Adaptation and Change: Characterizing the Survival Strategies of the Communist Successor Parties

JOHN ISHIYAMA and ANDRÁS BOZÓKI

Since 1991, the communist successor parties have undergone a considerable transformation. It is clear that the various parties have adopted various strategies of adaptation, and that these strategies themselves have changed over time. Four adaptation strategies can be identified: the national socialist/populist, the orthodox communist, the modernizationist/reformist, and the national communist. Study of these strategies helps explain the changes in the parties' political identities. The extent of party identity change can be explained as much by factors internal to the party concerned as to the external factor of electoral performance.

Since 1991, the communist successor parties (or those parties which were the primary successors to the former governing party in the communist regime and which inherited the preponderance of the former ruling parties' resources and personnel) have undergone a considerable transformation. Contrary to early expectations that the organizational successors to the communist parties would disappear into the trash can of political history, the successor parties have proved quite durable. Indeed, in almost all countries in Eastern Europe and in the former Soviet Union there is at least one active communist successor party.

What varies among the countries is not so much where the communist successor parties have survived, but how they have survived. This article focuses on identifying the various adaptation strategies of the communist successor parties and seeks to investigate the extent to which these strategies have changed over time, particularly after the electoral 'defeats' suffered by many of the successor parties following the so-called 'second

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generation' parliamentary elections. By second generation elections we mean the third freely competitive legislative elections between 1990 and 1999. The third elections were used to represent the second generation elections because three elections is the minimum number of elections for the successor parties to have lost power, regained power, and lost power again.

To determine the kinds of survival strategies these parties have adopted and how they have changed, we identify both three adaptation strategies that have been discussed in the existing literature (the 'leftist retreat', the 'pragmatic reformist' and the 'nationalist–patriotic' strategies) and the extent to which the parties have changed their political identities after the second legislative election. To ascertain why certain successor parties pursued one adaptation strategy rather than another, this article tests some of the existing literature on party identity change in light of the evidence from eight successor parties taken from the list of parties identified by John Ishiyama in 1997.²

To address the above questions, this article is divided into three sections. In the first, we characterize these eight parties in terms of the kinds of adaptation strategies they have adopted since the collapse of communism, engaging in a content analysis of the parties’ political programmes following the third parliamentary elections. Second, we review the most commonly cited factors which affect party identity change, most notably external factors (such as political performance) and internal factors (associated with internal workings of the party). Third, we evaluate these arguments in light of the evidence from four communist successor parties, examining the extent to which their party programmes had changed from the initial versions to the programmes which appeared after the second generation elections.

**Characterizing the Communist Successor Parties’ Adaptation Strategies**

So far, most of the literature on the communist successor parties has focused on why these parties made a political comeback in the 1990s.³ Several explanations have been put forward for why the communist successor parties were able to return successfully to the political scene.⁴ These include the argument that the characteristics of the previous authoritarian regime are crucial in explaining the return of the successor parties⁵ and the degree of competition the successor party faces from other left-wing parties.⁶ Furthermore, some scholars have argued that the existence of lingering social constituencies (such as the elderly) facilitates the political success of the formerly dominant communist parties. In addition, some have pointed to the existence of issues upon which the successor parties can capitalize that affect whether they are politically successful.⁷
Yet despite the attention paid to explaining the success (or failure) of the successor parties, relatively little work has been done on identifying the factors that might affect the extent to which the communist successor parties alter their political identities. Even among those few works that have dealt with the identity change of the communist successor parties, almost all have examined early ‘adaptation’ strategies when confronted with the first competitive elections rather than later changes. Moreover, these studies examined the identity change during the period where the successor parties were reasserting themselves (from 1992 until 1996), not during their period of relative decline (1996–2000).

