HUMBOLDT-KOLLEG '09
07 - 10 Mai 2009, Istanbul

Alexander von Humboldt-Gedenkjahr 2009
In memoriam Alexander von Humboldt 1769-1859

Beitrittssprozess der Türkei zur EU und Ihre Wiederspiegelung auf die Deutsch-Türkischen Beziehungen

Türkiye’nin Avrupa Birliği’ne Giriş Süreci’nin Türk - Alman İlişkilerine Yansıması

Vorträge
Präsidium / Başkan
Prof. Dr. Ahmet Mengi

Ehrenpräsident / Onursal Başkan
Prof. Dr. Güneş Gençyılmaz

Ehrenkomitee / Onur Komitesi
Prof. Dr. Dursun Koçer
Prof. Dr. Murat Demircioğlu
Prof. Dr. Fevzi Aksoy
Prof. Dr. Asım Čelâni
Prof. Dr. Güven Önal
Prof. Dr. Can Gökdoğan

Organisationskomitee / Düzenleme Komitesi
Prof. Dr. Ahmet Mengi
Prof. Dr. Güneş Gençyılmaz
Prof. Dr. Zafer Tunca
Prof. Dr. Doğan Kantarcı
Prof. Dr. Doğan Uçar
Prof. Dr. Cankut Örmeçı
Doç. Dr. Belkız Bilgin-Eran

Organisationssekretariat / Organizasyon Sekreterliği
Assist. Prof. Gülsum Savcı Gökgöz

Registration / Kayıt Masası
Dr. Atila Ateş
Iraz Akış
INHALT

"Der Beitrittprozess der Türkei zur EU und die Debatten um eine europäische Identität von einem "Karolingischen" zu einem "Konstantinischen" Europa?"
Prof. Dr. Gerhard Michael Ambrosi........................................................................................................ 1

"Aktuelle Bewertung der Bitburger Gespräche 2005"
Prof. Dr. Fazıl Sağlam .................................................................................................................................. 11

"Die Auswirkungen des Beitritts der Türkei zur Europäischen Union auf das Arbeits- und Sozialrecht"
Prof. Dr. Dres. i. c. Rolf Birk ......................................................................................................................... 15

"A Review of the Previous Studies (1983-2009) Based on the Effects of SO2, one of the Local or Transboundary Pollutants on the Forests Of Turkey"
Prof. Dr. Doğan Kantarcı .................................................................................................................................. 21

"Turkey’s Relations with the European Union"
Prof. Dr. Bahri Yıldız ....................................................................................................................................... 39

"Fundamentalisten Vereint im Kampf gegen die EU-Mitgliedschaft der Türkei"
Prof. Dr. Bülent Uçar ....................................................................................................................................... 47

"Korruptionsbekämpfung und die Erweiterung der Europäischen Union"
Dr. Wolfgang Hether ......................................................................................................................................... 53

"Türkiye’nin AB Üyeliği Sürecinde Türkiye-Almanya İlişkilerinin Ticari-Ekonomik Perspektiften Değerlendirilmesi"
Abdullah Çınar ................................................................................................................................................. 59

"Europeanization, Enlargability, Renewal"
Prof. Dr. László Csaba ..................................................................................................................................... 63

"Der Türkische Migrationsprozess in der BRD. Deutschland, die Türkei und EU-Beitritt"
Prof. Dr. Bilhan Doymuran Karal ................................................................................................................... 69

"Yeni CMK’da İnsan Hakları Özellikle Adil Yargılanma Yükümlülüğü - Adil Yargılanma Hakki"
Prof. Dr. Bahri Öztürk ....................................................................................................................................... 79

"Cultural Conditions Influencing Turkish-German Relations With The EU Process of Turkey"
Prof. Dr. Vehbi Doğan Sorguç ....................................................................................................................... 85

"Deutsch-Türkische Zusammenarbeit in Bereich von Umwelt"
Prof. Dr. Orhan Uslu ......................................................................................................................................... 95

