. However, the conditionality and the threat of exclusion are partial as right after the Parliament and the Council clarify that “Community assistance shall primarily be used to support non-state actors for measures aimed at promoting human rights and fundamental freedoms and supporting the democratization process in partner countries” (European Parliament and the Council 2006: Article 28:2). Therefore, even in the case of non-compliance, the EU will not completely withdraw the financial assistance but will simply change the channel from the state to civil society. The effectiveness of such strategy is doubtful because most of the ENP countries are autocracies with weak civil societies and the transnational channel of international socialization has “proved ineffective”\textsuperscript{66}. In addition, a question rises of how consistent and impartial the EU conditionality will be.

\textsuperscript{63} Commission 2004, 10.
\textsuperscript{64} Freedom House, Bertelsmann Transformation Index.
\textsuperscript{65} Commission of the European Communities, "Communication from the Commission European Neighbourhood," 8
\textsuperscript{66} Schimmelfennig et al., "Costs, Commitment and Compliance", 9.
To make the conditionality work the ENP has to offer certain incentives to encourage the compliance of countries with the promoted rules and norms, which otherwise either do not officially exist or are violated. Judith Kelley mentions that even if the benefits of the ENP “may be substantial”, she is concerned “whether governments [will] agree to submit to a system of rules in which they have little decision-making power”\(^{67}\). To increase the attractiveness of the ENP, the Commission elaborates the following incentives:

1. perspective of moving beyond co-operation to a significant degree of integration, including a stake in the EU’s internal market and the opportunity to participate progressively in key aspects of EU policies and programs;
2. an upgrade in scope and intensity of political co-operation;
3. opening of economies, reduction of trade barriers;
4. increased financial support;
5. participation in Community programs promoting cultural, educational, environmental, technical and scientific links;
6. support for legislative approximation to meet EU norms and standards;
7. deepening trade and economic relations.\(^{68}\)

At the same time trying to encourage compliance, the EU develops the Governance Facility, which allocates EUR 50 million annually for countries which made progress (Ukraine and Morocco were the first to receive this support for reinforcement). Though these might seem as considerable incentives to comply, the membership incentive is still absent and each of the mentioned incentives should be assessed in regard to individual countries and their domestic conditions.

As shown, the ENP follows the usual practice of the EU on norms promotion: it uses political conditionality with some incentives, putting a strong emphasis on the “shared values” notion. Though the Governance Facility has some elements of the reinforcement of support and the ENPI introduces partial reinforcement by punishment (though only in regard to the state funding), the ENP

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\(^{67}\) Kelley, 2006, 37.

\(^{68}\) Kelley, 2006, 37.
follows the usual EU strategy of the reinforcement by reward. The next section of the paper elaborates on the ENP strategy and priorities in Armenia and draws parallels to the relevant domestic conditions of socialization.

5. Armenia as an Aspirant Democracy and Target of the EU’s Democracy Promotion

Armenia, which declared its independence in September, 1992 after the collapse of the Soviet Union, has so far been a democratic laggard in comparison to most and an economic frontrunner in comparison to some of the post-communist EU candidate countries and its South Caucasus neighbours. The virtual commitment to democracy in Armenia is beyond doubt because the incoming and outgoing heads of the state and other officials do not lose the opportunity to proclaim their devotion to democracy and respect for human rights. The long-awaited membership of the Council of Europe was met by the former president with exuberant statements abound with commitments to fulfil the requirements for democracy. By its accession to the Council of Europe, Armenia “confirmed the commitment of the entire region to the common values of democracy and human rights”71. Unwilling to lag behind their Central European counterparts, where a representative of one country saw himself/herself more European than the neighbour72, state officials of Armenia declared not only adherence to democracy but also integration into Europe or even reestablishment “in the family of the European nations”73 as their top priority. Demonstrating high level of identification with Europe or at least paying a lip service, the former and long-serving Minister of

69   Freedom House.
72  Schimmelfennig, 2003.
73 Kocharyan, “Speech by Mr. Robert Kocharian”.
Foreign Affairs Vartan Oskanian said, “our [Armenia’s] goal is not just to become part of the EU but also to achieve EU standards”74.

With its demonstratively European attitude and actually no prior democratic legacies, Armenia embraced the new relations with the EU in 1996. The EU-Armenia Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA) entered into force in July 1999, with the goal of promoting respect for democracy, rule of law and human rights, as well as market economy reforms, trade liberalization and cooperation in a wide number of sectors. Meanwhile, the absence of progress accompanied by the aggravating situation of state corruption were among the features of the country75. In the scarce amount of academic literature where Armenia is mentioned, it is seen as either some type of competitive authoritarian regime76 or as a transitional government77 but never as liberal and even rarely as an electoral democracy. Practitioners usually give Armenia low “grades” and classify as partly free, with much improvements to be made for any democratic progress78. Since the declaration of independence and before the adoption of the ENP Action Plan79 Armenia has held three parliamentary (1995, 1999, 2003) and four presidential (1991, 1996, 1998, 2003) elections and none of them met the international standards80. Thus, the EU has returned to a familiar environment of little democratic resonance with a new policy, which supposedly offers more incentives for compliance.


77 Emerson and Noutcheva, “Europeanisation as a Gravity Model of Democratisation”.
Armenia set priorities for the EU assistance for the period of 2007-13. The ENPI sets attractive though yet not so incentive-rich objectives of cooperation between the EU and Armenia: “to develop increasingly close relationship between the EU and Armenia, going beyond past levels of cooperation, to deeper political cooperation and gradual economic integration”81. Though it remains unclear how the economic integration can be achieved without a membership perspective. The new ENP Financial Instrument allocates an amount of EUR 98.4 million for Armenia for the period of 2007-10. In 2006, EC allocated EUR 17 million for Armenia in bilateral. For 2007 an amount of EUR 21 million was available82. Though Armenia shows no improvements in the quality of its democracy (OSCE, Freedom House, and Transparency International), the EU assistance rises, showing inconsistency of the EU conditionality.

Priorities of the ENP Action Plan and the Country Strategy Paper were laid down by the EU in cooperation with the Armenian government, which indicates the government’s consent on the promoted rules. The EU and the Armenian government agreed on eight broad priority areas. Two of the priority areas directly correlate with democracy promotion: strengthening of democratic structures and the rule of law and strengthening of respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms. Under the ENPI National Indicative Program these two priorities are included under the umbrella area of democratic structures and good governance and are entitled to EUR 29.52 million assistance, which comprises 30% of the total Indicative budget for Armenia83. This umbrella priority area includes sub-priorities of the rule of law and reform of the judiciary; public administration reform, inter alia including combat of corruption; and human rights and fundamental freedoms. The ENPI indicates the specific objectives, potential long-term impact, and indicators of achievement of the specific priority area but is not as precise as regards to the implementation process. The ENPI Country

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83 Ibid., 4.
Strategy Paper names twinning and Technical Assistance Information Exchange (TAIEX) as the main tools for achieving the Action Plan’s objectives\textsuperscript{84}. Both strategies correspond to the social reinforcement strategy of international socialization. Unlike the general ENP documents none of the ENP documents on Armenia mentions what the expected actions of the EU are in case of non-compliance.

The ENP documents, including the 2008 progress report\textsuperscript{85}, and the EU actions show that the EU is hopeful towards Armenian progress because of its amended Constitution and is ready to condone other violations of democratic rules. The Constitutional referendum of November 2005 primarily aimed at reducing presidential power and granting increased independence to the judiciary. Usually reluctant Armenian voters showed turnout of 64 percent having 94 percent agree to the amendments. However, in practice there are few changes as regards the independence of judiciary and the final shortlist for the Constitutional Court is still to be approved by the President. Concerns over the independence of judiciary elevated, when in October 2007 President Kocharyan dismissed Judge Pargev Ohanian, after the latter acquitted coffee packaging company Royal Armenia senior executives, who were detained for two years on the charges of tax evasion. They were arrested immediately after accusing the customs officials of corruption\textsuperscript{86}.

The Constitutional referendum was followed by the Parliamentary elections of May 2007, when the Republican Party of the Prime Minister Serzh Sargsyan won 65 seats in the 131-seat unicameral National Assembly\textsuperscript{87}, forming a majority coalition with two other pro-government parties. The OSCE final report on elections stated that some “issues are yet to be sufficiently addressed, notably related to campaign regulation and performance of election

\textsuperscript{84} Commission 2006d.


\textsuperscript{87} Central Elections Commission of the Republic of Armenia. http://www.elections.am
commissions particularly during the vote count and tabulation.\(^{88}\)

Freedom House rankings of 2005-2008 show that Armenia is in a stagnate condition of a partly free country with an unchanging negative score of 5/4 for political rights and civil liberties respectively. International Republican Institute (IRI) Voter Study Survey also showed that an average of 60 percent of the respondents in the 4-month time period prior to the Presidential elections believed that the Parliamentary elections were not free and fair.\(^{89}\). The ruling Republican Party was still likely to receive the sufficient number of votes to pass the electoral threshold without bribery and threats, however, it would be unlikely to win the ruling majority.

Despite all the international efforts and domestic legislation, Armenia receives similar low rankings from the Corruption Perception Index of the Transparency International, not moving from the score of 2.9, which “indicates rampant corruption that poses a grave threat to institutions as well as to social and political stability.”\(^{90}\). Means of corruption were one of the major incentives for high voter turnout: widespread bribery of and “presents” to the voters, threats of dismissal in the case of public sector employment or commander’s order in case of military service. Corrupted means of campaigning, especially in rural areas, helped the incumbents to win the majority in the Parliament and secure the presidential seat (ArmeniaNow, It’s Your Choice NGO). The deputy chairman of the Transparency International Armenian affiliate, Varuzhan Hoktanian, even states “the authorities are not only doing little to tackle corruption, but are punishing people who really fight against it.”\(^{91}\).

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91 Daniyelyan, "Amenia: Presidential Dismissal of Judge Sparks Outcry over Judicial Independence,".
The same IRI survey published in January 2008 showed disbelief of the voters in freedom and fairness of the upcoming Presidential elections. The Presidential elections of 19 February 2008, when the outgoing President Robert Kocharyan endorsed his prime-minister Serzh Sargsyan as his successor, received mixed messages from the EU and other international observers. First reactions, coming from the observers after the voting ended giving preliminary 52% to Sargsyan, praised the conduct of the elections and stated they were “mostly in line with the country’s international commitments” but at the same time the vote count was “bad” or “very bad”\(^92\). The reaction was changed from praise to “concern” after the oppositional candidates had appealed the voting results and organized sitting mass demonstrations which lasted for 10 days until being dispersed by police on March 1, 2008\(^93\). The final OSCE report issued on 30 May, 2008 stated “an insufficient regard for standards essential to democratic elections [which] devalued the overall election process”\(^94\). Human Rights Watch\(^95\) expressed serious concerns over the human rights violations during the elections and its aftermath. Such conduct of the elections demonstrates a strong willingness of the incumbent to remain in power by all, even non-democratic, means, making the costs of compliance with the promoted rules of the ENP high, as they endanger the power of the current regime.

Based on the current political situation in Armenia, the ENP strategies of democracy promotion are unlikely to result in effective democracy promotion and achievement of the objectives in the priority area of democratic structures and good governance (See Table 1). International conditions do not satisfy the domestic ones. Though the credibility of incentives and the legitimacy of the EU are high, the incentives offered are not

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sufficient since they are mainly social and materially marginal. Domestic conditions are favourable with regard to the constructivist variable of identification with the EU values; however, the resonance with the issues is reduced due to Armenia’s lack of democratic legacies and merely nominal presence of democratic institutions. Most importantly, costs of adaptation are high as full-fledged democratic practices are likely to not only reduce the power of the current regime but also undermine it.

**Table 2. Conditions of international socialization in Armenia**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>International Conditions</th>
<th>Domestic Conditions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Incentives</td>
<td>Costs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- (low)</td>
<td>+(high)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Credibility</td>
<td>Identification</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>+ (high)</td>
<td>+(high)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legitimacy</td>
<td>Resonance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>+ (high)</td>
<td>(reduced)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The overall ENP Strategy Paper identifies the South Caucasus as a region that should receive ”stronger and more active interest” than it currently does96. The EU also acknowledges the democracy promotion as one of its main foreign policy priorities. This paper claims that the ENP is unlikely to achieve successful implementation of its democracy promotion policies in Armenia. This claim is grounded on a close qualitative analysis of the ENP official documents and Armenia’s political situation within the period of inclusion of Armenia in the ENP, adoption of the EU-Armenia Action Plan, and the first progress report of 2008. The potentially ineffective ENP democracy promotion may be explained by the marginal economic and security significance of Armenia to the EU. Irrational action and financial waste are not among the main characteristics of the EU, thus the raison d’être of the ENP might be not necessarily democracy promotion but stretching the influence of the EU further beyond its borders. This assumption, however, needs further research to be determined.

The empirical analysis shows that international conditions offered by the ENP are inadequate for effective democracy promotion given current domestic conditions. The rigorously-tested

international socialization framework argues that in the case of high adaptation costs only credible membership perspective can offer sufficient incentives for socialization. Though the credibility and legitimacy of the ENP and the alleged ‘Europeanness’ of Armenian state officials are high, the tangible material incentives are low and cannot undermine high adaptation costs. A potential failure in democracy promotion, however, does not guarantee the ENP’s failure in domestically less “expensive” priority areas.

This study has contributed to understanding the ENP democracy promotion perspectives in other post-communist target countries: Azerbaijan, Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine. Post-communist countries included in the ENP vary slightly according to their economic development and substantially according to their geopolitical interests. However, all post-communist target countries score negatively in democracy and corruption rankings (Freedom House, Transparency International) and usually receive negative evaluations on the conduct of elections and judiciary independence. Further research is needed to assess the ENP’s effectiveness in the post-communist countries by identifying variations among key conditions. As for the case of Armenia, to reach the goal of democracy promotion the EU needs to strengthen its compliance incentives, which can be done not only by offering a membership but by also granting other tangible and conditional economic and diplomatic incentives on the national priority issues such as relations with Turkey, the conflict of Nagorno Karabakh, and recognition of genocide claims.

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NATIONAL IDENTITY AND ETHNO-REGIONAL PARTY TYPES

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Abstract

This article tries to expand the analysis of ethno-regional parties by linking their strategies more closely to the prevailing structures of identity (national and regional feelings of belonging). It is based on four regional case studies (Wales, Scotland, Flanders and Bavaria) with successful ethno-regional parties (respectively Plaid Cymru, Vlaams Blok/Vlaams Belang, Scottish National Party, Christlich Soziale Union in Bayern). It analyses the implication of the configuration of these two identities on the style of campaign and the degree of radicalism of these parties, using de Winter's scale of ethno-regional party programs as an indicator of radicalism. The identity structure of the electorate has a decisive influence. This influence is non-linear. The most radical forms of parties on de Winter's scale coexist with either very strong or very weak regional identities. In case of a strong regional identity, a strong national identity acts as a moderating factor.

1. Introduction

As globalisation and anti-globalisation movements shaped much of public debate during the last ten years, global issues have taken a central place in research. Tarrow has largely analysed these new cycles of contention and has pointed to a vital group of activists, which he labelled “rooted cosmopolitans”¹. These people hold global ideas but remain deeply attached to and rooted in their local community and always use the prism of their community to gauge change and values.

This phenomenon of grasping the global context through the local prism is not entirely new (Tarrow mentions his father as a historic example) and can be seen in the ethno-regional parties which

emerged in the wake of the civil rights movements as local interpretations of global ideas².

2. The identity structure as a predictor of Ethno-Regional Party types³

Research on ethno-regional parties in established Western democracies has tended to focus on the supply side that is to say on party programmes. In this article we try to show that programmes depend largely on the demand side, that is to say, the configurations of identity in their homelands and the campaign opportunities they offer. Our analysis will focus on individual declared identities (national/ regional) in four specific cases.

These cases have been selected to cover a broad range of successful ethno-regional parties operating in stable Western European democracies without ethnic terrorism or warfare. We consider a successful party a party that has had elected representatives in at least two successive general elections during the time-frame of our analysis (1991-2003) and has been taking part in elections for at least ten years without hiatus. We limit ourselves to stable democracies in Western Europe (i.e. dating back at least to the immediate aftermath of the Second World War) that have developed a solidified party system long before our observation period to ensure that Lipset and Rokkan’s cleavage analysis including the freezing hypothesis are applicable to our cases. On practical grounds we had to limit the analysis to parties polling enough support to be measured in standard national polling samples.