To examine the adaptation strategies exhibited by the successor parties following the second generation elections, we begin with the work of Daniel Ziblatt, especially his study of the successor parties in the former East Germany (the Party of Democratic Socialism – PDS) and in Hungary (the Hungarian Socialist Party – MSZP). Arguing against the hitherto fairly common tendency to equate ‘successful adaptation’ with the ‘social democratization’ of the successor parties, Ziblatt argues that there were at least two strategies available, both which could prove politically successful: the strategy of leftist-retraction, which involves the successor party embracing its Marxist traditions (rejecting the free market), repudiating western influence, and adopting the status of an ‘anti-system’ opposition party. This pattern was exemplified by both the PDS in Germany and the Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia (KSČM) in the Czech Republic, which, as Anna Gryzma Busse points out, continues to attack ‘bourgeois democracy’ and ‘capitalist exploitation’. On the other hand, in Hungary and in Poland, by contrast, the leadership of the parties, apart from marginal leftist factions, has followed a strategy of pragmatic reform, attempting to distance itself from ‘dogmatic Marxism’ and redefining the party as a ‘European’ social democratic party of ‘experts’, ‘technocrats’ and ‘pragmatists’. Between these two poles are intermediate positions such as those taken up by the Bulgarian Socialist Party (BSP) and the Socialist Party of Albania (SPA), whose leaderships have professed the ‘social democratization’ of their respective parties, but have had to rely heavily on political nostalgia to mobilize electoral support (which has also been the case for almost all the successor parties in the former Soviet Union).

So far, the ‘strategies’ identified have treated adaptation in a ‘linear’ fashion, either moving progressively towards ‘social democracy’ or retreating ‘backwards’ to communism. This, of course, assumes that the ‘choice set’ facing the parties involved becoming either ‘moderate leftist’ or ‘far leftist’ (whatever left or right means in the post-communist context). But clearly there have been parties that have embraced nationalism and patriotism as their legitimizing ideology, and have sought to break with the
past. Some parties have adopted a *nationalist–patriotic* strategy, a tactic common to states in the Balkans and the former Soviet Union.\(^\text{12}\)

This strategy, like the ‘leftist retreat’ strategy, is characterized by the continued embrace of Marxist-Leninist traditions (rejecting the free market). However, unlike the ‘leftist retreat’ strategy, this strategy does not wholly embrace the Marxist-Leninist legacy. Thus, for instance, for the Communist Party of the Russian Federation (KPRF) a central part of the party’s programme is the critical re-evaluation of the past.\(^\text{13}\) In particular the party’s programme distinguishes between opportunists within the party who corrupted the ‘teachings’ of Marxism-Leninism, and the party of Soviet ‘patriots’.\(^\text{14}\) The present leaders of the Russian government are the intellectual heirs of this ‘party of opportunists’ – the party of Trotsky, Beriya, Gorbachev and Yeltsin who have historically plundered Russia.\(^\text{15}\) The KPRF, on the other hand, identifies itself with the ‘patriotic’ elements within the old CPSU (Communist Party of the Soviet Union) – the party of Soviet heroes, the cosmonaut Yuri Gagarin, Marshal Georgii Zhukov, and the author Mikhail Sholokhov.\(^\text{16}\) The party further claims that socialism is wholly compatible with the primordial collectivist sentiments of the Russian people, and the promotion of socialism necessarily involves the defence of Russian culture and traditions.\(^\text{17}\)

On the other hand, the *nationalist–patriotic* strategy, unlike the *pragmatic reform* strategy, although critical of ‘Marxist-Leninist’ dogma, does not involve the attempt to redefine the party as a ‘European’ social democratic party made up of ‘experts’.\(^\text{18}\) Although there is pressure to alter the image of the party, the party leadership does not embrace social democratic principles and capitalism. Rather, this strategy seeks to associate the party with nationalism, a modern ideological alternative to communism which in Eastern Europe was also historically anti-capitalist and anti-West.\(^\text{19}\) This strategy often involves the formation of ‘red and brown’ coalitions or so-called ‘nationalist–patriotic’ or ‘fatherland’ fronts which have emerged in countries such as Russia and Romania.