"AB Üyeliğine Giden Yolda Kibris Kriter mi?"
Prof. Dr. Fısun Arıva ...................................................................................................................................... 101

"Die Entwicklung des Rechtsstaats in der Türkei aus der Sicht des Straf- und Strafprozessrechts"
Prof. Dr. Hans-Heiner Kühne ......................................................................................................................... 109

"Die Türkei und Europa auf gemeinsamen Wegen in die gemeinsame Zukunft"
Prof. Dr. Herbert Osanna .................................................................................................................................. 115

"Neue Entwicklungen im türkischen Markenrecht"
Assoc. Prof. Hanife Öztürk ............................................................................................................................ 117

"Reading on Bruno Taut from Participation in a “Life Culture"
Assist. Prof. Didem Baş .......................................................... 127

"The Case of Germany for the Alternative Energy Production in Turkey"

Res. Assist. Hülya Deniz .......................................................... 139

"Collaboration Between German and Turkish Universities in Science and Technology; The Model of Istanbul Technical University Department of Metallurgical & Materials Engineering"

Assist. Prof. Nuri Solak, Prof. Dr. Sebahattin Gürmen, Prof. Dr. E. Sabri Kayali .................................................. 155

"Science and Technology Policies in EU and Challenges It Presents to Turkey"

Assist. Prof. Ufuk Kula .......................................................... 161

"Turkish Capital Markets by Considering the Adjustments Regarding the EU and Intersections between Turkey and Germany"

Assist. Prof. Meltem Ulusan .......................................................... 175

"Das Problem der Zwangsheirat; Daphne III: Die Empfohlene Lösung der Europäische Union und das Deutschland Beispiel"

Res. Assist. H. Selin Pürselim Doğan .......................................................... 185

"Capital Maintenance in EU: A Saviour or an Old Fashioned Concept?"

Res. Assist. Argun Karamanlıoğlu .......................................................... 197

"The Effects of 2008 Global Crisis on Turkey’s and Germany’s Trade"


"Legislative Amendments For Republic Of Turkey’s Harmonization To European Union"

Res. Assist. Aylin Moralioğlu .......................................................... 213

"The Course of Turkish Manufacturing Industry in the Framework of Customs Union with EU and Turkey-Germany Bilateral Trade Relations"

Res. Assist. Nurtaç Yıldırım .......................................................... 217

"UN Security Council Anti-Terrorism Measures – EC Law.Perspective"

Assist. Prof. Yıldıray Sak .......................................................... 229
EUROPEANIZATION, ENLARGEABLEITY, RENEWAL

Prof. Dr. László CSABA
Mitglied der Ungarischen Akademie der Wissenschaften

ABSTRACT

This paper is an attempt to answer if and under what conditions, the 'final borders of Europe' can and should be drawn. The hypothesis to be tested claims that it is a function of the self-interpretation of the current EU members over the mission of the entire enterprise. In turn, internal reforms, rather than extrapolating current arrangements pave the way to the definitive answer.

One of the most controversial issues of European studies is the issue where the borders of Europe can be drawn. It is known, inter alia from the endless debates in historiography, geography, social anthropology and cultural studies that definitions often imply the final outcomes. For this reason in good quality research we often arrive at conclusions only at the end of testing our hypotheses. Similarly to most books, whose introductory chapter is written at the very final stage of completing the entire project, such definitions and outcomes should be anchored in theoretically grounded analyses rather than formulated in axiomatic manner, the latter derived often from casual observations or simple prejudices, put in a mathematical formula. The latter approach, though most widespread in the modern social sciences based on rational choice theory, and predominating economics in the past few decades, might be positively misleading, if axioms are non-trivial. Even more so, if we are searching for an answer to an open-ended process, rather than trying to identify the optimal path to a pre-set terminus, where only the speed and the price might be subject to the inquiry.