Our sample tries then to represent a maximum diversity of country party systems, political positioning inside the party

³ The Data used in this article were made available by their respective collectors through the named distributors. The author is very grateful for having been able to work on such rich and well-documented databases. Neither the original collectors of the data nor the distributors bear any responsibility for the analysis or interpretation presented in this paper. The usage of the data does by no means imply any form of endorsement or validation of the interpretation by any of the collectors or distributors.
system and on general policy, position on de Winter’s scale and identity configuration.

The Scottish National Party (SNP) works in the classic bi-partisan political system of Great Britain and can be seen as a potential governing party in Scotland. It is generally regarded as being social-democratic on most issues. DeWinter classifies the SNP as Euro-federalist party. As we will show in Scotland, regional identity dominates national identity.

Plaid Cymru (PC) belongs in the same political system as the SNP, it positions itself as a possible partner in government. It is generally considered to be close to green parties on most issues. DeWinter’s classification of PC is Euro-federalist based on its programme while its actual policies seem closer to a national-federalist party. Welsh identity is, on first impression, close to a conflicting situation with national identity although closer examination changes this assessment.

The Vlaams Blok/ Vlaams Belang (VB) evolves in multi-partisan Belgium and positions itself as an anti-system party. It is generally considered to be right-wing extremist. In DeWinter’s classification the VB is ranked as secessionist. Flemish identity is in a close confrontation with national identity.

The Christlich Soziale Union in Bayern (CSU) is part of the German political system that Duverger called a two-and-a-half party system as although it is multi-partisan it generally operates as if it were bi-partisan. The CSU is, on the one side, Bavaria’s natural governing party (being in government since 1957 and only recently forced to enter a coalition after 35 years of absolute majorities) and on the other hand it is closely allied to the Christlich Demokratische Union (CDU) and thus a regular member of German governing coalitions. This association prevents any direct political contests between the two parties although the CSU retains all attributes of a political party and regularly differs with its counterpart. Bavarian identity is strong against national identity.
While being very diverse in their ethno-regional agenda and their general policy positioning, their common point is to heavily rely on the national identity issue to attract voters. One key to explaining this diversity lies in the different identity structure partially within the ethno-regional electorate, but even more so outside it.

After a review of the current state of the art, we will first analyze the structures of identity in our four cases then put forward the anticipated effects of this structure on their conditions of success as a political party in their party systems. Then we will confront our predictions with reality before making some amendments to our hypothesis to conclude on a globally positive tone.

3. State of the art

Our approach tries to expand on the program-centered analysis by de Winter. De Winter delivered the most succinct but still most accurate definition of an ethno-regional party as being a party "which postulates the fundamental social difference of a part of the general population and demands by virtue of this difference a special treatment of this group's needs and demands". On the base of the form this special treatment has to take in state organization, he classified the parties on a six point scale from "spokesperson" or "caretaker" party, trying to make the people heard, "autonomist party", demanding certain autonomous bodies to manage the intracommunitary affairs, to "national-federalist parties", demanding a complete reorganization of the national order on federalist and decentralized principles, "euro-federalist parties" demanding independence inside the European Union, the most radical: "secessionist parties", that simply demand complete

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independence from all other institutions, and "irredentist parties", that demand the incorporation into another existing nation-state. Our argument is that, based on the configuration of declared national identity, the character of a successful ethno-regional party in its campaigning and its stance on national organization can be predicted in general terms.

This argument is based on a specific reception of Rokkan's cleavage theory\(^6\) considering the basis of the party system to be a social cleavage that is a full-grown societal divide. A party alone would be merely representing such a divide. Inglehart\(^7\) among others has popularized the concept of an attitude cleavage, that would rely less on social structure but more on political orientation and attitudes.

In our study we focus on parties that Rokkan’s terms rely on the political premodern cleavage of center and periphery epitomizing the conflicts in the process of nation-building. The specificity of ethno-regional parties is that they emerge at a point of time when the nation-building process can be considered completed. Inglehart\(^8\) has taken stock of these movements as he conceptualized their emergence in the 1970s by a conjunction of remaining vestiges of the defeated peripheral structures (Rokkan’s cleavage) with the influx of new post-materialist groups keen on autonomy and self-fulfillment (post-materialist attitude cleavage). Generational change has, since the early 1970s, contributed to strengthen the latter group. We will thus concentrate on expressed attitudes towards the local identity and not the structural characteristics Rokkan\(^9\) stressed. To pinpoint

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\(^{8}\) Inglerhart, *Silent Revolution*, chapter 9.

the ethno-regional audience we will concentrate on attitudes towards pre-political identity\textsuperscript{10} considering that the replacement process that took place in the 1970s has not been reversed. On the basis of this analysis we will work on the declared national identity of random samples of the population in our four diverse examples of ethno-regional parties. These declared identities represent at the same time an attitude cleavage as it is a fundamental ideological orientation, and an indicator for the existence of a material cleavage in the literal acceptation of Rokkan's cleavage theory.

Our hypothesis is that ethno-regional parties have to rely on the attitudinal cleavage and mobilize it adequately to maximize their electoral success. Their attitudinal cleavage is the value of the small, regional identity as a focus of autonomy and self-determination.

4. The identity structure – a continuum

The configuration of identity from dependent to conflicting identities takes several ideal-typical forms although as a continuum the cut-off points are fuzzy and most cases range in between these types. The first type would be a dominant identity, where one identity would be universally shared, while the other would be irrelevant. The second type would be a strong identity, where one identity would be almost universally shared, while the other would be significantly shared though much less than the first one and in fact be nested within it.

The third type would be truly twinned identities where both identities cover almost the same very large proportion of the population. The fourth type would be conflicting identities where both identities can claim a significant proportion of the population without much overlap and without either being able to claim a majority. The final type would be irrelevant identities, where both identities are only shared by a few individuals and the great majority would identify with neither group.

\textsuperscript{10} Oddbjørn Knutsen, Scarbrough, Elinor, "Cleavage Politics". In \textit{The impact of values,}, eds. Van Deth, Jan Willem, Scarbrough, Elinor (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), 493-531.
Our cases reflect the time and space of our survey data (1991-2003). They may evolve and have been chosen as they situate themselves at interesting intervals on the continuum, as we will show.

5. Measuring identities – issues and functional equivalence

The measurement of identities has been a concern to many empirical studies since at least the 1970s. As most interrogations were national, the methodological apparatus developed was generally country specific. Our datasets mainly stem from this type of research carefully monitoring the national context, nonetheless the general purpose of these modules is generally the same (measuring territorial identities) and the cultural contexts are sufficiently close (old and stable Western European Democracies) to admit a general comparison of the result patterns following Harkness, van de Vijver and Mohler. On this basis we may consider that the general national modules are functional equivalents.

These classic national items are supplemented by the Moreno-scale which asks whether the respondent puts forward only his regional or national identity, one more than the other or both equally. It serves to measure the relative hierarchy of two conflicting identities, and is employed as well in Belgium and in the United Kingdom. This indicator provides opportunities for a more detailed comparison for three of our four cases.

To supplement the simple national modules asking either to give relevant identities or to assign grades of affection to different identities and the transnational indicator we will also take into account specific items to broaden our understanding of the cases without taking them directly into a comparative view.

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6. Four distinct positions on the identity continuum

**Scotland - "Scottish first"**

The first case is Scotland, one of the polar positions in our continuum:. When presented with a list of possible identities (including all British component nationalities, European, British and an explicit category for other identities) and the option to choose as many or few as they think appropriate, about nine out of ten Scottish respondents choose "Scottish" as one of their identities, relegating British identity far away to the second place (at about 50%). The gap is even larger when respondents are asked to rank their identities. About eight out of ten Scots pick the Scottish identity as their dominant (e.g. the one they think best describes them). Even those which declare themselves as much Scottish as British prefer the Scottish identity in same proportions.

**Table 1. Moreno-Scale Scotland**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Moreno Scale – Q: Do you consider yourself as:</th>
<th>1999</th>
<th>2000</th>
<th>2001</th>
<th>2003</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>only Scottish not British</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>more Scottish than British</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>as Scottish as British</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>less Scottish than British</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>not Scottish only British</td>
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<tr>
<td>Other</td>
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<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>refusal/ d.k.</td>
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<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>N</strong></td>
<td>(1482)</td>
<td>(1663)</td>
<td>(1605)</td>
<td>(1508)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The results on the Moreno-Scale largely confirm the trend and even amplify it. While roughly a third of the Scottish consider themselves as only Scottish and another third as more Scottish than British only about one Scottish in twenty considers himself to be either only British or more British than Scottish. The

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12 The data sets used are based on the Scottish Social Attitudes Survey. For complete data statement and acknowledgements please refer to the references section.
remaining rough quarter of the Scottish rank both identities on the same level. All these indicators give the image of a clearly dominant Scottish identity. The Scottish identity is the basic identity almost all Scots share. While a large number consider themselves to be also British the emphasis is on "also", as the Scottish identity is independent from the national identity and in fact sometimes seems to condition it.

**Flanders - "Divided identities"**

The second case represents the opposite pole of our continuum: Flanders. The Flemish were asked to choose the community they feel most attached to and subsequently to choose a second one (the choice included Belgium, the three regions and the three communities, the province and the municipality). While a solid majority of about 55% chooses Belgium as the most important entity, roughly half as many (25% to 30%) choose the Flemish region and linguistic community (the combined entity was a single option). Among those Flemings having chosen Belgium as their primary community, about 55% choose the Flemish community as their second community, while 60% of those

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Moreno Scale – Q: Do you consider yourself as:</th>
<th>1995</th>
<th>1999</th>
<th>2003</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Only Fleming, not Belgian</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>More Fleming than Belgian</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>As Fleming as Belgian</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Not Fleming, only Belgian</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d.k./ refusal</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>N</strong></td>
<td>(2099)</td>
<td>(2179)</td>
<td>(1213)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

having chosen the Flemish community choose Belgium as their second community. At the bottom line more than 75% of

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13 The data sets used are based on the ISPO federal election studies. For complete data statement and acknowledgements please refer to the references section.
Flemings choose Belgium in first or second position and about 60% the Flemish region and community. Roughly half the respondents choose Belgium and the Flemish region and community in either order.

On the Moreno-Scale most Flemings (about 45%) choose the median position, declaring that they are as Belgian as Flemish, a bit less than a quarter declares that they are more Flemish than Belgian while about one in seven declares himself more Belgian than Flemish. The extreme poles are more developed: about one in eight Flemings declares to be only Belgian and not Flemish while only one in twenty declares to be only Flemish and not Belgian. The groups favoring both identities are roughly the same size, but the Belgian side seems more radical in downplaying any Flemish connection as "Belgian only" is about twice as frequent as "Flemish only".

**Table 3. How often do you feel Belgian by “How often do you feel Flemish” – Flanders 1995**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Feeling Belgian</th>
<th>Never or Seldom</th>
<th>Sometimes</th>
<th>Often or Always</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Feeling Flemish</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Never or Seldom</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>8.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sometimes</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>15.4</td>
<td>14.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Often or Always</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>13.0</td>
<td>29.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*N = (2069)*

A third indicator is the feeling of being Flemish and Belgian. The general frequency is quite similar. The two indicators are moderately but significantly positively correlated but there are two interesting groups: the groups declaring either feeling almost constantly Flemish and almost never Belgian and vice versa. The first group is very small, representing about 5% of the respondents, while the second group totals just above 8% of the respondents. It is rare to regularly feel Flemish and never Belgian, the opposite is more frequent. This implies that feeling at least sometimes Belgian seems to be more essential to feeling often Flemish than the opposite. The implication is that the
Flemish identity is more a supplement to the Belgian identity (though they are tied closely together) than a real stand-alone identity, as neither the Moreno-Scale nor this indicator showed a clear independence of the two identities or a dominance of Flemish identity. Nonetheless there is a small fringe of about 5% of respondents who explicitly refuse the Belgian identity and declare a strong Flemish identity as well on the Moreno-Scale as on the feeling indicator. This group may be the nucleus of a contention of the Belgian hegemony over the identity landscape which at the moment of our surveys is still very stable.

**Bavaria - A strong but not dominant regional identity**

The two other cases represent the middle ground of the continuum, the Bavarian case is closer to the Scottish case. The national identity measures are quite different from those in the other examples as the Moreno-scale is not available. Asked to rate their connection to different entities from their town to Europe, 39% of all Bavarians rate their relation to their state (Bavaria) as very strong (10 points above the German national average) while 24% rate their connection to Germany as very strong, in line with the national average.

The Bavarian specificity persists if we consider the links between the two types of connections. While the general patterns in Germany are relatively homogeneous the Bavarian patterns are very dissimilar. In Germany (outside Bavaria) 55% of those declaring being very attached to their Land declare being very attached to Germany. Conversely these Land oriented people represent 56% of those declaring being very attached to Germany. The Bavarian pattern differs somewhat on the first point as less than half (47%) of the Bavarians who declare themselves very attached to Bavaria declare also being very attached to Germany. More importantly this group represents three quarters of those Bavarians declaring being very attached

---

14 Considering the size of the sample the Chi² is significant at the 0.1% threshold.
### Table 4. Connection to state by connection to Germany

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Connected to: Germany</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Strongly connected</td>
<td>Moderately connected</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bavaria</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Connected to:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>state</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bavaria</td>
<td>Strongly connected</td>
<td>138</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>% within Connected to: state</td>
<td>46.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>% within Connected to: Germany</td>
<td>75.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Count</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>% within Connected to: state</td>
<td>10.9</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>% within Connected to: Germany</td>
<td>20.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Count</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>% within Connected to: state</td>
<td>6.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>% within Connected to: Germany</td>
<td>4.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Count</td>
<td>183</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>% within Connected to: state</td>
<td>24.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>% within Connected to: Germany</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bavaria</td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>782</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>% within Connected to: state</td>
<td>54.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>% within Connected to: Germany</td>
<td>56.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Count</td>
<td>427</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>% within Connected to: state</td>
<td>16.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>% within Connected to: Germany</td>
<td>30.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Count</td>
<td>181</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>% within Connected to: state</td>
<td>13.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>% within Connected to: Germany</td>
<td>13.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Count</td>
<td>1390</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>% within Connected to: state</td>
<td>25.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>% within Connected to: Germany</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rest of Germany</td>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Connected to:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>state</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rest of Germany</td>
<td>Strongly connected</td>
<td>782</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>% within Connected to: state</td>
<td>54.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>% within Connected to: Germany</td>
<td>56.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Count</td>
<td>427</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>% within Connected to: state</td>
<td>16.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>% within Connected to: Germany</td>
<td>30.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Count</td>
<td>181</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>% within Connected to: state</td>
<td>13.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>% within Connected to: Germany</td>
<td>13.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Count</td>
<td>1390</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>% within Connected to: state</td>
<td>25.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>% within Connected to: Germany</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
(cumulative data file 1998-2002 consisting of two waves showing almost no difference)\textsuperscript{1} to Germany. These differences cannot be entirely explained by the size of the subgroups\textsuperscript{2}. Thus we must conclude that the affiliation with Bavaria is not only more widespread than the affiliation with Germany as a whole, but that the Bavarian identity seems to precede the German identity, although they remain forcefully positively correlated.

The fact of declaring oneself very attached to one identity and not to the other is another proof of this link and of the forcefulness of the Bavarian identity. Both groups total only about 5%, there is no distinctly Bavarian group considering itself only Bavarian and rejecting the German identity. We thus have a situation that resembles the Scottish case except that the Bavarian identity cannot claim to prevail on the German identity. Especially the link between both identities seems largely intact, while in the Scottish case the Scottish identity seems to have acquired a larger autonomy.

\textbf{Wales - competing identities and polarization}

The Welsh case is generally speaking closer to the Flemish case but has been undergoing some changes in the period covered (1997-2003). If at the beginning of the period a large majority of about 70% of respondents pick the "British" identity among the same list of the British apparatus submitted to the Scottish, this proportion drops below 60% in 2003. At the same time the proportion of respondents picking the Welsh identity list has risen from 65% to 70%.