Thus, we might also distinguish between the parties along two separate dimensions: one which represents the party’s movement from communism to social democracy, and the other representing the party’s movement from internationalism to nationalism. Therefore, we propose two dimensions in categorizing the adaptation strategies of the communist successor parties, distinguishing between *reformed* parties and unreformed parties on one dimension, and what we would call *transmuted versus non-transmuted* parties on the other. The first dimension refers to whether the party transformed itself into what Ziblatt would call a ‘pragmatic reform party’ or clung to an orthodox communist identity. The second dimension refers to whether the parties *transmuted* themselves, making a break (sometimes
indecisive and ambivalent) with their leftist traditions and managed a rightist or nationalist turn in order to cope with the political changes in their country. Table 1 highlights the differences between these models.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Unreformed</th>
<th>Reformed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Non-transmuted</td>
<td>Orthodox Communist</td>
<td>Modernizationist, Social Democratic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transmuted</td>
<td>National Communist</td>
<td>Nationalist-socialist, populist</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

To elaborate upon Table 1, sketched above, by reformed we mean a former communist party which abandoned its communist ideology and moved towards a politically more moderate leftist position. These parties are no longer communist, having turned away from the revolutionary tenets of Marxism or the orthodox methods of (post-)Stalinism, or both. Reformed socialists are accepting of Western liberal democracy even if they sometimes criticize its practice. By ‘transmutation’, on the other hand, we mean a former communist party which moved away from the Left and adopted one or more culturally right-wing, nationalistic, or anti-West elements in its ideology. Reform matches democratic conditions while transmutation alone does not. The latter may mean a move on the authoritarianism scale away from the non-democratic Left towards the non-democratic Right.

How might the eight successor parties in our sample be characterized in the light of the typology listed in Table 1? To measure the orientation of each party, and how they fit into the typology, we employed the technique of ‘theme coding’, using sentences and ‘quasi-sentences’ as the unit of analysis, a technique employed by Budge, Robertson and Hearl,\(^\text{20}\) and by Janda, Harmel, Edens and Goff.\(^\text{21}\) In this procedure sentences were coded ‘since they form the natural grammatical unit in most languages’.\(^\text{22}\) As in the work of Budge and his associates, sentences were counted rather than single words or phrases to measure the ‘stress laid on certain ideas and concerns’ rather than emphasizing slogans.\(^\text{23}\) However, very long sentences were ‘composed into “quasi-sentences” where the sense changed between colons or commas’.\(^\text{24}\)

The full texts of the eight party programmes were coded. The official party programmes were used rather than other types of text (such as the pronouncements of individual leaders and election manifestos) for two reasons: (1) unlike other texts, the party programme represents the product
of the collective endeavours of the party leadership as a whole. Hence, it represents the agreed identity of the party, rather than simply individual assumptions and opinions. Furthermore, unlike election manifestoes, party programmes are designed not only to address an external audience, but to win over the party's internal constituents – its members, leaders and supporters; (2) the party programme is the primary document which identifies the issues upon which the party campaigns. For these two reasons, therefore, we have chosen to concentrate on the textual analysis of the party programmes of these eight parties.

To characterize the eight parties, each of the political programmes which most recently followed the third legislative election (except for Russia) were analysed along two dimensions: anti-reform–pro-reform and the nationalist–patriotic–humanist dimensions. The third elections were defined as the 1994 election in Albania, the 1998 election in Hungary, the 1996 election in Romania, the 1994 election in Bulgaria, the 1998 election in the Czech Republic, the 1997 election in Poland and the 1995 election in Russia. In Russia the programme following only the second legislative election (1995) rather than the third legislative election was used, for two reasons. First, the timing of the second legislative election in Russia corresponded to the third legislative elections in several countries (such as Albania and Bulgaria in 1994 and Romania in 1996); moreover, unlike the other countries, which are largely parliamentary systems, Russia is a presidential system which had a presidential election in 1991 – thus to some extent the 1995 parliamentary election did serve as a third election. Second, the post-1999 KPRF programme has yet to be presented; thus an analysis of the genuine party programme after the third will have to wait.

The party programmes analysed included those of the Party of Social Democracy of Romania (PDSR, 1997); the Hungarian Socialist Party (MSZP, 1998); the Social Democracy of the Republic of Poland (SdRP renamed in 1998 as the Democratic Left Alliance – SLD); the Bulgarian Socialist Party (BSP, 1996); the Socialist Party of Albania (SPA, 1996); the Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia (KSČM, 1999); the Party of the Democratic Left in Slovakia (SDL, 1997); and the Communist Party of the Russian Federation (KPRF, 1997). In each case, the programme was derived from the party congress that immediately followed the third election (except for the Russian KPRF which has yet to have held a party congress since the 1999 election). To analyse these programmes, we employ a technique developed by Sarah Oates to analyse the post-Soviet Russian parties.25 On the basis of the work of Budge et al., Oates identified key terms which comprised what she referred to as 'anti-market and pro-market' indices. The first involved identification of terms associated with 'anti-market' themes, specifically mentions of a controlled economy, nationalization, pro-Marx
(or Marxism), pro-Lenin (or Leninism). The pro-market index involved mentions of markets or capitalism, enterprise, incentives, plus anti-Marx and anti-Lenin remarks.