In this methodological preliminary we wish to highlight the complexity of a task in which there are lots of similarities to nuclear physics. In the latter, as it is known, the method of observation determines to a large degree the outcome. Furthermore, if studying the smallest elementary units, we may make statements either about its whereabouts or of its speed, but never of both.

It is therefore anything but trivial for us to define the study of our analysis. Europe, as is known from a variety of writings, is a broad concept, ideologically loaded and contested, carrying often normative considerations of various sorts. Even the much narrower concept of Europeanization, that relates to projecting the EU institutions, regulations and norms in acceding countries and its neighborhood, is bound to remain an ideologically contested domain. While the deeper anchoring of the entire European project in Judeo-Christian values is beyond doubt, it is equally true that those values translate into an ideologically neutral secular state in terms of its constitution, legislation and policies/Thürer, 2008/. This observation, explained in great detail in the reference given, however, does not answer some practically weighty questions as yet. First, should we interpret Europeanization as a project to extrapolate, via projecting soft power, the values and norms of the European Union with or

1 Draft paper to be presented at the Humboldt Kolleg Türkei conference, Istanbul, 8-10 May, 2009. Comments are welcome and should be addressed directly to the author at: e-mail: csabal@ceu.hu
L. Csaba

without the prospect of membership/Schimmelfennig et al., 2006? Or should we see it as a ‘modest force of good’? Barbé and Johansson-Nogues, 2008? In the latter case much milder, less ambitious goals may be set. Or conversely, should we consider Europeanization as a basically imperialist project, where the objective and the outcome are equally the limitations put on the varieties of capitalism that may emerge in the new member-states, limiting their freedom of manoeuvre/Dyson, ed., 2006?

We have long argued/Csaba, 2008/ that Europeanization should not be seen as an exclusively top-down constructivist project, where tasks are pre-set and outcomes predetermined. This narrow view reflects the overgeneralization of the period of accession, when, to some degree inevitably, the elements of copying, of one-way adjustment – of newcomers to the rules of the pre-existing club – were dominating the scene. In reality, the outcome was, like upon previous enlargements, a product of the interchange between new and old members, interests, normative concepts and policy compromises. By the same token Europeanization should by no means be equated to its top-down components. On the contrary, the bottom-up and the horizontal initiatives have long been gaining currency.

In short, while the European Union used to be an extension of the German-French administrative tradition of centralized management and control, with a focus on large central projects, this is no longer the case. Already during the 1990s, i.e. while the northern and eastern enlargements materialized, the evolution of bottom-up policies and ensuing competences could be observed/Wallace et al., eds., 2005/. In areas like environmental protection, social policy, education and research such initiatives proliferated. The Lisbon Strategy, especially in its revised 2005 edition, was itself a reflection of the spread of such novel policy approaches.

In short, the Lisbon Strategy, relying on the method borrowed from business management, the open method of coordination, relies to a large extent to voluntary and flexible forms of cooperation across those interested, rather than a centrally set series of tasks to be performed by each member of the army/Cf also Rodrigues, 2003/. Furthermore in most of the newly emerging, progressive areas, such as research, environmental concerns, fighting climate change or more recently energy policy, actions are typically being financed by the nation state themselves. In reality, this has long been the case also in such traditional areas as agriculture, where community supports account for a friction below 10 pc/ of total spending on the target, the „rest” being covered from national-public and private-sources.

If we allow for the operationalization of the concept of multi-level governance, gaining ground especially in the second largest expenditure area, i.e cohesion policies/Táván, 2008/, it becomes clear that the EU no longer functions along the traditional top-down principles. Much or most of what has become viable in the past decade or so has been the outcome of bottom-up or horizontal initiatives, launched by industrialists, chambers of trade, NGOs, universities and the like. If this is the case, Europeanization as a concept implies much more than whatever happens or does not happen in Brussels. It entails a fair degree of spontaneous and horizontal activities.