While globally the British identity is slightly receding it remains at the same point when respondents are asked to choose their dominant identity. A majority (55%-60%) chooses the Welsh identity while a large quarter (25%-30%) chooses the British identity.

\textsuperscript{1} The data sets used are based on results of the Political Attitudes, Political Participation and Voter Conduct in United Germany programme. For complete data statement and acknowledgements please refer to the references section.

\textsuperscript{2} A simulation of a random distribution considering these two distributions anticipated a gap of about 15 points between the two proportions which is only half as important as the observed gap (29 points if exact proportions are used and not rounded figures).
On the Moreno scale the population splits into roughly four quarters: the first declaring to be only Welsh and not British, the second more Welsh than British, the third equally Welsh and British and the last quarter chooses either being more British than Welsh or only British not Welsh. Up to this point the Welsh identity seems somewhat more dynamic if not necessarily stronger than the British identity, but observing the pride taken in those identities the competition is getting even closer.

**Table 5. Pride of being British by pride of being Welsh 1997 (percent of global sample)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Pride of being Welsh</th>
<th>Very proud</th>
<th>Somewhat proud</th>
<th>Not very proud or not proud at all</th>
<th>Not Welsh</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pride of being British</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Very proud</td>
<td>24.2</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>6.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somewhat proud</td>
<td>22.4</td>
<td>9.1</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>6.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>not very proud or not proud at all</td>
<td>7.8</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>2.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>not British</td>
<td>7.6</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>2.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N=(686)

The pride of being British and the pride in being Welsh share a weak but significant positive correlation. The general level of pride is higher in the Welsh identity than in the British case. Roughly a quarter of the respondents are very proud of being Welsh and very proud of being British while another quarter declares being very proud of being Welsh and somewhat proud of being British. If we include the respondents somewhat proud of being Welsh and either somewhat or very proud of being British, 60% of the respondents cluster in the left upper corner of table 5. Their statistical relation remains weak as it is frequent to rank the British identity one degree lower than the Welsh identity. This is another testimony to the strength and dynamic of the Welsh identity as even in this configuration, being Welsh is deliberately

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3 The data set used is based on the Welsh Referendum Study. For complete data statement and acknowledgements please refer to the references section.
ranked higher by large parts of the population. Besides these, there are four groups which make the situation more contentious. About 8% of the respondents declare themselves very proud of being Welsh and not proud of being British and 5% declare the opposite. These groups are similar to the extreme groups found in Flanders but their relative size is reversed. On top of this we have two groups of about 7% who declare themselves very proud of being Welsh/British and explicitly refuse the other identity. They do not alter the balance of the two identities but show a stronger polarization than in the Flemish case.

The Welsh situation has a much higher conflict potential than the Flemish, as the relative strength of the Welsh identity compared to the British is higher and progressing. In Wales both identities are close contenders for dominance in the hearts of the people, with a slight edge for the Welsh identity. There seems to be no established dominance.

7. Anticipated effects of identity structure

As ethno-regional parties are late-comers to the political systems of Western Europe which took their classic shape during the interwar years, they have had to find a window of opportunity to successfully launch. In our four cases parties have been successfully launched as they found their window in substance (identity as their core message) and on its form (articulation and campaign). We will focus on the influence of the attitudes on the substance of the message (declared identity) on the form (successful campaign strategies to mobilize these attitudes and their articulation in policies).

On the basis of Marcus' analysis of emotional cues in political campaigns, we are to expect different communications strategies in our four cases which in turn have the power to modify the political orientation that stem from the identity situation. In the case of strong and dominant regional identities, an ethno-regional party would be able to claim the high ground on identity

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4 Herbert Kitschelt, *The logics of party formation.*

questions. In the case of a situation of dominance in ideology or identity Marcus' analysis points at a form of positive campaigning to strengthen established identities. A policy-centered campaign may prove effective as the ideological (in our case identity) dominance ensures that policies based on this ideology appeal to large parts of the electorate. On de Winter's scale such a party might as well be euro-federalist or secessionist. It may be this radical, as its claim to a specific regional identity is commonly shared and the weakness of national identity does not require accommodating the nation state. Scotland largely fits this situation.

If regional identity is a bit less dominant and central identity stronger, we would expect a party to be more moderate in tone and in aim. Marcus would lead us to expect positive emotional cues for the region while at the same time paying at least lip service to the national level. This would aim at comforting the attitudes of regional identifiers while at the same time not alienating voters with dual identities. This dual approach would make a national-federalist party the most probable situation as it permits stressing local identity without requiring a claim to a very special status of region. Bavaria can be seen as a case for this situation.

An even weaker regional identity might be condemned to be even more moderate to remain acceptable to the majority, a majority more attached to the national level. In this case a spokesperson party with only mild campaigning would be the most probable outcome. This would be one option in the case of Flanders. In Marcus' analysis negative campaigning mainly destabilizes existing allegiances and gives the opportunity for an ulterior realignment which in the case of a weak regional identity would point towards hard negative campaigning on identity themes to realign these allegiances. This hard campaigning would best fit with an aggressive agenda on de Winter's scale ranging from secessionist to irredentist. This would be a second option in the case of Flanders.

If regional identity has a slight edge over national identity this negative campaigning on central identity would in Marcus'
framework tend to be supplemented by a general positive campaign on the regional identity with general cues to values that the region should represent. This necessity to provide positive values could tend towards a bit of moderation on de Winter's scale to maintain a form of respectability, leading to expect a secessionist party or possibly a euro-federalist party, in case one of the positive values articulated for the region were openness to Europe. Wales would be expected to fall into this category.

Table 6. Party types predicted from identity structure

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Situation of regional identity with respect to national identity</th>
<th>Predicted campaign style</th>
<th>Predicted party position on de Winter scale</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Scotland</td>
<td>Dominance</td>
<td>Policy centered aggressive</td>
<td>Euro-federalist to secessionist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bavaria</td>
<td>Strong, not entirely dominant</td>
<td>Positive emotional respect for national identity</td>
<td>National-federalist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Flanders</td>
<td>Weak</td>
<td>Mild campaigning</td>
<td>Spokesperson</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Flanders</td>
<td>Weak</td>
<td>Heavy negative emotional aimed at national identity</td>
<td>Secessionist or irredentist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wales</td>
<td>Slight advantage</td>
<td>Heavy negative emotional against national identity, positive emotional aimed at regional identity</td>
<td>Secessionist or possibly euro-federalist</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

8. Confronting reality with prediction - a satisfying fit with one rogue case

Our analysis will rely on the data and results made by scholars of the different national party systems and the ethno-regional parties studied.

Scotland - the SNP: gradualist approach and policy focus

The situation in Scotland largely conforms to the expected result. After the Scottish National Party (SNP) experimented more
militant strategies in the 1980s it refocused on a gradualist strategy in the 1990s. The party returned to economic policy as a main focus not unlike its policies in the 1970s\(^6\), when the aim was to prove the economic viability of an independent Scotland which had been largely disputed. Finlay\(^7\) offers a comprehensive analysis of these arguments and comes to a conclusion leaning towards a benefit of devolving powers to the Scottish level. Besides this assessment of economic viability there has been an assessment of political viability of the independence project resulting in a policy called "Independence in Europe" advocating membership in the European Union in case of independence and a gradualist path to independence based on the Quebec model\(^8\).

The SNP also expanded its platform to acquire a complete slate of public policies to be implemented in case of an electoral victory, which Lynch largely links to Alex Salmond's leadership\(^9\) (Lynch 2002). In 2003 the SNP launched a campaign called "a penny for Scotland" proposing to use the tax varying power of the Scottish Parliament to undo a one point income tax cut by the British government and to use it for Scottish welfare policies. Although in the short term it proved a program difficult to sell to voters as it represented a tax hike, in the long term it gave the SNP credentials as a party of good and responsible government not forgetting financing its campaign pledges\(^10\). The situation and strategy of the SNP largely conforms thus to what we expected in the analysis of the opportunities based on the identity configuration.

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Flanders - a successful party more radical than predicted

During the time covered by our analysis we see in the Flemish case the demise of the Volksunie which, in its final phase, followed a strategy resembling the first one predicted (moderate spokesperson party) although being less moderate than expected. The party had entered a downward spiral in electoral support in the 1980s and ended its existence in 2001 in a leadership clash although its electoral support seemed to have stabilized in the late 1990s at a level around 8% of Flemish voters showing even signs of recovery in 1999. Splinter groups have subsequently associated with traditional parties but these alliances proved to be short-lived.

The very radical strategy seems to have been adopted by the Vlaams Blok (dissolved and refounded in 2004 as Vlaams Belang). Gijsels delivered a thorough analysis of Vlaams Blok's rhetoric and propaganda material, clearly establishing its credentials as a party of the extreme-right. In the scandal-ridden Belgium of the 1990s attacks against the probity of Brussels elites struck a sensitive cord with the electorate. Breuning and Ishiyama have analyzed the rhetoric and campaign used by both Vlaams Blok and Volksunie. The Vlaams Blok persistently took a very militant stand, slashing out at the central institutions and serving the classic right-wing extremist audience with attacks on foreigners and seculars. This extreme position has been confronted by ostracism on all levels and by all parties resulting in an almost complete isolation of the Vlaams Blok.

Apart from strong anti-Belgium and anti-Immigrant rhetoric the Vlaams Blok maintained the demand for an independent Flanders

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14 Cas Mudde, "One against All, All against one!: A Portrait of the Vlaams Blok". Patterns of Prejudice, 29 (January 1995): 5-28.
that should not be part of the European Union\textsuperscript{15}. The extension of the negative rhetoric on immigrants (and in fact it being the most noticed feature of \textit{Vlaams Blok} rhetoric) was not warranted by the initial analysis but it enabled the \textit{Vlaams Blok} to break out of the small ghetto it otherwise might have been confined to. On balance the analysis of the identity situation predicted a different party from the one \textit{Vlaams Blok} (and \textit{Vlaams Belang}) is, but not so unlike it: vigorously radical in program and rhetoric and isolated from the other parties. Except for the anti-immigrant appeal and thus a difference in size, this resembles the \textit{Vlaams Blok}.

\textbf{Bavaria - CSU: strong in Bavaria, present on the federal scene}

The Bavarian case presents us with a long tradition of a party firmly routed in the local sphere with disproportionate power on the federal scene. The Christian Social Union in Bavaria (CSU) is Bavaria's structural governing party. The CSU puts its main rhetoric accent on valorizing Bavaria in its dichotomy of the traditional more agricultural structure and the large modernization policies.

Valuing Bavaria and anything Bavarian, the CSU rarely resisted snapping at the federal government especially when it could mobilize another fundamental opposition and embed it in a Bavarian context\textsuperscript{16}. The deep Christian (mainly catholic) tradition in Bavaria regularly gave the CSU ammunition against secular politicians and progressive legislation\textsuperscript{17}. At the same time the CSU remained very active in national fields like the \textit{German Question} up to the \textit{Reunification}, deploying hard rhetoric against

\textsuperscript{15} Marc Spruyt, \textit{Grove Borstels: stel dat het Vlaams Blok zijn programma realiseert, hoe zou Vlanderen er dan uitzien?} (New Brooms: Imagine the Vlaams Blok realized its program: what would Flanders look like?). (Leuven, 1995).


communism while stressing the desire to reunite Germany\textsuperscript{18}. Another field of action was European integration where a mix of Gaullist sovereignty preserving politics and integrationist agenda to strengthen the "Christian fortress against communism" was personified by Franz-Josef Strauss, longtime party chairman and Bavarian prime minister\textsuperscript{19}. These policy engagements largely surpass the mere lip-service to national identity that was expected as it entailed some real political action. Lately the CSU came to the front as an advocate for decentralization and federalism in unified Germany by, for example, demanding cutbacks on the compensation program between richer and poorer states (\textit{Länderfinanzausgleich}) partly to enable more regional competition and partly to ease charges on the Bavarian budget\textsuperscript{20}.

Taken in its entirety the CSU seems to be more attached to the national level than it was expected from the analysis of the identity situation. Although action (e.g. \textit{Länderfinanzausgleich}) is more federalist than rhetoric (e.g. \textit{German Question}). This difference taken into account the CSU largely conforms to the shape of the party predicted from the identity configuration.

\textbf{Wales - \textit{Plaid Cymru} - a much more moderate party than expected}

The Welsh case is truly rogue as the party is very far from what has been predicted. Instead of finding a party running aggressive smear campaigns putting it in isolation, we find \textit{Plaid Cymru}. This party is quite moderate in its communication strategies. While denouncing politics in Westminster, the general tone is not

\begin{flushleft}
\end{flushleft}
that of fundamental evil, but that of fundamental differences that make it impossible to treat the Welsh case adequately in the current party system (the whole of this section is largely dependent on McAllister’s recent study of the party\textsuperscript{21}).

*Plaid Cymru* historically focused on cultural and heritage subjects which still shape its myths. Economic policy generally played a secondary role. While *Plaid Cymru* still remains committed to a policy of independence in Europe much like the SNP its recent policy decisions put more emphasis on extending devolution one step at a time.

Moderation also opened up the doors of power for *Plaid Cymru* which after the 2007 elections to the Welsh Assembly signed a coalition agreement with the Welsh Labour Party. This moderate rhetoric and the gradualist approach make *Plaid Cymru* in the short term more of a national-federalist party than a euro-federalist and the focus on cultural and heritage clearly contradicts our first analysis. This calls for a thorough search for overlooked indicators of the different landscape.

**9. The specificity of the Welsh case**

Thorough analysis of the Welsh case shows why our prediction was erroneous and needs to be amended. The Welsh case lacks the homogeneity we could assume in the three other cases and which fundamentally changes the identity situation and the space in which *Plaid Cymru* operates.

The divisive factor in Welsh society is the knowledge of the Welsh language. In the surveys about 15% of the respondents claimed fluency in Welsh. This group decidedly differed by their national identity, as measured by the national apparatus, as 80% to 85% of this group declared Welsh as their primary or only identity (90% choose it as part of their identities) while only about 50% to 55% of those claiming not to speak Welsh do so. This group differs on many indicators of identity. For the Welsh speakers the two characteristics that rank highest for being "a real Welshman"

\textsuperscript{21} Laura McAllister, *Plaid Cymru - The Emergence of a Political Party* (Brigend: Seren, 2001).
are first speaking Welsh and secondly living in Wales while for the non Welsh-speaking it is being born in Wales followed by having Welsh ancestors and on a par be living in Wales.

*Plaid Cymru* has historically concentrated on the Welsh speaking population. The fact that its English name component ("the Party of Wales") almost entirely slipped past public attention bears testimony to this. This concentration has been historically analyzed by Balsom, Madgwick and Van Mechelen \(^2^2\) noting that *Plaid Cymru* could claim as much as 20% of the vote among Welsh feeling Welsh speakers in 1979 but at the same time was so unsuccessful among English speakers that it was hardly measurable in the sample (resulting in a net share of the vote of 7%).

In 1979 Balsom had already analyzed the *Plaid Cymru* support in detail \(^2^3\) pointing to the fact that the support for *Plaid Cymru* was concentrated among voters speaking Welsh and living in the north and west of Wales, the regions where according to census figures still lived the highest proportion of Welsh speakers. *Plaid Cymru* was a party only strong in Welsh-language cultural context among those integrated into this culture and even then *Plaid Cymru* was no match for the Labour Party. According to our data the situation has evolved since, as *Plaid Cymru* can now claim to be the largest party among those fluent with the Welsh language, almost doubling its support in the Welsh language group since the late 1970s (to about 40%) with a notable decline of support for Labour (dropping from about 60% to the vicinity of 30%).

If we consider the actual constituency of *Plaid Cymru* being only the Welsh language group (in accordance with the literature) we see the interest of a focalized positive campaign to establish protection for the group. The Welsh language group considers itself Welsh in proportions even unseen in Scotland thus there is

\(^2^2\) Denis Balsom, Peter Madgwick, Denis Van Mechelen, *The Political consequences of Welsh identity* (Glasgow: University of Strathclyde, Centre for the Study of Public Policy, 1982).