We employ an adaptation of the pro-market and anti-market measures to take into account political orientation – especially how much the parties emphasize ‘socialism’, ‘Communism’, ‘social democracy’, ‘democratic socialism’ or ‘social democratic’. On the one hand, the emphasis on socialism and communism as themes in a party programme is likely to indicate that the party retains ties to the past and is willing to emphasize the continuity of the successor party with the communist past. On the other hand, given that ‘social democracy’ and social democrats were (and are) considered by hard-core Stalinists as even worse than ‘bourgeois democrats’ (largely because social democrats are considered traitorous), parties which discuss social democracy are presumably less nostalgic for the communist past. We use ‘social democracy’ and ‘social democratic’ instead of ‘democracy’ because all parties (including communists) considered themselves to be democratic, whereas social democracy has a more specific connotation for communists (or communist successors).

For the purposes of this article, rather than using Oates’s terminology (pro-market versus anti-market which focuses exclusively on economic issues), we create ‘pro-reform’ and ‘anti-reform’ indices which include references to political identity. For the pro-reform index, references to social democracy (other than the name of the party) democratic socialism, and positive references to markets, capitalism, private property or privatization, enterprise, incentives and negative references to Marx, Lenin, Stalin, communism, constituted the pro-reform index. References to socialist (other than the name of the party) socialism, controlled economy, state control, nationalization and positive references to Marx, Lenin, Stalin and communism constituted the components of the anti-reform index.

In addition to the pro-reform and anti-reform indices, we also develop a ‘nationalist–patriotic’ index which takes into account the extent to which the parties made reference to national and patriotic themes. These include any reference to the glorification of the national way of life, patriotism, promotion of national traditions, protection of national culture, national unity, fatherland and motherland. Finally, we also develop a ‘humanist’ index, in which themes that emphasize human co-operation, such as human rights, international co-operation, the development of a united Europe, or the cultivation of European values, are considered. In many ways the patriotic versus ‘humanist’ index is similar to the particularist versus universalist divide.

To form a composite score for the ‘reform’ dimension for each party, the number of pro-reform terms was divided by the number of pro-reform and
anti-reform terms, which produced a score of 0 to 1. The high score represented a programme which emphasized only pro-reform terms and no anti-reform terms, and the low score represented a party which used only anti-reform terms. This measure allowed for the estimation of the relative degree of emphasis each party placed on pro-reform and anti-reform themes.  

For the other dimension, ‘transmutation’, the number of nationalist–patriotic themes was divided by the number of nationalist–patriotic and humanistic terms, which produced a score from 0 to 1. The high score in this case represented a programme which emphasized only nationalist–patriotic terms and hence was most transmuted.

| TABLE 2 |
| PLACING THE (FORMER) COMMUNIST PARTY POSITIONS IN EASTERN EUROPE |
| (NATIONALIST-PATRIOTIC, REFORM SCORE) |

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Non-transmuted</th>
<th>Partly reformed</th>
<th>Reformed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>KSCM (Czech Rep.)</td>
<td>SPA (Albania)</td>
<td>MSZP (Hungary)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[.42, .12]</td>
<td>[.13, .50]</td>
<td>[.00, .86]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SDL (Slovakia)</td>
<td>SLD (Poland)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[.14, .74]</td>
<td>[.27, .82]</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Partly transmuted or transmuted</th>
<th>KPRF (Russia)</th>
<th>BSP (Bulgaria)</th>
<th>PDSR (Romania)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>[.88, .23]</td>
<td>[.64, .51]</td>
<td>[.67, .87]</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2 records the results for each party. As indicated, there are several identifiable patterns illustrated. First, there are the parties which rank very high on the emphasis on reform themes in their programmes, most notably the MSZP, SDL, PDSR and SLD (with scores of .86, .76, .87 and .82, respectively). On the other hand, the KSČM, KPRF, SPA and BSP (.12, .23, .51, .50) have rather high proportions of anti-reform themes appearing in their programmes, and in the cases of the KSČM and KPRF these anti-reform themes comprise the majority of coded themes. Thus, using Ziblatt’s categories, the former four parties would be characterized as following ‘pragmatic reform’ strategies, and the latter four followed more ‘leftist-retreat’ strategies.