If this is the case, it also follows, that when thinking about the nature and limits of EU enlargement two sets of issues need to be considered as a minimum. First, the genre and workings of the EU can not and should not be confined to describing and preserving its current policies and institutions. Those are outcomes of historical evolution and thus subject to change, both under economic and policy exigencies/emanating e.g. from the change of social values and perceptions/, and owing to learning by doing. For instance experiencing the inefficiency of agricultural and regional spending new patterns of expenditures and a refocusing those on forward looking areas as migration control, common foreign and security policy or research and development are becoming inevitable. For this reason extrapolating the status quo and asking, how much it would cost for incumbents if big countries like Ukraine or Turkey would join in, makes simply no analytical sense. All the less so, since recent changes/Richter, 2008/ have already lead to the equalization of the position of net contributors and net recipients, which did not use to be the case in the 1960s and 1970s and 80s.

Second, not less important is the issue, is that internal interests of the EU also push for changing the way the organization operates. The fact that neither northern, nor eastern enlargement has yet changed the structure of decisionmaking does not mean, that such changes will never be forthcoming. Likewise the
fact that enlargements has not yet lead to rgrouping expenditure priorities does not mean, that such changes are not forthcoming in any future period of time. That period comes with the adoption of the Financial perspective for the 2014-2020 period at latest.

I think it is of utmost importance for our subject to be clear if we take the existing EU with its policies and arrangements as a given, or we perceive it as an ever changing organism in need of continuous adaptation to the external world. If we see EU as a static unit, as intergovernmentalists do, we would consider the Lisbon Treaty of 2007 as the maximum attainable and the point of orientation for the future/Moravcsik,2008/. By contrast, if the emphasis is on change, then 'nothing is sacred' and each policy area, each organizational option, and each priority may undergo a change, without necessarily proposing revolutionary arrangements, but accommodating the multiplicity of priorities and challenges that follow from globalization and the financial crisis.3

If we adopt the former perspective, then the baseline scenario is unlikely to be anything else than muddling through. Let us be clear: while this scenario has been dominating the policy and strategic debates in the post-2002 period, this is anything but a lucrative, or even a mildly satisfactory option. For the simple reason that under such conditions Europe, meaning the EU for a moment, is then unable to come up to the challenges it faces. Without being exhaustive: to develop a new neighborhood policy, stabilize areas from Maghreb to the west Balkans, to contribute to the democratization in and among the New Independent States, be relevant on global trade talks, spend sufficiently on competitiveness, protect its borders and citizens under the new military realities, confront terrorism, secure supplies of energy and contribute to fighting climate change. Due to constraints of time and space I need to refer those interested in the detail to my recent monograph/Csaba,2009/ where a documentation of how the listed issues are already on the level of policy debates at the EU level is available. For short, doing nothing is no longer an option, and this is not poetry or just wishful thinking of an academic, but pressing policy reality.

In the alternative scenario incremental penetration of long established academic insights and normatives may be forecast. This implies a gradual restructuring of decision-making and of expenditure priorities. The more radical the move away from tradition-inspired spending patterns may be, the higher is the probability for practising rather than merely preaching the new priorities listed above. The slimmer is the Commission and the thinner are the central coffers, the more we may move towards spending only on areas that generate measurable value added. And of course, the less traditions may be invoked in setting the limits to Europe.

Let me be clear: I never advocated, as the British, the relapse of EU in a free trade zone. In my view political, social, institutional, legal intertwining has gone much farther than even considering this option. The three pillar system established in Maastricht, the evolution of the single market, the workings of the European Court of Justice, and not least the experience with running a highly successful single currency simply do not let any member to exit. Even less is there the room for procrastination or disintegration, as the listed areas all imply a self-propelling process of ever closer union on the day-to-day level. Schengen is a mighty experience for tens of millions of citizens. Price disparities which used to be exorbitant have come down to a maximum of 20 per cent at the sectoral- not the individual product or type of service- level according to Eurostat by 2007. This is still a long way from what the microeconomic law of one price would dictate, but wherever markets are established, the process is indeed in the making. We could observe these in air fares, roaming and phone prices, insurance fees and even restaurant charges, not only in the supermarkets.