\(^2^3\) Denis Balsom, *The Nature and distribution of support for Plaid Cymru* (Glasgow: University of Strathclyde, Centre for the Study of Public Policy, 1979).
no need to claim Welshness, it's almost a natural feature of those speaking Welsh. The aspect of being a structural minority within the claimed homeland made any claims to secession of the Welsh-speaking parts problematic, thus a concentration on preservation and extension of the cultural parameter becomes the major first step in order to attain at least survival and equal opportunities for the group *Plaid Cymru* thinks of representing.

As the link between speaking and feeling Welsh has not weakened in recent years (cf. Balsom 1979 and McAllister 2001), a massive extension of Welsh speaking may result in a larger potential constituency for *Plaid Cymru* and with credentials of having fought for the preservation of Welsh heritage in past and present this might in the long term prove a way of extending the real support for *Plaid Cymru*. *Plaid Cymru* has been very active in demanding a Welsh language television channel and has recently succeeded in imposing learning the Welsh language in all schools in Wales.\(^\text{24}\)

### 10. Conclusion

The relative and absolute strength of local and national identities in the constituency influence campaigns (in their general appeal) and the program (in its stance towards the central state) of ethno-regional parties, confirming that they at least partially mobilize on a center-periphery attitude cleavage.

Radical demands as measured on de Winter's scale rises on both ends of the spectrum, while campaigning becomes consistently more positive when the strength of local identity increases as the party has more to gain to affirm general attitudes towards the region and the central state than to shake them. In case of a weak local identity, a radical campaigning tone, which is more credible with a radical reorganization agenda, is possible while a strong local identity may make independence a realistic outcome depending on the strength of the national identity. A strong national identity (coupled to a strong local identity) makes

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\(^{24}\) cf. McAllister, *Plaid Cymru.*
moderate stances more likely, in order to be acceptable to a large audience.

Wales contains two groups (Welsh speakers and Anglophones) who both have a strong identity. Thus in order to be successful defending the interest of one group without being unacceptable to the other group is an essential part of the positioning of the ethno regionalist party in the party system.

**Table 7. Party types predicted from identity structure and existing parties**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Situation of regional identity with respect to national identity</th>
<th>Predicted party position on de Winter scale</th>
<th>Observed Party</th>
<th>Observed position on de Winter scale</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Scotland</td>
<td>Dominance</td>
<td>Euro-federalist to secessionist</td>
<td>Scottish National Party (SNP)</td>
<td>Euro-federalist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bavaria</td>
<td>Strong, not entirely dominant</td>
<td>National-federalist</td>
<td>Christlich Soziale Union in Bayern (CSU)</td>
<td>National-federalist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Flanders</td>
<td>Weak</td>
<td>Spokesperson</td>
<td>Volksunie (VU) – defunct</td>
<td>Spokesperson</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Flanders</td>
<td>Weak</td>
<td>Secessionist or irredentist</td>
<td>Vlaams Blok / Vlaams Belang (VB)</td>
<td>Secessionist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wales</td>
<td>Slight advantage</td>
<td>Secessionist or possibly euro-federalist</td>
<td>Plaid Cymru (PC)</td>
<td>nominally euro-federalist in fact more national-federalist</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
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Flanders


Bavaria

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INTERPRETING THE TIBETAN DIASPORA: CULTURAL PRESERVATION AND THE PRAGMATICS OF IDENTITY

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Abstract

Nearly all accounts of Tibetans in exile acknowledge the remarkable extent to which they have been able to maintain their culture against all odds. They were premised on the idea that exile and identity was only worth studying insofar as it contained traces of “how things were in the past”, and proof of how well that past has been preserved. The result of this approach to refugee studies has been the tendency to neglect the variety of strategies displayed by Tibetans with regard to “place-making”. Without making any definitive claims about the prevalence of a distinctly “Darjeeling Tibetan exile culture”, this ethnographic study of Tibetan refugees in Darjeeling town, India shows how the experience of movement to and from a “place” – Darjeeling town reconstitutes the idea that Tibetan refugees have of their relation to a specific “place” in the diaspora; of how this sense of “place” in the diaspora gives meaning and purpose to refugee lives.

1. Introduction

Since 1959, one of the primary concerns of the exiled Dalai Lama and the Tibetan refugee community has specifically been to preserve the “rich cultural heritage of Tibet.” This attention to

1 A version of this article was presented at the 4th Central European University Graduate Conference in the Social Sciences, Budapest, Hungary from 20-22 June, 2008. I am grateful for the comments and criticisms offered by participants at the CEU Conference.

The author is grateful to the Centre for the Study of Social Exclusion and the Institute of Development Studies Kolkata for institutional support

2 Soon after his arrival in exile the Dalai Lama founded a number of institutions at several levels for the preservation of Tibetan culture. The Tibetan Institute of Performing Arts was the first one established in 1959; the Central Institute for Higher Tibetan Studies in 1969; the Library of Tibetan Works and Archives at
the preservation of linguistic, religious and artistic knowledge through both documentation and education was prompted by two legitimate threats: the disappearance of Tibetan culture in the homeland under Chinese rule and the disappearance of exiled Tibetans into their host societies.

Melvyn Goldstein on writing about the development of ethnic boundaries operative within and outside of the Tibetan community remarked that the “two critical aspects of the Government of India’s (GOI) policy towards the Tibetan refugees have been 1) the liberal non-assimilative framework as reflected in the separate settlements and 2) the broad ‘delegated’ authority of the Tibetan leadership headed by the Dalai Lama over the Tibetan settlements in India.” The proposed settlements were a kind of compromise because their envisioned size of three to four thousand was large enough to sustain Tibetan language and other institutions easily. The GOI further facilitated this cultural preservation effort by allowing Tibetans considerable autonomy and in particular by permitting the Dharamsala administration to exercise administrative control over the settlements.

Scholars working on the Tibetan issue in the 70s and 80s unequivocally agreed that Tibetans had been extremely successful in retaining their ancestral way of life in the face of acculturation and constituted a model of good integration with

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6 This did not mean that the GOI abdicated its authority over the Tibetans. Rather it means that the GOI (and the state government) had no objection to giving the Dharamsala administration de facto internal administrative control of the camps and to working with the individual refugees, so long as the latter did not object.
their host populations.⁷ These early anthropological studies emphasized notions of adaptation, acculturation and change as the key processes through which a history of Tibetans in exile might be charted. It is not surprising that the anthropologists’ primary research agenda became to assess the Tibetans’ rate of adaptation to their new surroundings and their degree of acculturation. The result of this approach to refugee studies has been the tendency to portray exile life⁸ of “self-settled” refugees or urban refugees of Darjeeling town in India as an atrophied vestige of the traditional Tibetan society. Scholars and visitors unofficially deride it as “inauthentic” and little worthy of investigation. The presentations of exile Tibetan culture which is exclusively focused on Dharamsala (the headquarters of the Tibetan government in exile in northern India) has the tendency to reify the “story” of exile primarily constructed by Tibetan administrators, intellectuals, lamas and “cultural performers” who are conversant with, and eager to engage in, debates about “the construction of Tibetan culture” on terms set by Western audiences. The rationale for engaging in the field-based study of Tibetan refugees in Darjeeling has been to critique, along Toni Huber’s lines⁹, this primarily Dharamsala-centred construction of Tibetan exile culture. This study endeavours to know how


⁸ The terms ‘exile’ (rgyang bud btang) and ‘refugee’ (btsan byol ba) will be used interchangeably for a number of reasons. Firstly, it comes out through the numerous conversations with Tibetans that the Tibetans commonly refer to themselves as both, although during political gatherings such as demonstrations the term ‘refugee’ is more often employed. Secondly, the use of both ‘refugee’ and ‘exile’ is legitimate since the entire population of Tibetan refugees in India does not in fact benefit from ‘refugee’ status since India is not a signatory of the UN Refugee Convention. First generation Tibetan refugees and their India-born children have been granted ‘refugee-like status’ and given a Refugee Certificate (RC) as proof of identity. However more recently arrived Tibetans are allowed into India but not given legal residence there.

⁹ Toni Huber delivers the bluntest of this critique, "In my own experience, most Tibetan refugees are not like these persons and certainly do not live in Dharamsala but in rather non-cosmopolitan agricultural and craft communities. They tend to be humble and self-effacing, conservative, often uncritically devoted to their leaders, seemingly as avid about watching Hindi films as attending religious ceremonies and they have Hindi or Nepali not English, as their second language. Why are these many Tibetan exiles left backstage or merely out in the audience in the study of ‘Tibetan culture?’” see Toni Huber, "Book Review,” in *Constructing Tibetan Culture: Contemporary Perspectives*, ed. F.J. Korom (Journal of Buddhist Studies 1999), http://jbe.gold.ac.uk/5/huber981.htm.
Tibetans as refugees experience place (Darjeeling) and how it becomes “inextricably bound up” with their identity. Ruling elites and few lay Tibetans of pre-exilic Tibet who came from Tibet before 1959 secured a comfortable niche in the socio-economic environment of the Darjeeling region. Some of them had come along with their cattle and others with enough riches, gold and precious stones, to be soon counted among the richest in the region. These pre-exilic Tibetan hosts - Bhutias in Darjeeling town - extended financial and other forms of assistance to those less fortunate Tibetan refugees coming after 1959. The cultural affinity between the Bhutias and the Tibetan refugees would have had a role in creating a temporary home for Tibetans in exile. The proposition put forward by Tanka Subba (1990) that proper adaptation of groups is a function of cultural affinity would be critically examined. This ethnography of the displaced seeks to explore how the “refugee – host” dynamic in a “place” and the individual accounts of Tibetan/refugee identity that emerge from there reinforces those articulations that angle away from the stereotyped ways that Tibetans are read and suggest alternative currents that produce plural or hyphenated identities.

The section on methodology below would state the need to choose between appropriate methods depending on the contingencies in the field. The decades of living in exile has created divisive impressions between Tibetans and between Tibetans and their hosts that threaten the very understanding of all Tibetans as co-ethnics on which the rhetoric of cultural preservation and ultimately the struggle for independence depends. What would follow in the next section is an introduction to the fieldwork site – Darjeeling town and an elaboration of the early period in exile of Tibetans living there. The ethnographic focus would be on the lived meanings that displacement and exile can have for Tibetan refugees which would draw attention to the local differences in the construction of categorical identities, refugeeness; Tibetanness and its ties with specific settings in the town where Tibetans reside and work alongside their hosts. This would open up a debate on what constitutes Tibetanness, refugeeness, and the nature of diasporic identity and its association with place.
Methodology

The material that is presented here is derived from fieldwork which was conducted among Tibetan refugees and members of the host community (Bhutias and Nepalis) in Darjeeling town\textsuperscript{10}. The field-based study was spread over a period of two years (2004-2006), totaling six months: October and November 2004 in Darjeeling and Sikkim; May 2005 in Darjeeling; April 2006 in Dharamsala; October-November 2006 in Darjeeling. The sampling of informants in the present study of refugees is a combination of “convenience” and “snowball sampling” methods. Deploying the convenience sampling method to the study of Darjeeling town refugees is however difficult since a majority are “self-settled” among host populations. Yet “convenience sample” is one that is simply available to the researcher by virtue of its accessibility. Given that refugees in Darjeeling town are self-settled, membership in any groupings is fluid with people being highly mobile (out-migration during the winter season). As a result, even refugees with legal status are effectively untraceable or absent. Physically locating the “type” of people one is interested in researching does require considerably more effort in heterogeneous urban settings. In this context, it was prudent to use a convenience sample when chance presented itself to get interview data and it represented too good an opportunity to miss. The gradual creation of relationships with key informants and their informants and so on happened through processes that culminated in “snowball samples”.

In the present research study the principal role that has been followed is that of “Observer-as-participant”. Opportunities for genuine participation were few in refugee contexts and that there were situations that were not amenable to the immersion that is a key ingredient of the ethnographic method. Initiating the interview process required establishing “rapport” with the

\textsuperscript{10} Darjeeling town is situated in the Darjeeling district of West Bengal, India on a long, narrow mountain ridge of the Sikkim Himalayas that descends abruptly to the bed of the Great Rangit River. The town lies at an elevation of about 7,000 feet (2,100 m). The Darjeeling Municipal Area has an area of 10.57 sq km according to Census of India 2001. The total population of Darjeeling Municipality is 107,197 comprising of 55,963 males and 51,234 females according to Census of India 2001.
respondents so that they are prepared to participate in and persist with the interview. In the context of this research study on refugees this rapport could not be established quickly because of the difficulty of establishing “trust” involved in the relationship and the gulf that already exists between the refugee “lifeworlds” and that of the researcher. About eighty respondents coming from diverse backgrounds were interviewed on an individual basis in Darjeeling town and in the Tibetan Refugee Self help Centre (TRSHC)\textsuperscript{11}. Over and above the eighty respondents who were part of the individual-based interviews, about forty respondents were involved in the group-based discussions. The age group of the Tibetan refugee respondents was between 18 to 50 years. They comprised those Tibetans who were born in exile on and after 1959.

\section*{2. Articulating Exilic Tibet: The Context of Darjeeling Town Refugees}

In describing the life of Tibetans in exile, using the phrase “myth of return”, it would be important to exercise caution in ascribing one single or even one dominant orientation to enforced existence outside Tibet, given the size and spread of the Tibetan Diaspora in India and elsewhere. On June 12, 1998 the exile Tibetan population had reached 122,078 from the initial estimated population of 80,000 in 1959.\textsuperscript{12} The distribution of the total number of households and population by sex in India is given in Table 1.

While home for the Tibetans lies without a doubt over the Himalayas, Darjeeling in the East has emerged as the community’s home in exile among other settlements throughout South Asia, Europe, Australia, the United States and Canada. The “place” Darjeeling is however not strictly speaking a home to the generation of Tibetans who escaped into exile. Protracted exile

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
\item[11] Situated at ‘Hill-side’ Lebong West in the area locally known as ‘Hermitage’, the Tibetan Refugee Self Help Centre in Darjeeling town is one of the oldest refugee centres in the Tibetan Diaspora. This refugee settlement came into existence on October 2nd 1959.
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
however has produced a new generation of India-born Tibetan refugees who oscillate between the need to keep the notion of the homeland alive on the one hand and of the different kinds of material investments and emotional or social ties with host populations as a creative result of being the heirs of the displaced. The distribution of the Tibetan populace in West Bengal located in Eastern India is given below:

Table 2. Distribution of Tibetans in West Bengal – India

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region - West Bengal</th>
<th>Total population</th>
<th>Absentees as on 12 June, 1998</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Calcutta</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Darjeeling</td>
<td>2411</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ghoom, Darjeeling</td>
<td>442</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jalpaiguri, Jaigaon</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kalimpong</td>
<td>2023</td>
<td>118</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kurseong</td>
<td>447</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Siliguri</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sonada, Tashiling</td>
<td>641</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>17297</td>
<td>761</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Tibetan Demographic Survey 1998, Planning Council, Central Tibetan Administration, Dharamsala, p. 36.

Darjeeling has had a history of serving as a zone of contact between different ethnic communities over time. With the exception of the autochthonous Lepchas of the region, the Nepalese and the Tibetans moved to Darjeeling from Nepal and Tibet respectively. Darjeeling and Kalimpong town for instance
served as a trading centre but its economic basis expanded to cover activities in handicraft, transport and service sectors. Right until the late 1950’s, caravans of Tibetan mules used to ply back and forth between Kalimpong and Tibetan towns through the place known as Chumbi Valley, connecting India and Tibet. Members of the oldest generation in exile came to India from areas that were proximate to Darjeeling through Eastern Nepal, Bhutan and India’s North East Frontier Area after escaping from Tibet in 1959 on foot over the Himalayas. But refugees from far-flung areas of Tibet such as Amdo and parts of Kham were not so fortunate. They experienced more trauma and fatigue. Most of them had to trudge for more than a month while twenty days were often an average span of their trauma-filled flight.13

The early period was unanimously remembered as one of extreme social and economic hardship. The refugees who chose to stay in the Refugee Centre and other settlements were those who were not in a capacity to establish themselves privately mainly due to the lack of capital. Others resorted to alms collecting.14 The following excerpt of an interview with a Tibetan youth, who is studying in Loyola College in Chennai, summarizes aspects of refugee life brought up by many informants in their chronicles of early hardship faced by their preceding generation who first arrived from Tibet: “My father and grandfather are there to give advice. They told me how they suffered, when they came here, they had no financial assistance15. Gradually my grandfather did small business. He always tells me to do your education well only then you would not suffer like them. Without education (shes yon slob sbyong) you cannot do anything, he says. The duty of our elders was to motivate us. From what they

13 According to the Secretary of TRSHC (interviewed on 30/9/06 at TRSHC), most of the people at the Centre have come from U-Tsang province in Tibet (about 70%). About 20% from Kham and 10% from Amdo province.
14 It is difficult to assess what percentage of those refugees resorted to alms collecting. Even those who were once engaged in it are unable to give any tentative figure. It is generally agreed that they constituted a large number and were conspicuous in the town area.
15 The term ‘financial assistance’ used by the respondent is a pointer to the acute awareness that refugees have of the presence or absence of aid organizations in their lives or the support that is extended to them by individual donors.
told us, it seems that our identity as refugee was very marked then. Now we can pay to go to school (slob grwa).”