However, this bipartite typology masks significant differences within each category. For instance, although both the KPRF and the SPA have relatively high numbers of anti-reform themes in their programmes, they differ in the degree to which they emphasize nationalist–patriotic themes as well, with the KPRF nationalist–patriotic score at .88 and the SPA at only .13. On the other hand there is certainly also a difference between the PDSR
and the MSZP: although both currently emphasize reform themes most frequently, the PDSR emphasizes national themes far more than does the MSZP (at .67 as compared with 0). Thus, we might also distinguish between the parties along another dimension, the nationalist–patriotic dimension, where in addition to pragmatic reformist and leftist retreat strategies, we might also distinguish between nationalist socialist and populist strategies (such as the PDSR), modernizationist or social democratic strategies such as the MSZP, orthodox communist strategy (KSČM), and the national communist strategy (KPRF). This certainly would explain why, for instance, despite emphatically proclaiming itself to be a social democratic party in nature, the Romanian PDSR has also sought political co-operation with extreme right-wing nationalist formations such as the Greater Romania Party. On the other hand, the KPRF has not proclaimed social democracy as its goal (although there are a number of social democrats in its ranks), but like the PDSR has embraced nationalism as a legitimizing ideology.

What Affects Party Identity Change?

To what extent have the successor parties altered their 'adaptation' strategies over time? And what factors might have caused these parties to change strategies? In the literature on party identity change, two sets of factors are most often cited as affecting changes in party identity. First, as argued by Kenneth Janda and his associates, change occurs as the result of environmental influences. Parties are assumed to be conservative organizations that are unlikely to change unless forced. As Harmel and Janda put it, 'party change does not "just happen"'. Thus, party change is viewed as a rational and purposeful move by the party, in response to specific stimuli. Janda proposed a 'performance theory' of party change in which he argued that poor electoral performance is necessary for any party change. Harmel and Janda later modified performance theory, and argued that major change will always be precipitated by poor electoral performance.

Janda and his associates tested the hypothesis that parties will change only if they perform poorly in elections. The authors defined five different kinds of elections as perceived by the party's activists: calamitous, disappointing, tolerable, gratifying and triumphant. They found that generally calamitous or disappointing elections were associated with the greatest degree of change in the themes the party emphasized, indicating that parties try to change their identities when voters reject the policy face they had presented in the previous election. This would suggest that a party’s electoral performance should correlate with the degree of change in the party’s basic platform.
The second approach focuses more on what happens as result of internal features of the party. In particular Ishiyama and Velten suggested that the ability of parties to change in post-communist politics is to a large extent dependent upon whether 'hardliners' in the party act as a brake on reforming the party's image and hence its ability to adapt to new political circumstances.

As a starting-point to measure the organizational features of the party which might impinge on the way it adapts, we begin with two ideal types of political party organization: the cadre and mass parties. Both were historical types which do not now exist in their 'pure' form, nor are they likely to emerge in Eastern Europe and the countries of the former Soviet Union. However, they do represent useful starting-points. The 'cadre' or 'elite' parties of the nineteenth century were basically 'committees of people who jointly constituted state and civil society'. Parties at that time were merely 'groups of men' pursing the public interest, with little need for formal or highly structured organizations or large formal membership. The parliamentary component or the party in office dominated, and the resources required for election often involved local connections and personal political notability.