For this reason I think it is quite misplaced to be in favor of further enlargements for instrumental reasons. In case of Britain advocacy of Turkish membership is often just another way of ensuring, that the project of political union founders. In the case of Spanish socialists, the fun of provoking the Catholic

---

2 Of the most interesting – and at the moment yet unpublished – papers presented to the conference of the Netherlands Institute for Advanced Study, convened by Prof.D.Curtin and Prof.J-J.Hesse, entitled 'The European Union as a Model: Forms, Functions and Policy Options of Regional Cooperation', Wassenaar, 26-28 February, 2009, available at the website of the institute: www.nias.nl
Church itself makes the run worth. And by contrast, conservative parties in western Europe, long having hollowed messages for their electorate, may posture as champions of protecting European culture from oriental invaders. The latter have long been within the fences and often more or less integrated in the respective societies, thus the cry might be not only hypocritical but belated by a few decades. This is not to belittle the relevance of the challenge of fundamentalist Islam versus Euro-Islam for both sides/Tibi/B, 2008/, but this is an entirely different cup of tea, i.e. that of internal social rather than external economic and political integration.

If we wish to be sincere and constructive, general considerations should orientate particular ones, not the other way around, as it is most often the case in actual policy-making. The latter circumstance does, by no means, relieve analysts, especially of academic standing and aspiration, of detaching themselves from bad practices including instrumentalization and becoming directly subservient to various vested interests, be that business, political, party or just media effectiveness.

Enlarging the Europe of Six, Nine, Twelve and by now Twenty-Seven has always been a process of give and take. As documented in rich detail by an insider, former Commissioner Péter Balázs in a monograph 2002/ the Commission as a policy entrepreneur, supported more or less by some or most principal states, has always been involved in a process of 'selling' the European project. Whatever was the stage of development, it was described as best practice and benchmarking has constantly been attempted. While at one level this is inevitable, since any bureaucracy aims at standardization, this is not what the outcomes were. In short, during each enlargement new issue areas, agendas, concerns and often policies emerged. For this reason it is not realistic to expect that the Commission could or would not attempt to sell the entire currently existing acquis communautaire to any candidate country, irrespective of its size and aspirations. On the other hand, it would be equally misplaced for any candidate to ignore the overwhelming historical evidence cited above. In short, any accession may and does change the landscape.

It is equally important to avoid the flacy, especially frequently encountered in the polity and broader public opinion of large countries, which see any attempt by the Commission to follow its elementary mission statement, as interference in the internal affairs of the candidate country. The Commission, being an executive and supranational body, neither creates nor condones the rules of the game, as those evolve by decisions of the member governments sitting on the Council, and put in final form by the legislative of the European Parliament, directly elected by the citizens in separate vote. Therefore changing certain fundamentals is possible only from within, but such changes are by no means improbable. Alas, this is one of the major incentive for any country to join in, as long as it shares the values and concrete objectives of the Community.

If we perceive thus Europeanization as a dynamic and also evolutionary process that is always in the making, and the outcome is often the spontaneous and non-intended- thus quite Hayekian- outcome of side effects of complex bargaining strategies among a variety of players cf also more recently Hesse and Toonen, eds 2008/], there is no objective way to define the limits of Europe, also definitely not ex ante. While geographically Europe spreads from Iceland to the Urals, the central geographical location of Kyrgyzstan does not allow for the country to qualify for EU membership now or in the future, owing to its cultural, historic, ethnic and political features.

According to traditions of the EU geography is not decisive. For instance the overseas territories of Aruba-Caribbean- for the Netherlands or French Polynesia and New Caledonia for France- both in the south Pacific- not only are eligible for cohesion funding, but inhabitants may vote not only for the respective national assemblies, but also for the European Parliament elections. These examples show also that history, in terms of crusades or cannibalism, does not seem to be a major constituent factor.

---

2 WALLACE et al (eds 2005) describe in great detail eg how cohesion policies emerged as an answer to the challenges of southern enlargement, while environmental and social policies to those of northern enlargement.