2.1 There are no Refugees in this Area!

The major feature of the socio-cultural landscape that aided the Tibetan town refugees in their quest for safety and scope for progress in their socio-economic trajectory was the presence of Bhutias who happened to be the well-established ethnic Tibetan immigrants of Indian nationality who lived in the Darjeeling region since the colonial times and even earlier. This fortuitous situation was put to use by Tibetan refugees seeking to conceal their “refugee” status. Their frequent usage of the Bhutia identity is revealed at the time of initiating a conversation with them. A respondent who had a shop in Mahakal market, (the most trendy and fashionable market selling garments and other accessories) on Ladenla road was most unwilling to talk anything about himself, despite the presence of my key informant (a Bhutia) who knew him well. He vigorously claimed to be a Bhutia, in other words, an immigrant from the pre-exilic era, an Indian and to know nothing about any refugees. He said that he had lived in Japan for four years but then came back to Darjeeling to take up business. He insisted that there is similarity between Bhutias and Tibetans in terms of religion and place. “We are Buddhists, we are one,” he said. On being asked why he decided to remain in Darjeeling, he explained his situation in the following words: “I

16 Interview with Tibetan youth aged 19 years at TRSHC on It is important to note that for the new generation India-born Tibetans, their identity as refugee was something which had to be cognitively learnt. Tenzin Tsundue in his essay, “My Kind of Exile” emphasizes this point, “When we were children in a Tibetan school in Himachal Pradesh. Our teachers used to regale us with tales of Tibetans suffering in Tibet. We were often told that we were refugees and that we all bore a big ‘R’ on our foreheads”, available at www.friendsoftibet.org on 15/06/07.

17 A general term applied to a number of groups bearing varied degree of affiliation with Tibetan culture. The early history of the Bhutias in Sikkim is shrouded in myth and legend but a common belief is that they came from eastern Tibet see L.S.S. O’Malley, Bengal District Gazetteers Darjeeling (Government of West Bengal: Basumati Corporation Limited, 2001 [1907]: 188.

18 Laying claim to Bhutia identity is a common strategy adopted by most Tibetan refugees doing lucrative business in Darjeeling town area. It serves a strategic end of securing ties to Indian citizenship and providing business opportunities in a condition of anonymity and security.
know this place better than any other place. I do not want to go and stay in any other part of India. It is convenient to do business in India but given the chance I would like to go to America (a mi ri ka) you know, there is opportunity (go skabs) there.”

On furthering probing which became possible after some degree of trust was established, what came to light was the fact that the respondent was socialized into becoming aware of the connection between his identity as a Tibetan refugee and the place – Darjeeling (he had many Bhutia friends, like my key informant). His knowledge that the Bhutias are Tibetans and diasporics of an earlier era like the Tibetan refugees themselves initiated the process of “emplacement”, by creating a sense of belonging to the place (Darjeeling) which in the imaginative sense formed part of what he, echoing my key informant called, “the Great land of Tibet”. This similarity of sentiment generally held by Tibetan refugees and Bhutias echoes the British colonial perception that the Bhutias and Lepchas were unlikely to shift their loyalty from Tibet as they were strongly integrated by a common heritage, religion, language and culture. They all belonged to the Tibeto-Burman group and adhered to a pan-Buddhist religion of “Lamaist Buddhism” from where they derived their ethnic identity. The British policy of encouraging Nepali migrants to Darjeeling throughout the second half of the 19th century and in the subsequent period originated from the colonial design to outbalance the original ethnic domination of the Lepchas and

19 For the respondent, ‘knowing this place’ meant a certain degree of identification with the place – Darjeeling, its history and geography.

20 Excerpt from an interview with a Tibetan shop owner at Mahakal market, Darjeeling town, on 19/05/05. The source of the respondent’s knowledge of the three places - Darjeeling, India and America that he mentions is both experiential and imaginative. Here we see the process of diasporic identifications at play. While feeling of belonging to Darjeeling is greatest, the place is evaluated in relation or opposition to India. America is there in the distant horizon, for him an abode of prosperity, a projection into the future. Tibet as a place is not mentioned by him in the initial phase of the interview.

21 My key informant, a Bhutia, in the numerous conversations with him, once interjected and told about the historical fact that the King of Sikkim used to traditionally give tributes periodically to the Dalai Lama of Tibet at Lhasa, as demonstration of his allegiance to the Lamaist State. He told that he had read it somewhere but could not recollect the source.
Bhutias in the region.\textsuperscript{22} The British found in the Nepali immigrants, a group of loyal subjects whose allegiance would lie with the British and not with the Dalai Lama of Tibet.\textsuperscript{23}

The town refugees’ assessments of their actual relations with Bhutia immigrants and vice-versa vary considerably. Some informants say that Tibetan refugees and Bhutias have got on very well together and a good deal of cooperation exists between them. My respondent (a Bhutia) spoke about his childhood friend (a Tibetan refugee who lived in TRSHC). “He did not hesitate to mix with others in the town. He was like this from young years. We played football at the local club – Viva sporting club and in Darjeeling Government College and Himalayan sporting club. It is his sporting spirit that has helped. He is like a non-playing captain. Now he works like a liaison man. He even knows some police personnel in town. Any trouble in TRSHC everybody goes to him for help. In the Centre the people are orthodox type. They think that young generation if they mix with local guys, they will get adulterated. My friend (grogs po) is different. But I see that the Centre’s members can choose to have less and remain with their limits. A very good quality, very few Tibetans are like that. My friend did not choose to go abroad.” My Bhutia respondent hastened to add that there is mutual support between Tibetan refugees and the Bhutias. His remarks testified to this, “Last year wool that was being imported to Darjeeling was seized at Dalkhola by commercial tax check post. I called up commercial tax office and got them (Tibetan refugees) out of the problem. They need us for the day to day problems and interactions with local authorities. We need them also. In my marriage (chang sa), I was not getting a groom hat. The self help centre has a cultural section. They lend hats to other Buddhists. I got the groom hat


\textsuperscript{23} In order to understand the ethnic domain in the context of Darjeeling spelt out here, it is particularly relevant to recall Michael Fischer’s essay, “Ethnicity and the Arts of Memory,” in which he states, “The different ethnicities constitute a ‘family of resemblance’: similar, not identical; each enriching because of its inter-references, not reducible to mechanical functions of solidarity, mutual aid, political mobilization or socialization. It is the inter-references, the interweaving of cultural threads from different arenas that give ethnicity its phoenix-like capacities for reinvigoration and reinspiration” See Michael Fischer, “Ethnicity and the Arts of Memory,” in Writing Culture: The Poetics and Politics of Ethnography, ed. James Clifford & George Markus (California: University of California Press, 1986): 194-233.
from them. In schools too when some Buddhist functions are to be held, we approach the refugees for assistance. Anybody can come of help later that is why I help others."\(^{24}\)

Other informants believe that the Bhutias had desired first and foremost to distance themselves from the Tibetan refugees when they first arrived, even when support was extended to them. Conversation with an elderly Bhutia, a former Councillor of the Bhutia Busty Ward, revealed this aspect. "Tibetan refugees who came with precious stones and gold did not go to the Centre. They settled in different parts of Darjeeling town, even in Bhutia Busty area. The refugees used to stink. They coughed all the time. We avoided contact with them. Refugees would not stay in queue for collecting water. Khampas were brute people. They carried the habits of Tibetan highlands with them to India. They did not take bath when they came here. Many had T.B. In schools the Tibetan refugee students used to vomit. In Bhutia Busty some Bhutia families gave them shelter. My family had given rented accommodation to a Tibetan refugee when he came here. We had even given him permission to enter our kitchen. He told me about stories of Chinese atrocities. He told of the times in Tibet when the Tibetans never trusted their own brothers who could be spies. They did not sleep all day long. Such a grave situation was not there when they came to live with the locals of Darjeeling."\(^{25}\)

Many other residents interviewed at Bhutia Busty spoke of their unwillingness to associate too conspicuously with the Tibetan refugees. "We Bhutias do not take part in any political activity that is for the cause of Tibetan independence,"\(^{26}\) said a few

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24 Excerpt from an interview with a Bhutia respondent who worked in a government office in his mid 40s at Bhutia Busty on 24/09/06.
25 Excerpt from the interview with the former councilor of Bhutia Busty on 29/09/06. Both conjunction and disjunction is seen to characterize Bhutia-refugee relationship. Tibet that is portrayed by the refugee in the excerpt is a picture of Tibet which assumes an unShangrila-like appearance, which violates western sensibilities of a pristine Tibet. Exile is therefore a ‘place of refuge’ where normal social relations are restored at the intimate level of the family.
26 Interview with few Bhutia respondents in Bhutia busty on 24/9/06. This is not to suggest that the Bhutias are indifferent to the Tibetan cause. On the contrary, Bhaichung Bhutia, the Indian football captain who has his home in Sikkim took the decision to drop out of the team that would carry the Olympic torch on its Indian leg in New Delhi. "I sympathise with the Tibetans and their cause. I have sent a letter to the IOA (Indian Olympic Association) refusing to carry the torch," Bhaichung told The Telegraph (The Telegraph, Calcutta,
respondents. The disjuncture that exists in the refugee-Bhutia relationship is further revealed in the subsequent discussion with the Bhutias about the Bhutia encounter with the refugees. One Bhutia respondent echoed the sentiment of the youth members of his community. “The Tibetan refugees used the term ‘Ghyagar Khampas’ to denote Indian citizens. They see Bhutias at a lower stage than them. They do not express it openly. Their reason may be that our Tibetan language is not good. We do not have foundation about that. We are comfortable here since we are interacting with Indian Nepalis and India is where we belong. So we do not mind if the Tibetan refugees feel this way about us. But sometimes we have to talk in Nepali in order to put them down.”27 Nepali language here is deliberately used as an instrument of domination by the Bhutias to keep the Tibetan refugees at bay. The use of Nepali is a constant reminder not only of the minority status of the Tibetan refugees but also of the threat of assimilation. However, speaking fluent Nepali is the easiest method adopted by Tibetan refugees to fend off outsider’s suspicion. The other is by negating the refugee label in front of outsiders by passing28 themselves off as Bhutias.

Using the “adoptive label” of a Bhutia therefore does not conceal the actual identity of a Tibetan as refugee in contexts where the traffic existed between Tibetan refugees and locals. The strategy of invisibility arose not out of a generalized fear of repression or expatriation. It particularly worked in allowing them to avoid involvement with strangers, particularly when it entailed revealing one’s status. The play of identities in shifting contexts opened up avenues whereby they could become self-employed or join the competitive market, obtain licenses for trade and spend leisure time in town. The use of Bhutia identity by Tibetan refugees shaped by the nexus of relations in gaining success in business

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27 Interview with a Bhutia respondent in Bhutia busty on 25/9/06.
28 In traditional usage, ‘passing’ refers to the practice of assuming the identity of another type, class or groups of persons in order to be recognized as a member of that group, for social, economic or political reasons see Emily Yeh, “Will the Real Tibetan Please Stand Up! Identity Politics in the Tibetan Diaspora,” in Tibet, Self and the Tibetan Diaspora: Voices of Difference, ed. Christiaan Klieger (Boston: Brill Publications, 2002). 237.
and employment did not go unnoticed by Bhutias and Nepalis. One Bhutia respondent living near the Tibetan dominated Dragon and Mahakal market spoke about the Bhutia-Tibetan refugee relationship in the following words: “Human beings have the tendency to settle down in the place where they come to stay. This was true for the Nepalese in Darjeeling. Tibetans came as migrants before 1959. They came as refugee after 1959. Earlier Bhutia people were not literate, so they allowed refugees to take advantage of the name of ‘Bhutia’. After sometime, when literacy among Bhutias grew, competition among Bhutias and other Scheduled Tribes\(^{29}\) to get government jobs intensified. If an outsider comes, then it creates problems for us. Bhutia Welfare Association did raise protest against Tibetan refugees taking up government jobs under the Scheduled Tribes certificate.”\(^{30}\) The desire for anonymous status arose out of the need to circumvent excess bureaucratic entanglement. By virtue of not remaining spatially isolated as in a camp, refugees in Darjeeling town could translate this desire into a workable reality in the form of obtaining ration cards, entering their names in the voter’s list and procuring Scheduled Tribes certificate by using the surname “Bhutia”. The passage to obtaining Indian citizenship was thus clear but had to be arranged discreetly.\(^{31}\)

The need to buy nationality was deemed more necessary for those refugees who had become wealthy on account of owning houses, restaurants, hotels, shops or valuable items like taxis and cars. Wealth made them visible in town areas which necessitated the procurement of citizenship documents to deal with “exposure”. Identity documents on the one hand signaled permanent residence in Darjeeling town but it did not have a fixed one-to-one correspondence with particular degrees of commitment to place among the refugees-turned-Indian citizens. Citizenship documents were only a technique of invisibility or means for commerce. It was something more than a simple matter of have or have-not for Tibetans at TRSHC. In a situation

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29 The total population of Scheduled Tribes in the Darjeeling Municipality is 12,747, of which 6,448 is male and 6,299 is female (Census of India 2001).

30 The Bhutia respondent was an elderly man. His family members were helping him narrate. Excerpt from an interview with a Bhutia resident in Darjeeling town on 29/09/06.

31 Obtaining Indian citizenship has never been an easy decision for a Tibetan in exile.
of protracted exile, the citizenship question is a controversial one confronting Tibetans in the diaspora. Other problems or complications were raised in its wake and had its distinctive resonance in Darjeeling town in particular. These were the perspectives on the problem of “return”; to questions of identity as an effect of diasporic (multiple) attachments to several places at one time; in the framework of the Central Tibetan Administration’s policy which officially discourages Tibetans from taking up Indian citizenship consistent with the cultural preservation thesis which it espouses. Successfully claiming to be a Bhutia, producing the ration cards at the food ration shops, voter’s identity card at the time of Municipal elections provided sufficient proof of naturalization for many town refugees. Although it was possible for Tibetans to garner Indian citizenship through use of these identity signs, they could not hide their identity as refugees from locals. The effectiveness of these identity signs depended upon the general acceptance of and tacit support from sections of the local population.

The fact that immigrant agents and officers at the Foreigner’s Registration Office (who were recruited from the local Bhutia and Nepali Buddhist community) were reluctant to disclose information about the size of Tibetan refugee population in Darjeeling town to an outsider is sufficient proof of the prevalence of a tacit approval from sections of the local community of the workings of this “naturalization” or de facto citizenship of town refugees. Yet nearly all Tibetan refugees in Darjeeling town fulfilled the requirements of the Foreigners Registration Act by obtaining the Registration Certificate (RC)32. Several Tibetans reiterated that the procedure of renewing the Registration Certificate every year was problematic, cumbersome and indicative of their changeable and precarious status. Further, it is incumbent upon Tibetan refugees having the Registration Certificate to report his/her presence to the district registration officer within 7 days of his/her arrival, every time one moves out of the district of registration and residential address for more than 7 days. In practice, few Tibetan refugees in Darjeeling who

32 Both Tibetan refugees and Tibetan-turned Indian citizens possessed the Registration Certificate (RC). RC was an emphatic proof of their Tibetan nationality; their adherence to the movement for the independence of Tibet and an affirmation of their ethnic identity as Tibetan.
are RC holders take the trouble to report. As residents of India they move around freely from place to place unlike foreign visitors to the country.