On the other hand, the mass party, unlike the cadre party, was characterized by a large, active membership. This is because the mass party arose 'primarily among the newly activated and often disenfranchised elements of civil society'. Whereas the old cadre party had relied on the quality of supporters (that is, their personal attributes) the mass party relied on the quantity of supporters, attempting to make up in membership what it lacked in terms of individual patronage. Thus, mass parties were characterized by several features, the most notable of which were the reliance on large memberships, and ideological homogeneity which linked leaders with rank-and-file members. Thus, mass parties were more likely to have organizational brakes which hindered the ability of party elites to alter the party's identity vis-à-vis a changing political environment.

**Measures**

To address change in the party programmes, the full texts of the eight party programmes for four parties were coded: the MSZP's founding programme in 1989 and the party's programme adopted in 1998, just after the electoral defeat; the SdRP's founding programme in 1990 and the party programme of 1997; the KPRF's second congress party programme of 1993 and the 1997 party programme produced by the fourth congress; and the Socialist Party of Albania's founding document in 1991 and its programme issued in 1996. These parties were chosen because they represented the three basic
types of communist successor parties as identified by John Ishiyama: (1) those in which the ‘radical’ reformist element took control prior to the transition (MSzP, SdRP); (2) those in which the stand-patters remained a significant part of the party’s leadership (KPRF); and (3) those in which the ‘liberal’ reformists took control of the party prior to the transition (SPA).\textsuperscript{40}

Two techniques are used to assess party change. First we employ the technique used by Janda and his associates. Sentences and quasi-sentences in the programmes were coded in terms of themes, corresponding to the (32) categories grouped in the seven domains listed in the Appendix.\textsuperscript{41} The theme codes allow for the assessment of issue positions relative to key features of the post-communist social and political structure. To test the reliability of the coding procedure, a measure of \textit{intra-coder} reliability was used which tested the consistency of codings of sentences and quasi-sentences by the same coder. The \textit{intra-coder} reliability score stood at .95 for the Hungarian programmes, .97 for the Polish programmes, .91 for the KPRF programmes and .93 for the Albanian programmes. To measure the actual amount of change that occurred in the party programmes, this article used the same measure of change employed by Janda \textit{et al.}: the product moment correlations between party programmes. This coefficient was then subtracted from ‘1’ to produce a value ranging from 1 to 0 where 1 indicates complete change and 0 indicates no change from the previous election.\textsuperscript{41}

Second, we examine the degree of change in terms of the pro-reform and nationalist–patriotic indices as discussed above, comparing the individual scores for the parties in their founding congress programmes with the party congress programmes that followed the third elections.

As for the ‘independent variables’, to measure the degree of success of the communist successor party two indicators were used. First the success of the party was measured in terms both of the actual percentage of seats which were won in the parliamentary elections immediately preceding the latest party congress programme, and of the change in percentage of seats won in the lower house elections over the course of the second and third elections before the adoption of the congress programme. This included the Hungarian elections of 1994 and 1998, the Polish elections of 1993 and 1997, the Albanian elections of 1992 and 1994 and the Russian elections of 1993 and 1995.

To measure the various types of possible party organizational configurations, we measure the degree to which parties are more ‘mass-like’ or ‘cadre-like’.\textsuperscript{42} Although there have been several ways in which to characterize the different organizational types of parties, we focus on the extent to which the \textit{constituencies} that support the party are politically coherent. This is because, although there are certainly other ‘faces’ of the party, one of its basic identities is that of the ‘party in the electorate’. Thus,
the party in the electorate is assumed to reflect to a great degree other facets of the party; in other words, the more coherent is the party’s supporters in the electorate, the more likely it is that the party itself is politically coherent. To measure the degree of coherence in the constituencies that support the successor parties, we employ the data from the 1995 and 1996 Central and Eastern Eurobarometers (CEEB) to ascertain the extent to which the supporters of the party form a politically coherent group. In particular, we use Question 4 on the 1995 CEEB and Question 5 on the 1996 CEEB, which asked the respondent whether he or she felt that the creation of a free market economy (or one that was one largely free from state control) was right or wrong: ‘Yes’, ‘No’, and ‘Don’t know/Unsure’. These proportions were then used to calculate a Herfindahl Hirschmann index of concentration score for each party. The index was devised by economists to measure the degree fractionalization of corporation market shares, although it has also been used widely in electoral studies. The formula for the index $HH$ is

$$HH = S p_i^2$$

Where $p_i$ represents the fractional share of the $i$-th component which is squared and summed across all components. The components can be vote shares, corporate shares of a market, or in this case the shares of supporters claiming that the market reforms are a good thing or a bad thing, or are unsure of the reforms. The values of $HH$ range from 0 to 1, where 1 represents complete constituency coherence; if the components all have extremely small population shares then $HH$ tends towards 0. Thus, if there is high degree of coherence among the party’s supporters (at least in terms of attitudes towards the free market) then $HH$ will tend towards 1.