4 Its capital city, Bishkek, is about equal distance from Petersburg and Vienna.
On the other hand the quality of institutional system, political, legal and economic, does seem to matter. For instance the intertwining of criminality, business and state seems to be a major hindrance on the road of integrating the western balkans states, who were offered a full European perspective at the 2003 Thessaloniki Council. By contrast, Ukraine, despite its Orange revolution, and recent joining the WTO in July 2006 does not qualify as a country with a market economy in the sense of the EU. Also political democracy has been shown to be more fragile than most of us, especially from neighboring Hungary, would have liked to see in the 2004-2009 period. The influence of oligarchic groups on polity, the weakness of judiciary, corruption and political infighting, often via rather unconventional means, not least the economic collapse in 2008-2009 render the prospects of eventual membership in the EU dim. The open involvement of Russia in Ukrainian body politic, not least via sending over the former Premier Chernomyrdin as ambassador, and the recurring claims over the way energy policy is being managed/publicized by the clashes in the winter of 2006 and 2009/ all cast doubt about how robust the independence of that country is in the longer term perspective.

In short, while nobody doubts the Europeanness of Ukraine, this does not automatically translate into EU membership either now or in any future period. Likewise, the Swiss and Norwegian voters, by sinking the already negotiated deals with the EU, have let elites to know that vital strategic decisions over the future of any democratic country is in the hands of its electorate, not its bureaucracy or polity. Likewise the 2008 Irish veto of the Reform Treaty of Lisbon must have served as a wake-up call for anybody who conceived EU matters to be those of technocratic, legal or institutional convenience and rationality only.

What follows from our resoning is no more and no less, than EU membership, enlargement and enlargeability has remained, as before, a matter of political economy games. The EU, from its part, is unlikely to enlarge, unless at least two preconditions are met. 1. To change current practices with a focus on redistribution and appearance, in fave of efficiency and joint value added and 2. Develop a long run, twenty year perspective on its own role in managing global issues and its neighborhood. The latter should include the re-confirmation of its original mission statement, one of creating paece and security, stability and cooperation in Europe as a whole. This is not the same as the debate on dairy quotas.

On the other hand, any candidate country should care and invest into building up a constituency favoring accession. This constituency is first of all within the country itself. But equally important is the building up of a constituency among the incumbents, fighting prejudices, perceived and real dangers. In short, accession is a change which is unlikely to happen without mastering it indetail, which is a deeply political, strategic and economic enterprise.

Since Turkey has gone a long way from the first association agreement of 1963 to launching membership negotiations in October 2005 in developing both its economy, society and its forms of cooperation with the EU, it stands a realistic chance to manage the task successfully. Given the free movement of persons, the customs union, and especially the accelerated legal harmonization since 1999 the process does not start from nil. It is, however a multiple set of equations, with no trivial solutions at hand. Lessons from the eastward enlargement/Onis,2004/ should be studied and made use of.

What we tried to contribute to by this essay has been to clarify the points of references, the analytical frame and the discourse in which constructive and strategically forward looking options can be formulated in an operational fashion for analyses and policy-making alike. While we are convinced, that the potential exists, we are less sure about the "inevability" of a favorable, win-win outcome. Not least because of the foot-dragging within the EU, and the very uncertain perspectives of reforming both decision-making and expenditure priorities. We can only hope that the challenge of the global economic crisis and being confronted with the 'costs of non Europe', to paraphrase an old strategic document, will provide the much needed impetus to overcome the current scenario of muddling through and doing nothing, while the ship has already started to sink.

REFERENCES


BARBÉ, E. And JOHANSSON-NOGUES,E./2008/: EU as a modest 'force for good' - the European Neighborhood Policy. International Affairs/Chatham House/, vol.84.no.1.pp81-96.


IVÁN,G./2008/: Bevezetés az EU költségtérésbe/An introduction to the budgetary system and policies of the EU/. Budapest: Osiris.