3. The Meaning of Place in a World of Movement

The ethnographic exploration of the lived and experiential circumstances of the Tibetan refugees in a specific host context (Darjeeling town) on the one hand reinforces the idea that the Tibetan refugees and Tibetans (Bhutias) have always been mobile or ‘on the move’ under very different conditions and predicaments. This view immediately served to highlight the theoretical limitations of viewing refugee groups like those of the Tibetans as occupying a bounded territory; of viewing cultures as spatially localized. The corollary of this perspective is that people regardless of their territorial origin have become or are in the process of becoming deterritorialized, resulting in generalized “homelessness”33 or “refugeeness”. The implication of such a conception of displacement is that since there is no need for people to belong to a specific place, the idea of return “home” or repatriation as constituting a durable solution to protracted refugee problems is unfounded. On the other hand, the transnational practices of Tibetan refugee groups as a result of their dispersion have paved the way for the creation of a complex niche in the “hostlands”. The existence of this complex niche that directs attention to the processes, practices, actors and relations in the specific local context of Darjeeling town is seen to provide meaning to the diasporic world that the Tibetan refugees inhabit.

The presence of pre-exilic Tibetan hosts, the Bhutias in Darjeeling town and recognition of the fact that the current situation of Tibetan refugees is a result of past (pre-1950) migrations and eventual settlement of Tibetans in the region directs attention away from viewing the Tibetans in terms of the presumed isomorphism of people, culture and territory. The ethnic similarities have been particularly important in the sense that a large part of the refugees, through tribal relations (claiming Scheduled Tribes status of the Bhutias) or by echoing pan-

Buddhist sentiments expressed in statements such as “We are Buddhists, we are one”, have been able to lay claim upon available resources. The movement of Tibetans as refugees into the region previously occupied by the ethnic Bhutias and their use of the adoptive label – Bhutia - for functional purposes spawned new local groups and new relationships both of cooperation and conflict with neighbouring groups. The Bhutias were for long caught up in the same contingent social situation as the refugees, except that they have all acquired Indian citizenship.

The growing competition between Scheduled Tribes created a rift between Bhutias and the refugees but there were also conscious attempts by refugees to reduce feelings of hostility among neighbours. This attitude is reflected in the following statement by the Welfare Officer of the Darjeeling refugee settlement who said, “We are neither a burden nor an asset to Darjeeling local economy. As refugees we have to work that is all.” Living in urban residential areas among nationals meant that the Tibetan refugees have had to fend for themselves in an otherwise economically depleted and congested urban space. Neighbourhoods where Tibetans live with non-Tibetans therefore require and produce contexts.34 They have to be carved out from “some sort of hostile or recalcitrant environment” which may include other neighbourhoods. Thus, the making and remaking of ethnic communities in a place became intertwined with acts of surviving and gaining resources. Yet the construction of Tibetan identities in the diaspora remain linked to the experiences of flight from the homeland and seeking asylum, which results in differentiation of the Tibetan community dispersed across spaces on the basis of their affiliations or identity groups back home. The dispersal of Tibetan refugee groups involves a strong sense of the danger of forgetting the location of origin (as is the fate of the Bhutias of Darjeeling, which the Tibetan refugees living there are well aware of). Even though the Tibetan refugees are in a “Stateless”35 situation, the very prospect that they may never return home creates a more intensified yearning for the


homeland. Thus diasporic consciousness, as Clifford states, “lives loss and hope as a defining tension.” A Tibetan refugee’s ruminations about Tibet, “We have a dream of a free Tibet. In everyday life, the dream sometimes vanishes. But it is in there. It cannot be erased or something. It is in there. Anytime it can come up. Even if it does not come up, it is in there,”36 shows how this yearning becomes a major preoccupation and, in a sense, replaces the real possibility of returning home.

When seen as not just movement but as a relational network associated with particular places, diaspora becomes a way of creating a rift between places of belonging and places of residence. The following statement made by a Tibetan refugee engaged in the garment business in Darjeeling town, “I know this place better than any other place37. I do not want to go and stay in any other part of India. It is convenient to do business in India but given the chance I would like to go to America (a mi ri ka) you know, there is opportunity (go skabs) there,”38 points to how diasporic cultures mediate, as James Clifford argues, “the experiences of living here and remembering/desiring or not desiring another place”.

4. At Home in the Diaspora!

Darjeeling has had a history of serving as a zone of contact between different ethnic communities over time. With the exception of the autochthonous Lepchas of the region, the Nepalese and the Tibetans moved to Darjeeling from Nepal and Tibet respectively.39 Darjeeling and Kalimpong town for instance

36 Excerpt from the interview with a Tibetan refugee at TRSHC on 24/05/05. See James Clifford, Routes: Travel and Translation in the Late Twentieth Century (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1997).
37 For the respondent, ‘knowing this place’ meant a certain degree of identification with the place – Darjeeling, its history and geography.
38 Excerpt from an interview with a Tibetan shop owner at Mahakal market, Darjeeling town, on 19/05/05. The source of the respondent’s knowledge of the three places - Darjeeling, India and America that he mentions is both experiential and imaginative. Here we see the process of diasporic identifications at play. While feeling of belonging to Darjeeling is greatest, the place is evaluated in relation or opposition to India.

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served as a trading centre but its economic basis expanded to cover activities in handicraft, transport and service sectors. Right until the late 1950’s caravans of Tibetan mules used to ply back and forth between Kalimpong and Tibetan towns. In this sense, Tibetans historically did not have a boundary nor were they fixed in a territory but had a “place” and were “on the move”. Past migrations of Tibetans (before 1950) into the region had to be taken into cognizance. It was difficult to doubt the historicity of their move, even though it had happened long enough ago to be embellished in myth and legend. As member of the pioneering group of Tibetans became more and more “emplaced” in an area, they acquired a name – Bhutia that had no reference to their place of settlement (Darjeeling) but was identified with the place that they had left – “Bhot” or “Tibet”. When the Tibetan refugees moved into Darjeeling town from 1959 onwards, they began to settle or work in areas where their predecessors (the Bhutias) had their presence (Bhutia Busty) or in places (Ladenla road) or shops bearing Tibetan names. The refugees were aware that the etymology of the word ‘Darjeeling’ had roots in Tibetan culture. They began to adopt the name “Bhutia” in their everyday life in order to conceal their refugee identity in certain contexts. This can be seen as a consequence of their need to gain shelter by presenting a veneer that they seek assimilation in a host society and their commitment to either a theoretically unending process of movement into new places or a deferred “return” to their homeland. Their attempts to forge meaningful ties with the Bhutias and the dominant Nepalis in the town became integral to the process of rehabilitation in the early years of exile. Notwithstanding, the apparent assimilative tendencies that the refugees exhibited in their use of the Bhutia label or in their speaking of Nepali, the gradual differentiation between Tibetan refugees and the Bhutias had set in based primarily on the political commitment of the former to the idea of “return” expressed in spatial and cultural terms. The Tibetan-host relationship characterized by conjunction and disjunction relative to local40 circumstances makes it possible to appreciate the significance that the Tibetans attribute to their refugee identity

40 Local or locality in the study is viewed, borrowing from Appadurai, in strictly relational and contextual sense. Refugee and host dynamic is captured in specific neighbourhoods, whether it is in the social form of the refugee centre or the market place in Darjeeling town.
and the “spatial practices” by means of which the Tibetans produce and maintain a sense of “place” in a contested environment.

While the sense of an eventual return to the place of origin seemed imminent to those who had escaped from Tibet in the initial years of exile, their heirs born in Darjeeling have instead begun to look forward to another place of arrival – the West or some other place of settlement in order to give meaning to their present localized existence. The “return” to Darjeeling by some refugees from the West or places in the diaspora during Losar (Tibetan New Year), provides additional information about the predicaments of exile life in a different host context. Becoming legally secure through obtaining a refugee status (Registration Certificate and the Identity Certificate) or acquiring citizenship rights while planning to move to other host societies is perceived by many refugees as the one kind of life they can lead in Darjeeling for the present. Some Tibetan refugees in India are aware of other family members and friends who have acquired citizenship rights in the West but have found meaningful integration into their host societies unattainable. For some Tibetans, Darjeeling appears to continually refer beyond itself to other places – United States, Canada, recently Australia. So while living in Darjeeling and India is an attractive option during certain periods of one’s life, for example, when acquiring school and college education or some skill, other places of residence, such as the United States, is regarded as the best place for work or reunifying the family and kin group. As these different places become increasingly familiar, whether through direct experience, word of mouth or other communication channels (phayul.com) that allows Tibetans to monitor current events, it becomes difficult to see them as separate places.

In spite of expressing an interest in obtaining Indian citizenship, a Tibetan respondent in Darjeeling town confirmed having more than one identity by stating that, “Becoming an Indian becomes important, we get opportunity. With Holiness there, we feel proud we are Tibetans. I do not mind becoming an Indian but I want to keep my status as refugee. It is important that we believe that we will get our freedom. We can always convert to Tibetan, when Tibet is free. I am a Tibetan but since I am born in India I am an
Indian.⁴¹ Integration into the host society, Darjeeling or India, here is imagined as becoming an Indian citizen while still maintaining Tibetan identity and culture. The networks across political borders created by Tibetans in their quest for economic advancement and political recognition have afforded the possibility of having hybrid identities. Tibetan refugees in Darjeeling are seen as either bilingual or multilingual (knowing Tibetan, Hindi, English and Nepali), frequently maintaining homes in two or more places and pursuing economic, political and cultural interests that require their real or imaginary presence in both. The emphasis on “place” by Tibetan youths living in TRSHC who have chosen to remain refugees or stateless does not signify alienation from the present or a straightforward and actual longing to return to Tibet. Some of the self-settled Tibetans in Darjeeling town have become Indian citizens, given the perceived benefits which accompany that status, such as freedom in terms of physical movement, exercise of the right to own businesses, property and increased educational opportunities. However, in the Darjeeling town context, acquiring citizenship documents was not tantamount to a declaration that a Tibetan has given up the belief that Tibet will eventually be free. Embracing Indian citizenship has had an instrumental dimension, in that, it exists alongside the desire and the practice of remaining a refugee while interacting with co-refugees or constitutive others within a refugee settlement context or becoming a diasporic in the context of the town.

The exponents of the “deterritorialization” theme have argued that one of the reasons why refugees are in a deplorable state is because of the assumption that there are “natural” places from which people derive their identity. However, the “right to remain” or belonging to a territory with strong associations through long-term occupation, does not make sense unless it means the right to stay in that territory in safety and that right is exercised by the right holders themselves free from external pressure.⁴² The way Tibetans prior to 1959 and after have experienced movement into

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⁴¹ Excerpt from the interview with a Tibetan respondent who does garment business at Mahakal market, Darjeeling town on 24/05/05.

and settlement in a new place, Darjeeling, is determined by whether and how much they viewed themselves as being displaced against their will and whether their notions of territorial attachments can be retained and even extended to areas not necessarily adjacent to each other. The Tibetans who moved to Darjeeling as refugees clearly viewed themselves as “being displaced against their will”. The telling and retelling of stories told by older generation exiles to the new generation Darjeeling-born Tibetans about Tibet and the early years of struggle in a new place; the re-creation of familiar features from the lost environment as recaptured in the architectural design of houses built in and around the refugee settlement; rituals of naming houses and streets with their spatial and temporal symbolism; inner decoration of refugee homes and the transportation of familiar objects and personal mementoes constitute the set of “place-making” activities meant to re-establish continuity with the place of origin. For the refugees there was no obvious rupture of continuity with the place (Tibet) from which they moved. What was also at work in these forms of social action was the process of “reterritorialization” as Tibetan refugee groups faced with a protracted exile condition have attempted to delimit and influence relationships with “others” over a geographic area (Darjeeling town). This process assumes significance in places like Darjeeling where the rights of, access to and use of sources of livelihood are apportioned on the basis of territorially anchored identity. To be outside that physical context often entails loss of rights to belong to an ethnic or national group which is physically grounded. In a multi-ethnic place like Darjeeling which has been host to migrant groups in the past, Tibetan refugee groups and individuals have developed over time a repertoire of strategies of managing assimilative tendencies towards productive ends on the one hand and forging meaningful social relations that link several localities in more than one “host” place.

When the Tibetan refugees in Darjeeling town related with strangers or other ethnic groups, they tended to use the term, “Bhutia”- an Indian ethnic group, which in consequence implied their identification with an Indian identity. Assuming an Indian identity, such as, Bhutia, did not mean that they had lost their Tibetan identity. While referring to themselves as Bhutia, the Tibetan refugees in Darjeeling town could collectively view
themselves as part of on-going movements from the place of origin (Tibet), of long-term displacement, dispersal and resettlement in new societies of residence. Nearly all Tibetan refugees in Darjeeling town under the Foreigners Registration Act have also obtained the Registration Certificate (RC) as an emphatic proof of their Tibetanness. The RC remains of the most powerful unifying symbols for the Tibetan exiles. In such a situation, it becomes difficult to distinguish between a façade and a reality, since refugees are unwilling to disclose how they identify themselves. Identifying themselves or identified by others as Indian citizens has the intended or unintended consequence of giving off the image that refugees “imagine” themselves as being part of the host society or producing real or fictitious forms of cosmopolitan identity.

Even in more deterritorialized times and settings where the very notion of “home” as a durably fixed place is in doubt, displaced peoples like the Tibetans who have clustered around the imagination of homelands or places from a distance are seen to be the ones who have become “emplaced”, that is, developed attachment to a “place” or “places” and have tried to establish firm territorialized anchors in their new place of residence. Territoriality is thus reinscribed at just the point it threatens to be erased. As actual places and localities become ever more blurred and indeterminate, ideas of culturally and ethnically distinct places become even more salient. Deterritorialization has not thereby created subjects who are “free-floating monads”, despite what is sometimes implied by those eager to celebrate freedom and playfulness of the postmodern condition. Cosmopolitan identity cannot be wished into existence in most host societies where identities are determined on the basis of territorially anchored identities.

Since the Tibetans who moved to a territorialized place like Darjeeling as refugees could not claim entitlement based on past physical occupation or membership of a co-ethnic group such as the Bhutias, the desire to return to one’s place of origin became an overriding preoccupation, bordering obsession. The heirs to the displaced Tibetans have however tended to identify strongly with their society of residence by virtue of being born in Darjeeling town – as one Tibetan respondent stated, “Darjeeling
is there till we are here. It is not our country. It is our birthplace. Till we are here in India, it is our home,” and the opportunity this offers regarding rights of access to resources and protection that is due to citizens of a territory. They have also been the ones who have maintained multiple connections with co-ethnics living in other host societies in ways that aim at supporting a distant homeland, Tibet, and enabling opportunities by virtue of being spatially anchored. Identities of Tibetans that operate in the context of the town are shown as being fictional, adoptive, hidden or lost. They do not suggest an oversimplified opposition between territorialized and deterritorialized identities or statements such as “that people are not free to go wherever they want”. Rather identity is seen as a “situated” process. It is striking how Tibetans respond once the option of moving within the diaspora presents itself, regardless of whether the option is ever exercised. It is the movement of individuals and groups from place to place within the diaspora as being in the realm of the possible and not that of becoming rooted in a particular place which becomes important for Tibetans in certain interpretive contexts.

Through the course of the study of Tibetan refugees, it became evident that the attempt has not been to arrive at a holistic description of a “total way of life” of Tibetan exiles nor has it been to provide a “durable solution” to protracted exile of Tibetans. This ethnography of displacement seeks to bring to bear the specific histories of groups operating in a region and their traditions of movement; their practices of "dwelling in a place and their dwelling-in-displacement" (Clifford 1997) in order to understand how identities become allied to places.