**Results**

Table 3 illustrates the results for the four parties. In the first and second columns are reported the indicators of electoral performance, the percentage of seats won by the parties in the third elections, and the change in the proportion of seats held in the lower house of the legislature from the second to the third elections; in the third column is reported the party constituency coherence score; and finally in the fourth column is the party identity change coefficient. To assess the hypotheses that either external or internal pressures compel parties to change, the preliminary results from Table 3 are portrayed in Figures 1 and 2.

As indicated by the results in Figure 1, there appears to be considerable correspondence between the degree to which the parties’ electoral fortunes declined and the extent to which programmatic change occurred from the
### TABLE 3
**PARTY ELECTORAL PERFORMANCE, PARTY ORGANIZATION, AND PARTY PROGRAMME CHANGE**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>% of seats won in third election</th>
<th>% change in seats won comparing second and third elections</th>
<th>Party constituency coherence score</th>
<th>Correlation coefficient for party programme change</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MSZP</td>
<td>34.71 134/386</td>
<td>-19.43</td>
<td>.37</td>
<td>.67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SLD</td>
<td>37.17 164/460</td>
<td>-1.52</td>
<td>.48</td>
<td>.42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KPRF*</td>
<td>33.88 157/450</td>
<td>+20.10</td>
<td>.65</td>
<td>.37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPA</td>
<td>6.28 10/155</td>
<td>-18.23</td>
<td>.43</td>
<td>.55</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### FIGURE 1
**PARTY PROGRAMME CHANGE SCORE BY CHANGE IN PERCENTAGE SEATS WON FROM SECOND TO THIRD ELECTION**

$r^2 = .6046$
initial party programme to the programme which appeared after the third election (R-square = .61). However, the fit between the degree to which the parties' political support was coherent and the degree to which the parties changed their identities was even better (R-square = .79). Although great care must be exercised in interpreting results based on only four cases, these results might suggest that the greater the extent to which the party is politically coherent (a feature of a more mass-like party) the less likely the party is to change, and this has a greater independent effect than does electoral performance. However, since the party coherence score is highly correlated with electoral performance, it is difficult to separate out the independent effects of electoral performance and party coherence on the basis of these data. Only the further analysis of the data from all the successor parties will enable a more complete test of these contending hypotheses.

Figures 3 and 4 likewise illustrate the degree of change from the initial programme to the programme which immediately followed the third election, although the focus is more on the content of that change. The most noteworthy result illustrated by Figure 3 is the general trend for all the parties in the direction of greater emphasis on reformist themes, although the MSZP and the SLD are far more reformist than are either the SPA or the
KPRF. None the less, it is interesting that the relative balance of themes has shifted even for a party considered as 'hardline' as is the KPRF.

However, Figure 4 indicates that an even more pronounced trend for the KPRF is in the direction of emphasizing nationalist–patriotic themes (from a score of .44 in 1993 to a score of .84 in 1997). The SLD also illustrates some movement in the direction of greater emphasis on nationalist–patriotic themes, but this shift is much less than the shift illustrated by the KPRF. On the other hand the MSZP has purged virtually every reference to nationalist themes from its programme, and the SPA has considerably lessened its emphasis on nationalist themes.

Discussion and Conclusions

The above work represents an initial attempt at characterizing the successor parties and identifying the sources of party identity change in post-communist politics. However, based as they are on only a limited number of cases, the conclusions can be only preliminary at best. Nevertheless, at least two observations can be made concerning the evolution of the
successor parties, especially following the second-generation elections. First, it is quite apparent that the two adaptation strategies initially identified by Ziblatt do not capture the full scope of different adaptation strategies, at least those illustrated by the analysis of the party programmes. There are at least four types of adaptation strategies: nationalist-socialist or populist strategies (illustrated by the PDSR); the modernizationist or reformist strategy, illustrated by the MSZP, which makes that party very much akin to the social democratic parties of Western Europe; the orthodox communist strategy (KSČM) in which the party emphasizes traditional Marxist-Leninist and internationalist themes; and the national communist strategy (KPRF) in which the party seeks to wed traditional Marxist-Leninist themes with nationalism, in a form of 'red and brown' combination.