**Bibliography**


BOOK REVIEWS


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The term Anti-Americanism covers a wide range of different perceptions, theoretical views and attitudes towards the United States of America as a whole, and represents a phenomenon which exists in the contemporary world. This book, with its attractive title “The Anti-American Century”, a collection of six articles written by different authors and edited by Ivan Krastev and Alan McPherson, focuses precisely on this phenomenon. The authors define the twentieth century as “the American century”, in which the United States won the Cold War, tremendously increased their influence and became the only superpower by all meanings of the word. In their view, the beginning of the 21st century marks the end of “the American century” and the authors are convinced that the era we are entering may be freely recalled as “the anti-American century”. This book examines the nature of the phenomenon of anti-Americanism in present days, as well as in the past, searching for its roots in different parts of the world.

Lead by this thought, it explores several questions in terms of how the phenomenon should be seen from different perspectives such as political, social and/or cultural, what are the historical roots and turning points of it in certain parts of the world, and what are the links with anti-Semitic sentiment. The particular value of this book is in its wide framework. It is a combination of different pieces by different authors, with a background in different academic disciplines. These pieces are in a continuous dialogue with each other, voicing different national experiences, intellectual traditions and personal approaches. Moreover, as the editors define, they share neither the same politics, nor the same obsessions but at the same time they are united by a common intuition: we are living in the anti-American century (p.2).
In the first part, entitled the same as the book, Krastev focuses on the anti-Americanism mainly in Europe, arguing that anti-Americanism has not changed much, but what has significantly changed is the world. What the author sees is not so much the rise of anti-Americanism in singular as the rise of anti-Americanisms in plural, connected with real problems that people all over the globe face, the globe lead by the United States. He points out that people are against America because they are against everything – or because they do not know exactly what they are against (p. 12). In the second part, written by Janos Matyas Kovacs, the book focuses on Eastern Europe referring to this area as “Little America” and on Eastern European feelings and behaviors towards the United States, as well as their influence and expressions in the European context. He starts the chapter quoting a common eastern European citizen: Why do we want to become members of the European Union? Because we haven’t been invited to join the United States (p. 27). The author concludes that as the argument goes on, the whole world is becoming increasingly anti-American, yet, as usual, Eastern Europe is an exception to the rule.

The third chapter focuses on anti-Americanism in Latin America and it is elaborated by Alan McPherson. Here, the author explains how different generations of “anti-Americans” have defined themselves vis-à-vis the United States and how their strategies evolved over time. Through the three generations depicted in this chapter— the 1920s, the 1960s and the 2000s the author concludes that the state was the locus of power, but not always of anti-American activity. Anti-Americanism arose outside the state when United States power acted within it, and inside the state when United States power loosened its hold on it (p. 70). In the fourth chapter, through Youngshik Bong’s and Katharine H.S. Moon’s extensive analyses, the book seeks to explain the new anti-Americanism in a traditionally partner country of the United States, such as South Korea. Examining the assumptions that new nationalism among Korean youth generates anti-Americanism and its influence on Korea’s bilateral relations with the United States, the authors argue that numerical correlations between age and so-called anti-American sentiments are both limited and inconsistent. They conclude that there is no doubt civic activism will continue in addressing and protesting against
the United States military presence. But, they point out as well, in the long run, democratic consolidation is likely to have a stabilizing effect on feelings of anti-Americanism among the young people and lead to its pragmatic manifestations. In the fifth part of the book, the author, Farish Noor, concentrates on understanding the new phenomenon of religiously inspired anti-Americanism among the Muslim communities in Southeast Asia and underlines the need of some understanding of the history of this region itself and of its convoluted relationships with the United States. The conclusion of the author exposes the reality of Washington’s failure to appreciate the fact that in this region two realities exist: the islands of wealth, power and cosmopolitan culture of the cities and the under-developed seas of poverty and relative backwardness of the countryside as well as the urban slums (p. 123). Moreover, he emphasizes that in these poor, Muslim-dominated areas, “the battle for hearts and minds” has been won, not by the United States and its local allies, but by the Islamists of Southeast Asia. The final part, presented by Brian Klug, deals with the popular notion of connecting anti-Americanism to anti-Semitism. The author examines the view that the two phenomena are inseparable. Nevertheless, although the author asses that anti-Americanism and anti-Semitism are occasionally connected, he denies that they constitute a double-headed monster that is stalking the earth.

We are dealing with an engaging book that I can freely say is a page turner. While the book gives different cultural and geographical stories in a provocative language, the overall tone remains unquestionably scholarly. Conceptually and academically it represents an extremely valuable piece of work. The phenomenon which it seeks to explain and understand is certainly controversial and so, even the definition of the term Anti-Americanism has been debated in the literature a lot. While some are trying to systematize it, suggesting a view of classical aspects of the phenomenon, others recognize that it can represent two extremely different tendencies, a form of prejudice targeting all Americans and a labeling of the criticisms of the United States as “anti-American”. In these regards, the book to some extent incorporates the different standpoints. The authors have fulfilled their goals in terms of covering a huge amount of ground, from South-East Asia to Central Europe, and from Western Europe to
Latin America, and creating a volume that offers original insights into the nature and origins of the phenomenon of Anti-Americanism. They have also managed to give both culturally and academically different considerations of this phenomenon, as well as to examine the benefits or self-destructiveness to its “believers”. Yet, further analyses of the response of the United States to the phenomenon and the Anti-American sentiment in general, possible developments and suggestions of how different actors position themselves towards the phenomenon are still needed. As Kohut and Stokes warn that anti-Americanism is one of the principal challenges facing the United States in the years ahead (p.152), this book could be helpful in examining this challenge both for graduate students and scholars, as well as for policy makers and will certainly suitably fit in the spectrum of literature covering the theory of Anti-Americanism.


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The collapse of the Soviet Union did not only change the context in world politics but also it had a huge effect on political science. Scholars from all over the world have been trying to understand this spectacular change in societal, economical, political, and ideological means. In *Socialism: An Analysis of its Past and Future*, Erzsébet Szalai also focuses on the transition in former socialist states. She elaborates the characteristics of the former regime and society, and analyzes the existing political and economical system influenced by capitalism. While doing this, she makes a harsh criticism of both capitalism and what she calls “existing socialism”. The main countries the author analyzes are Eastern European countries, with a specific emphasis on Hungary. She defines the current system as “My own thesis is that the social formation called state socialism was in reality a social system located between state socialism and state capitalism – a transitory society which it would be more legitimate and exact to call semiperipheral socialism.” (p. 3)
Among the eight chapters of the book, the first five are dedicated to an in-depth theoretical analysis of “existing socialism”. She discusses the complex nature of existing socialism mainly in the means of political and economic power relations. The power holders, class and power structures, interest groups, actors, economical and social infrastructure are questioned in the existing socialism throughout these five chapters. Her claim is “…it was the party and state bureaucracy – the bureaucracy of the state party and the party state – and the stratum of big-company managers who possessed power. “ (p. 7). She calls them a “status group with some traits of a class, and will call them the status group in power.” (p. 9). She claims that this status group in power constituted the main elite of the country and they owned the means of production. However, their interests were separate from those of society. Thus, the interest conflicts were expressed and solved through subordination and super-ordination (p. 27). She argues this complexity eventually became the source of system’s disintegration (p. 54).

“Existing socialism” denotes the transitional society, it did not move towards any kind of socialism, but towards new capitalism. In the final three chapters, the author criticizes this new capitalism and underlines three possible alternatives to capitalism: fundamentalist movements, open dictatorship of the global international economic elite, and the new socialist alternative (p. 68). Her suggestion is the promotion of new-socialism as an alternative to new-capitalism. She defines it as “Without a chain of voluntarily created and accepted microcommunities bringing together free individuals, even the idea of society merely approximating communalism will remain an eternal illusion. Only the results of organic development nurtured from below are enduring, because the inherited socio-cultural patterns bind people even where the societal conditions change radically, since such changes occur or can be brought about only very slowly.” (p. 64) Thus, the basis of the new-socialism lays in the bringing an end of the atomization of individuals, and prompting a change coming from below.

This is generally a well-written book about the past and future of socialism. The author is genuinely aware of the theory and related studies, embedding the study in a broader literature. She
underlines many interesting and important points about the structure of the system and most of her arguments are wisely elaborated especially about class and hegemonic relations within society (pp. 9-18). However, most of her claims are not supported by any empirical work. The arguments about big company managers as the main power holders (p. 5), the structure of economic system, which is named as indirect socio-economic mechanism (p. 26), or her comments about the system such as “existing socialism socialized people into passivity, servility, and slyness in relation to estranged conditions, and that we suffer the consequences to this day” (p. 23) are strong claims made by the author but lack any empirical proof. She solely depends on her personal observations and knowledge, using other studies only to support her theoretically, not empirically. This decreases the scientific value of the book and, when it coincides with certain claims of the author (p. 64), makes it look like a personal manifest rather than an academic study.

Szalai is successful in reaching the first part of her aims – providing a criticism of socialism and capitalism. However, the second aim of the book which is suggesting a new-socialist alternative is not that successful. It is not clear what she means by new-socialism or how it can be realized because she does not define it systematically, and does not provide a solid theory. It seems like she perfectly analyzed the failure of Soviet socialism, and the reasons behind it. And now she knows what should not be done, but is not sure about what should be done. The lack of conceptualization of “new socialism” is one of the major shortcomings of the book, in addition to lack of empirical evidence.

The author provides valuable information and observations about Hungary while analyzing existing socialism. Nevertheless, she does not mention any other “East Central European countries” as she claims. She overgeneralizes her observations about Hungary to other Central and Eastern Europe countries, which also decreases the scientific value of her work. The use of language and terminology is appropriate. The most important shortcoming about the writing style is the frequency of using long quotes. The placement of long quotes so often may distract readers.
Consequently, *Socialism: An Analysis of Its Past and Future* is a valuable book from an important scholar. Szalai makes very bright comments but fails to provide enough empirical evidence to support them. So, the book should be read as a very personal essay, rather than an academic work. It is a good resource for scholars dealing with Eastern Europe or Soviet studies and for advanced political science students interested in these issues.


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Globalization, imperialism, and Americanization are all terms that have dominated current political and cultural theory. While accepting these theories as relevant, one must consider their origins, stemming from European culture and a tradition of universalizing aspirations. John Headley’s *The Europeanization of the World* is a fascinating and very much captivating work on the effects of what today is thought of as Western civilization on the rest of the world, most importantly the ideas of human rights and democracy. This book addresses very complex and relevant ideas in a fairly short number of pages. It provides a geographical, political, historical, theoretical, and philosophical background for the European influence on the origins of human rights and democracy throughout the modern world.

It is clear that a great deal of research and consideration went into this book. Headley uses evidence from some of the world’s most important scholars and philosophers, from the earliest writings of Ptolemy, St. Augustine, and Machiavelli, to the later theories of Immanuel Kant, John Locke, Martin Luther, Thomas Paine, Thomas Jefferson and James Madison. By examining the influence that these writers and thinkers had during their historical periods, Headley introduces the framework for the debates on human rights and democracy, specifically the use of dissent, all the while incorporating the evolution of globalization throughout this period.
The book is divided into three main chapters, the first of which identifies the Renaissance and the Enlightenment periods as the periods which set the stage for the “Global Arena”; the second which then uses the Reformation and Christendom as a “universalizing” force, up to the signing of the United States constitution in the evolution of natural rights and freedoms; and the third chapter which explains the figures and theories behind political dissent. While these previously described chapters provide an immense amount of substantial research and information, it is the “Aftermath” which connects the three chapters and reinforces how significant the implications of these political and social ideas have been for the modern world.

Headley offers numerous examples of how the interchanges of peoples would be characterized by European cultural expansion, settlement, commerce, and evangelization, with religion figuring as one among several civilizing factors (p. 46). When European explorers finally discovered that the entire world was populated, it provided a new space for expansion and spread of ideas, especially by the Church. Headley then goes on to relate this to the emergence of the Protestant Reformation, and Martin Luther as an origin of political dissent. Headley argues that in a religiously penetrated and ecclesiastically constructed society, religious dissent was the only type to prove effective. Democracy as a philosophical concept can be traced back to Plato’s dialogues, but it is the idea of “self-criticism” which Headley sees as the basis for democratic thought, which he believes emerged with the surfacing of dissent.

In each respective section, the emergence of human rights and the ensuing spread of dissent and democracy, Headley does not use the actual phrase “human rights” or “democracy” except for on a few occasions. The downside to this is anyone just skimming the book may not be able to grasp the main focus of the chapter. It is somewhat difficult to grasp what concept he’s attempting to examine amidst the pages of philosophical thought and historical details. Yet this is also an interesting way to approach the idea, which allows the reader to put the information together for himself. Headley provides the specific facts, general theories and philosophies and then by the time the reader comes to the “Aftermath” he is able to relate the history to the modern
world and the modern view of human rights and democracy. Some readers might find it helpful to read the “Aftermath” first and then start from the beginning. It is the “Aftermath” and subsequent Epilogue that provide the evidence for how these philosophies, actions and changing theories from Europe have had an impact on the debates of human rights and democracy.

Headley justifies his structure of the book in the introduction by stating that “the present study seeks to pursue a historical analysis and deliberately eschews any polemical, much less triumphalist, exposition of its two themes... the object here is to deepen our historical appreciation of two distinctive features of our civilization” (p. 7). He wishes to prove how Europe and Europeans “have come to identify and define a distinct civilization” (p. 3), providing the construction for a universalizing principle which led to the emergence of human rights and democracy. He argues that at the core of this development is a universalizing principle that has its basis in the construction of humanity as idea and fact. He advocates that it was not accidental that this changing concept of humanity “fell to a society so conceived and structured to create the global arena for the realization of the universal jurisdiction of humanity, among other better-known and less attractive enterprises” (65).

Too often scholars today are discussing the Americanization of the world and overlook the origins of the American political and global policies in Europe. Headley therefore tries to avoid using the terms “West” or “Western” in order to represent the whole of European civilization. The response by the rest of the world today to the idea of the “West” is greatly reflected in the “universalizing” techniques used during the Renaissance and Reformation periods, but it is important to also acknowledge the positive aspects that evolved during these periods. And while many scholars simply focus on the science and technological achievements by “Western” civilization, Headley focuses on the advancements of human thought and a type of universal brotherhood and the evolving belief that every human on this earth is entitled to equal rights and human dignity.

While the work may appear obsequious towards Europe, Headley acknowledges the “dark sides” of Europe, but prefers to remain
committed to the positive outcomes throughout the work. Thereby he justifies the fact that the book ends before the nineteenth century and the periods of colonialism and imperialism, two eras that were dominated by Europe and are in many ways in conflict with the ideas of human rights and democracy. The shortcoming of this is that while he argues how these unique ideas may have their origins in Europe, it struggles to hold up against the readers instincts and the present and more modern views of human rights and democracy in the world and the horrific consequences of these ideas that occurred during the 19th and 20th centuries, such as imperialism, most obviously WWI and WWII, and the highly controversial Iraq War, all of which were done with the intent of “spreading democracy”. From this point of view, can one truly say that these principles have been entirely positive? To withstand this argument, Headley refers to the ideas as simply “unique”.

This work is essential for anyone studying or interested in the foundations of human rights and democracy, as well as political theory and globalization, regardless of where one is in the world. Headley himself recognizes that “without the principled reference, study, and appreciation of the Western development as the continuing agent and source of global initiatives, the pursuit of cultural diversity becomes baseless” (p. 212).

Georgiy Kasianov and Philipp Ther (eds.) 2009, A Laboratory of Transnational History: Ukraine and Recent Ukrainian Historiography, Budapest: Central European University Press, 310 pp.

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Ukraine’s gaining independence and the fall of the communist regime was a milestone for historiography, since it allowed the revival of banned historical studies which hitherto were kept alive only in the Ukrainian diaspora. But the study of history in independent Ukraine purely in terms of the requirements of state- and nation-building and ethnicizing interpretations came into conflict with the prevailing cultural, social, and political diversity. By taking into consideration that a multitude of languages,
religions, and cultures as well as the various empires that have ruled Ukraine have made a lasting impression, the authors of this edited book go beyond the established national paradigm and present its history from a transnational perspective, involving disruptions and episodes of a “lack of coherent history”. The book is based on the fundamental argument that a narrow ethnonational narrative cannot offer a comprehensive or balanced Ukrainian history.

A Laboratory of Transnational History is sectioned into a theoretical and an empirical part. The theoretical section, which consists of four chapters, focuses on the deconstruction of major historical events by stressing the importance of local perspectives in the light of the multi-national coexistence in the region of present-day Ukraine. In line with the recent “spatial turn” in history, the authors stress that the nation-state is only one category of space among others. Thus, with the concept of histoire croisée – an area studies approach – Ukrainian history is suggested to be conceptualized as a Ukrainian-Polish-Russian-Jewish narration. The transnational approach is presented as a complementary perspective to find new units of analysis, such as sublevels like towns, villages and regions, families and individuals or, on the other hand, supranational levels, such as the history of Orthodoxy.

Within this context, the author of the fourth chapter outlines the weakness of national histories with their internalist perspectives of state-territorialization and then offers a new paradigm which is oriented toward agency, that is externalism, transcending the boundaries of one culture or country. This new “transfer history” approach concentrates on agents of cultural exchange and aims to view societies or social groups without idealizing contacts between two countries but rather includes multiperspectivity and comparison. In this respect the author pleads for a modification of the structural definition of East Central Europe in which places and axes of cultural exchange, not the nation-state, shape the mental mapping of Europe.

The second part of this book offers four empirical chapters which in their abundance and thematic variety flesh out the theoretical section. The articles embrace periods of Ukrainian history ranging from early modern times to the nineteenth century, World War II,
and the post-independence years. The authors of the book succeed in overcoming the methodological nationalism and offer a distinctive and alternative reader of Ukrainian history – be it the chapter about the etymological process of Ukraine’s self-definition in its various social and historical contexts, the presentation of the different versions of Ukrainian history with its short Cossack history and the long Kyivan one that evolved within diverse networks of the local szlachta, or the ideological significant discourse about Latin and Cyrillic Alphabets on the two stages of Galicja and Dnipro Ukraine. Finally, the analysis of the collective memory of World War II in the Ukrainian Diaspora in North America on the basis of a documentary film premiered in the year 2003, and the quantitative as well as qualitative study about the hierarchy and dynamics of group identity in today’s Lviv and Donetsk connect history with the present.

The book points to delicate topics such as the contradictory images of Bohdan Khmelnytsky and the Ukrainian revolution of 1648, the Ukrainian People’s Republic and Symon Petliura’s anti-Jewish inclination, as well as the Second World War in the collective memories of Ukrainians, Poles, Jews and Russians. The analytical undertaking to handle collective memory not from the victimization perspective but to also include the narrative of Ukrainian executioners involved in massacres successfully contributes to promote understanding of other perspectives and interpretations of history. As the authors show, there are many different Ukrainian histories; we cannot understand the politics of today’s Ukraine without an analysis of indirect Russian, Polish, German, and the Habsburg contributions, pressures and power relations. Gaps in Ukrainian national narratives, such as the absence of Jews in most history textbooks published before and after 1991 point out the arbitrary character of historical narratives.

Of special interest are the arguments that any relationship thus defined may turn out to be discontinuous. For instance, the Galician Ruthenians were torn between different national alternatives and finally adopted the Ukrainian culture from Ukrainians in Russia – whose culture itself had taken form in the encounter of East Ukrainian nationalists with Polish culture in the Russian Empire. The book reminds the reader also that the
German nation, which may be classified as a “historic” and well-defined nation, was itself undergoing complex processes of formation and redefinition. The rise and fall of empires is closely connected with the history of ideas. The contributors pay attention to the individuals and the collective instances which compete to define and disseminate the ruling identity projects, such as particularly the language as symbolism of ethnicity and the ideological significance of the alphabet. At the same time, however, the book indicates that while the transnational methodology and its objects have their own ways and history, nevertheless the trajectories of goods, people, ideas, capital and power are still shaped by the history of national, regional, or global formations. Although the authors do not dismiss the prevailing ubiquity of national histories and mention the difficulty of installing or imposing historical narratives in mass consciousness, they do not say how contemporary citizens could be reached with these transnational insights to alter prevailing interpretations of history. Deeply routed sentiments and experiences of grievances are not easy to overcome; since this book is embedded into present-day debates of national narratives, an allusion to ways of how to transmit these new academic insights to mass society would be of interest.

To study connections and to put them in context with the social units requires an approach in different languages, familiarity with several archival systems and historiographical traditions and questions – a methodological aspect that the reader is not confronted with in this book. How does one track the movement of objects, people, ideas, and texts using the sources at one's disposal? Even though this is a far reaching point the book was not trying to make, it could serve as an incentive for readers to consider methodological matter. The inclusion of empirical research, as for example the comparison of Lviv and Donetsk, successfully complements the archival source selection and examines how cultural practices and ideologies shape, constrain, or enable the economic, social, and political conditions in which people act and goods circulate. Furthermore, it shows which far reaching impact history has on current states and attests that long durée factors are indispensable in cultural studies, as well.
The authors contribute to a debate about national identity, collective memory, and alternative Ukrainian history by providing very abundant, yet well structured and documented information. In line with the aim of the book, it manages to present a new historiographical method by highlighting the comparative possibility of transnational history of Ukraine and other countries as a means to contribute to a new history and interpretation of the world.


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Stefan Ihrig’s book “Wer sind die Moldawier?”¹ is one of the singular works published in recent years that addresses with particular care the conflict that arose in post-sovietic Moldova over the problem of national identity. After the fall of communism the problem of identity itself was not a new phenomenon in Eastern Europe, yet in Moldova it gained a different dimension through the debate between the Moldovanists and Romanianists² (both Romanian speakers) engulfing at the same time the minorities of the country that make up 35% of the population and are largely non-Romanian speakers. As such the question posed in the title is provoking, because it has not been answered for the past 200 years, with the subject of the book aiming at a public interested either in post-socialist transformations, manifestations of national identity or the historiography of Eastern European countries. The problem of identity, as already established, is the main thread leading through the post-socialist history of the country, yet the author carefully draws attention to the fact that he, as well, will be unable to provide an exclusive answer to the question “Who are the Moldavians?” but will guide us through the debate over this issue, a debate that made identity a problem.

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1 “Who are the Moldavians?”
2 Terminology adopted according to the original German version of the book
The relevance and importance of the study carried out by Ihrig lies in the fact that there is not only a lack of works dealing with the recent political history of Moldova but there are also few studies addressing the two dominating and conflicting political discourses of the political elites. As such the book provides a detailed analysis of both discourses, the Moldovanist as well as the Romanianist, while specifically concentrating on the historical scientific developments in the country after 1989 and especially after 1994, as well as on the way history was taught in schools and universities in the post-socialist era. The reason for choosing this specific thread as the object of analysis is the fact that it is this particular field in which the Moldovanist faction, which has been in power in some form or another since 1994, lost the upper hand in the battle against the Romanianists. This battlefield of definitions, as the author calls it, is even more important if we consider the implications of the concepts taught and used in it, on certain types of actions affecting both the present and the future of the country as well as its foreign policy orientation. Whereas the Romanianist has a more Western inclined orientation the Moldovanist looks to Moscow for guidance.

The specific topics dealt with by the author in the chapters of the book are as follows: the political transformation in the country after 1989 with particular attention to the period following 1994; construction of self and other in school books as well as historiography; connections between identity, nation and history; the typology and effects of the political and social discourses up to 2006; the concept of “integrated history” as well as the role of Gagausia and Transnistria in the identity debate.

Already from the onset Ihrig provides a range of arguments to be developed further in order to clarify various aspects of the central question of the book: “who are the identity bearers for both historical discourses?”. It is Prime Minister Tarlev’s statement that is the starting argument and possibly one of the reasons the present and similar books were published. “Moldova has no history” the prime minister claimed, but this is not to be understood that the country or the people are without a history but in the sense that the existing history does not reflect the country’s social realities as the author comes to prove it. The entire debate revolves around this central claim as we can see.
A second very strong argument is the fact that there has been no clear manifestation of a Moldovan or Romanian nation in Moldova for the past 200 years which makes it difficult, if almost impossible, to establish the existence of such in 2006, as the initiative of the integrated history aimed at. Until 2006 national history was taught in the form of the history of the Romanians even though the Moldovanists were in power. As such in-school history teaching became critical of the political establishment, while the government was unable to use this leverage. In 2006 an attempt occurred to create Moldovan history, named integrated history, and it is still in place, yet failed as well to fulfill its role in education of the younger generations.

At the same time while analyzing how the nation is constructed and written herein, Ihrig argues that identity per se was and is not the problem, the real problem is the identity debates and discourses. These describe the problem in post-sovietic Moldova. Yet nation remains an unclear concept for Moldova and at this point even the author encounters difficulties in defining it, especially when drawing on its linguistic as well as religious constituents. Unconvincing is his argument that the Romanian used in Moldova, which is also considered a dialect of the language used in Romania, may be regarded as a self-standing language.

A shortcoming of the book recognized by the author as well is the in-depth analysis and exact placement of the minority problem into the big picture of the identity debate. Its presence is a must, since both Gagausian as well as Transnistrian minorities have decisive leverage on the political system in Chisinau. Even so Ihrig points out that the Romanianist discourse almost ignores them, relying on the Romanian speaking majority of the country, whereas the Moldovanist one attempts to include them in some form or another without being able to put them in their proper place.

By the end of the book the author successfully demonstrates how Moldovanists and Romanianists differ in their understanding of the concept of the nation even though their narratives are similar from several perspectives. With particular attention to the
Moldovanist claims, he establishes that their idea of a nation is not a civic concept as it should be, but not an ethnically exclusive one either. Contrasting it to the Romanianist, one even the minorities are integrated in some form or another.

In what regards the two conflicting discourses Ihrig shows accurately that they are closed discourse systems not only because they rely on exclusivist ethnic claims but also because at the historiography level they are in dialogue only with themselves, ignoring the rest of the scientific world. Even so they have been able to neutralize other interpretations so far. What makes the identity problem even more complicated in this respect is that neither discourse is able to provide alternative histories and focuses only on what they call the “truth”. Their biggest shortcoming remains the fact that neither manage to fulfill their guiding role for society, or mandate, as the author calls it, making a political battlefield of the history classes instead of protecting the younger generations; not to mention the fact that both of them show a severe incapacity to “tell democracy”. They only focus on the national aspect and even though there is an envisaged national state to acquire, there is no desired form of government. This former aspect is very accurately depicted; neither discourse entailing a deep civic compound, the Romanianist because it desires unification with Romania while the Moldovanist is unable or unwilling to provide one. The dead-lock situation created by the historical narratives of the two dominating discourses have led to a situation where Western as well as Eastern European authors tagged Moldova as a failed or failing state and a state with a failed historiography.

As such the question from the title remains controversial and unclear with at least four possible answers to be found in the book, none being entirely satisfactory, with the author unable to chose between them either.
The former Eastern Bloc countries have faced many difficulties concerning the study of international affairs after their mainstream theoretical framework lost its credibility. The book reviewed here reveals how the discipline of International Relations has developed in the biggest former communist country since the system change.

This book contains a collection of articles which attempt to point out key trends and major stages of progresses in Russian international studies. The book was originally published as a special issue of Communist and Post-Communist Studies in order to improve the understanding of western social scientists regarding the development of Russian International Relations (IR). Thus, the authors are exclusively notable Russian scholars who provide a comprehensive overview of the major processes, key debates and determining fields of research in post-Soviet Russian international studies.

The editors’ explicit goals are first to map the Russian perception of the international environment and the Russian self-concept as an international actor, and second ‘to move away from excessively West-centered IR scholarship’. (p. 14) They identify three different trends in Russian academic discipline – pluralisation, Westernization, isolation – and point out that Russian IR is academically open to indigenous and foreign concepts as well, however it is too diverse to find its ‘own ideological mainstream’. They argue that Soviet Marxism, as the main theoretical framework of Russian IR, lost its significance after the fall of the Soviet Union, and many new concepts began to flourish, thus pluralisation has emerged in academic thinking and in the policy field as well. However, according to the editors, the observable diversity and conflicting trends (e.g. Westernization – isolation) in Russian IR are the result of the identity crisis of Russian society.
This diversity and uncertainty are well demonstrated by the introductory chapter of the book, putting Russian IR theoretical thinking into wider social and political context, in order to theorize the trends and phenomena of Russian international studies using a constructivist point of view. The following chapters describe mainly the theoretical development of the major IR-schools (liberalism, realism) and the progress of other research programs (globalization, geopolitics, ethnicity, political economy and international negotiations) in greater detail. These chapters explain these prevailing approaches and main debates regarding every subfield in a highly descriptive manner. Namely, the authors focus on introducing the bases and the evolution of ideas; in addition they provide a huge amount of information and explanation for the better understanding of these processes. These chapters also attempt to offer a clear picture of why some approaches (realism, geopolitics) have greater influence upon Russian IR thinking than it is experienced in Western countries, and why other approaches (liberalism, political economy) clearly play a less significant role there.

The authors point out disciplinary problems in Russia as well, while some astonishing data demonstrate the difficulties of Russian scholars. For instance, ‘according to estimates of the late 90’s, only 2-5% of Russian political scientists actually read papers of their foreign colleagues in the original form. Although the situation is slowly improving, the majority of Russian political scientists badly rely on translations, summaries and reviews of academic sources in other languages’. (p. 115.) Furthermore, many authors highlight the causes of why Russian IR is mostly mass-orientated, over-politicized and under-theorized.

Despite the useful explanation and huge amount of information provided, the book fails to fulfill its main goals which are determined by the editors themselves in the introductory chapter. It is true that the reader gets an overview of several perspectives regarding Russian IR, however a summarizing chapter on the conclusions of all these is missing from the end of the book. Thorough understanding can be problematic for readers who are unfamiliar with the main concepts of Russian foreign policy, as the quoted authors of the consecutive chapters represent
different aspects. Furthermore, there is no greater emphasis put on the more influential approaches of Russian IR (realism, geopolitics and ethnicity) than on the less influential or the irrelevant ones. Hence, we do not know exactly what the editors assume about how Russia sees herself in the world and how Russia perceives the international arena in general.

Fulfilling the second goal – ‘to move away from West-centered IR scholarship’ – was not successful either. Most of the authors focus on the political, social, economic backgrounds of the evolution of Russian international studies, instead of a comparison between Western theoretical thinking and its Russian counterpart. Furthermore, the authors do not and sometimes can not draw a clear distinction between Russian foreign policy thinking and IR as an academic discipline. Therefore, it is often hard to follow and distinguish what kind of achievements Russian scholars have made in the field of international studies since the end of the cold war.

It is true that the authors were not in an easy situation when writing their essays, because some of the aforementioned problems of the book, on the one hand, come from the over-politicized character of Russian international studies. On the other hand, sometimes it is not obvious in Russia where the boundaries of science are and how scholars should perceive some concepts. For instance, Eduard G. Solovyev points out that some approaches see ‘geopolitics as a complex scientific discipline and it is the closest to a philosophy of foreign policy in international relations. Another school tends to interpret geopolitics as a branch of a broader discipline, political geography.’ (p. 140.) Others question that geopolitics would arise from a scientific base at all. Thus, the author’s attempt – ‘to move away from West-centered IR scholarship’ with the help of Russian international studies - can not come true in such a situation, where politics and scientific research do not separate clearly from each other, and scholars do not agree on basic matters.

Despite the flaws of the book, it is worth reading for everyone who is interested in Russian foreign policy. Even though it does not fulfill its main goals and does not enrich the IR discipline with a novel theoretical framework, it contains much useful
information and offers a very good overview of the evolution of contemporary Russian thinking concerning international politics. Thus, this book can help in understanding the steps of members of the Russian foreign policy elite and the concepts which circulate among them. In addition, by reading the book, the appropriate interpretation of Russian foreign and security policy related documents – like The Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation and The Russian National Security Concept – become more evident.

In general, the book provides insight into the conceptual transformation of the fields of policy and academic thinking of a great power which has recently undergone an identity crisis, and offers an opportunity to track the steps of development of Russian international studies in many fields. However, it fails to fulfill its main goals and the reader does not get the answer regarding Russian self-concept in world politics and Russia’s perception of the international system. In addition, the authors can not generate a new dialogue and move away from “West-centric” IR as intended. Nevertheless, scholars who are interested more in Russian foreign policy than in theory per se can benefit a lot from this compilation, because each chapter separately represents high quality in describing the key processes of different subfields of Russian international studies.
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