Second, it appears that internal party organizational factors are at least as important in explaining the change in identity as is party performance. Indeed, it appears that parties that are more politically coherent tend to be more resistant to change than are parties that are less coherent. This might suggest that parties which are more coalitions of different groups are more flexible in adapting to new political circumstances than are parties with a
coherent political identity, although the evidence is still far too preliminary to draw any definite conclusions concerning this relationship. To be sure, external factors such as the degree of competition the party faces have affected the development of the successor parties. However, at this point, all we wish to point out is that the internal characteristics of the successor parties are at least as important as external factors in explaining the evolution of the former communist parties.

Although only preliminary, the above results suggest that the systematic analysis of the evolution of the identities of the communist successor parties represents a promising avenue for future inquiry. The extent to which the communist successor parties alter their identities provides insight into how much they have changed and to what extent they might act as positive forces in the process of democratic consolidation in post-communist politics.

NOTES


6. Waller, 'Adaptation of the Former Communist Parties ...'.

7. Ibid.


17. Ironically this also includes the defence of the Orthodox Church: see Pravda, 21 April 1994, p.1.


23. Ibid., p.31.

24. Ibid., p.24


26. This technique we believe to be an improvement on the index constructed by Oates in her 1998 study in that it provides a basis for assessing the relative emphasis of pro-reform and anti-reform themes but more importantly prevents the following relatively perverse result. For instance, in the case of the MSZP, in 1990 there were 30 pro-reform codings and 10 anti-reform codings. If we were to use Oates’s calculations (pro-reform and anti-reform themes) then the resulting score would be +20. In the 1994 party programme there were 19 pro-reform codings and no anti-reform codings, which would have resulted in a score of +19. This would suggest that the 1994 programme was less pro-reform than the 1989 programme, even though there were no anti-reform themes appearing in 1994. Our technique avoids this problem.


30. Janda, "Toward a Performance Theory ...".
31. Harmel and Janda, 'An Integrated Theory ...'.
32. Janda et al., 'Changes in Party Identity'.
33. Harmel and Janda, 'An Integrated Theory ...'.
39. Ishiyama, 'Communist Parties in Transition ...'.
41. Janda et al., 'Changes in Party Identity ...'.
42. It is important to note that we do not use the term 'cadre' party in the same sense as connoted by Leninist theory. In this article 'cadre' refers to the well-known concept in party organizational theory developed by Maurice Duverger.

APPENDIX

ISSUE DOMAINS AND THEME CODES

Domain 1: Attitudes about Past
   101 pro-Marx(ism), pro-Lenin(ism),
   102 Soviet, Communism
   103 anti-Marx(ism), anti-Lenin(ism).
   104 controlled/planned economy
   105 nationalization

Domain 2: External Relations with West
   201 foreign contact with Europe, west or world, neutral
   202 military
   203 foreign contacts with USSR, Soviet Union, CMEA (for KPRF with Eastern Europe, CMEA

Domain 3: Political Structure
   301 freedom, political and human rights
   302 social democracy, social democratic, democratic socialism
   303 government decentralization and local autonomy
   304 current government efficiency and inefficiency
   305 current government corruption
   306 current government effectiveness

Domain 4: Evaluations of Current Economic Situation
   401 enterprise
   402 private property/privatization
   403 incentives
404 capitalism, market
405 inflation
406 unemployment

Domain 5: Welfare and quality of life
  501 environment, environmental protection
  502 social security
  503 social welfare, social equality and social justice
  504 education/cultural promotion

Domain 6: Nation, national way of life, security
  601 defence of national way of life, patriotism
  602 promotion of national traditions, culture
  603 law and order
  604 national social harmony

Domain 7: Social groups
  701 labour
  702 agriculture and farmers
  703 other non-economic social groups
  704 defence of national and ethnic minorities